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ABSTRACT  
   
Political and economic competition, so goes the broad argument, reduce 
corruption because competition increases the cost of actors to engage in corrupt 
practices. It increases the risk of exposure, provides non-corrupt alternatives for 
consumers, and introduces non-corrupt practices into the political and economic 
domains. Why then, has corruption persisted in the Central Eastern European countries 
decades after the introduction of political and economic competition in the early 1990s?  
This dissertation asks how and why the emergence of competition in the political 
and economic domains leads to a transformation of the patterns of corruption. I define 
corruption as an act involving a public official who violates the norms or regulations of 
their office, receives some compensation in return, and thus harms the public interest.  
I argue that under conditions of a communist past and high levels of uncertainty, 
the simultaneous emergence of political and economic competition transforms the 
opportunity structures of actors to engage in corruption. The resulting constellation of 
powerful incentives for and weak constraints against corruption encourages political and 
economic actors to enter into corrupt state-business relationships. Finally, the resource 
distribution between the actors in the corrupt state-business relationship determines the 
type of corruption that emerges—legal corruption, local capture, or covert political 
financing.  
To test the causal mechanism, I employ intensive process-tracing of the micro-
causal mechanisms of eleven corruption cases in Poland and Hungary. Using paired 
comparisons of cases from the same business sector but at different points in time, the 
dissertation examines how corruption patterns transformed over time in Poland and 
Hungary.  
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The dissertation shows that the emergence of political and economic competition 
changes the opportunity structures of actors in favor of corruption. Moreover, the new 
constellation of incentives and constraints encourages political and economic actors to 
establish corrupt state-business relationships. Crucially, I find that the resource 
distribution within these corrupt relationships determines the type of corruption 
emerges—local capture where both sides have concentrated resources that balance each 
other out, legal corruption when a strong economic actor confronts a fragmented 
political actor, and covert political financing when a weak economic actor faces a strong 
political actor. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite all the structural changes the Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries have experienced since their transition towards democracy and the process of 
acceding to the European Union (EU), these countries still experience far higher levels of 
corruption than the older member states of the EU, even 10 years after EU accession.1 
For instance, the corruption-perception scores of the CEE countries have seen little 
improvement despite the implementation of various direct and indirect factors 
supposedly constraining competition, as Figure 1.1 shows.  
Scholars and policy-makers alike touted the benefits of competition, that is, the 
increase in the number of actors involved in a domain, as a cure to corruption. 
Competition, so goes the broad argument, breaks up old corruption patterns by shedding 
light on them and/or increasing accountability of these actors. A large body of research 
also supports the idea. They find that higher economic growth and/or democracy are 
closely associated with lower levels of corruption (Barth, Lin, Lin, & Song, 2009, 
pp. 361–388; Emerson, 2006, pp. 193–212; Escobar-Lemmon & Ross, 2014, pp. 175–
188; Fisman & Gatti, 2002, pp. 325–345; Gerring & Thacker, 2004, pp. 295–330; 
Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2005, p. 573)—both concepts representing the idea that an 
increase in actors (either in the market or in politics) reduce corruption. Such 
correlations are captivating, but commonly share two weaknesses.  
                                                        
1 Despite the importance of finding an appropriate definition and the decades of research on corruption, no 
commonly accepted definition has yet emerged. I will go into the details of how I conceptualize corruption in 
this dissertation in chapter 2. Broadly, I follow the definition used by a majority of scholars and policy-
makers: corruption as the abuse of entrusted power. 
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Figure 1.1:'Control of Corruption' Scores in Poland and Hungary, 1990-2014 
First, we still have little information available on how competition-oriented 
reforms across the areas of politics and the economy interact with each other and impact 
corruption. Research on competition and corruption focuses mostly on a single 
competitive process (Fisman & Gatti, 2002; Gerring & Thacker, 2005, pp. 233–254; 
Golden & Chang, 2001, pp. 588–622; Grzymała-Busse, 2003, pp. 1123–1147; Grzymała-
Busse, 2007, pp. 91–110; O'Dwyer, 2006), thus neglecting to study their interactions. 
Such lack of information poses a significant problem for policy-makers as the impact on 
corruption by liberalizing reforms in multiple areas may not parallel those of liberalizing 
reform in a single area.  
Second, political economy research on corruption also does not take into account 
the emerging literature in the social sciences arguing that corruption varies not just in 
amounts, but in kinds, from one country to the next (Johnston, 2005; Mungiu-Pippidi, 
2015; Stephenson, 2015, pp. 92–133; Warner, 2007; Wedel, 2012, pp. 453–498). By 
implicitly assuming that all corruption is equal, previous studies did not consider the 
possibility of a transformation of corruption taking place (Bussell, 2015, 21-45), which in 
turn might explain the lack of research on the micro-causal mechanism that link 
competition to corruption (Beach & Pedersen, 2016; Yadav, 2011). 
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The dissertation therefore asks how and why the emergence of political and 
economic competition has transformed the patterns of corruption in the CEE countries? 
In other words, the dissertation seeks to establish that corruption patterns transform 
over time, and that competition transforms these patterns in a systematic manner. To 
address the first part, I develop a framework that allows me capture systematically 
change in corruption across time and country.2 To answer the second part of the research 
question, I will illuminate the ‘black box’ that surrounds our understanding of how 
competition shapes corruption. 
The Argument & Research Approach 
I argue that the causal mechanism through which the emergence of competition 
transforms the patterns of corruption in a country occurs in three steps. The emergence 
of political and economic competition transforms the opportunity structures, that is the 
incentives and constraints, of actors in these domains to engage in corruption. The new 
constellation of incentives and constraints encourages the political and economic actors 
to form corrupt state-business relationships. And finally, the resource distribution 
between political and economic actors within the corrupt state-business relationship 
determines the type of corruption that emerges. Specifically, I suggest that the various 
arrangements that result from either a concentrated or fragmented political actor that 
interacts with either a concentrated or fragmented economic actor determine the specific 
type of corruption that emerges. 
The research sets up a paired comparison where I compare the variation in 
corruption patterns in several matched corruption cases within two CEE countries. I 
                                                        
2 Already Scott (1972) pointed out the inherent difficulty in comparing corruption across time and space. 
The challenges are also part of the reason for why scholarship has largely relied on one single measurement 
indicator for cross country comparisons, 
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select two countries from the CEE region to reduce the likelihood that findings in a single 
country are surprising outliers. Within each country, I examine multiple corruption cases 
characterized by varying business sectors and the time period they have occurred. This 
allows me to explore the transformation of patterns and the micro-causal mechanism 
through which competition impacts corruption, while holding key structural variables 
constant across space, and in some cases, over time. Specifically, I compare five pairs of 
closed corruption cases that have taken place in the same business sector but at different 
stages of the competitive processes. 
To test the argument, I will use process tracing, a qualitative method which 
allows me to systematically uncover the inner workings of the causal black box that 
surrounds the link between competition and corruption.3 At its core, process-tracing, as 
employed in this research, has four steps. In the first step, I theorize the proposed causal 
mechanism and the individual causal claims within the mechanism in the form of 
entities and their activities. In a second step, I operationalize the various parts of the 
causal mechanism, making predictions about the evidence I expect to find if the causal 
mechanism worked as proposed. These propositions are, in essence, the process-tracing 
equivalent of operationalizing a concept, just that I operationalize the entire causal 
mechanism by specifying the activities of entities that move the causal force towards the 
outcome in question (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). These two steps occur in chapter 2. The 
third step clarifies the evidence that I expect to encounter as I describe the various forms 
the evidence can take and how it relates to the concepts of interests. In this step, I also 
present the evaluation criteria I use for the evidence to assess how well the collected 
                                                        
3 There is a rapidly expanding literature on process tracing, its strengths and weaknesses, and the various 
approaches that are emerging within (see, Kay & Baker (2015, pp. 1-21) for a recent review of the literature). 
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evidence supports the theorized causal mechanism. I describe this step in chapter 3. In 
the last step, I evaluate the collected evidence in light of whether it corroborates or 
invalidates the propositions derived from the causal mechanism, taking place in Chapter 
4 and 5. 
Contribution & Significance 
The dissertation intends to contribute to contribute to social science scholarship 
and policy-making in several ways. First, it contributes to scholarship substantively by 
demonstrating that corruption patterns transform in a country, not disappear, and that 
such a transformation in corruption patterns is systemic, stemming from the underlying 
change in resource distribution between political and economic actors, and not from any 
industry-specific factors. Second, the dissertation also improves our methodological tool 
set as I refined process tracing to systematically trace the micro-causal mechanisms that 
links the emergence of competition to the transformation of corruption. In particular, I 
have adjusted existing approaches of process-tracing to deal with subject matters that 
thrive in the dark and where it is particularly important to systematically evaluate the 
evidence that appears in various forms and shapes. Corruption is difficult to study as it 
thrives on remaining unknown, and corrupt actors have incentives to distort the truth. 
Finally, the dissertation also contributes to a clearer understanding of how corruption 
operates. Corrupt actors are constantly adapting to changes in their environment and 
finding weaknesses in any anti-corruption system. As the study reveals, anti-corruption 
practitioners that place their hope in a single anti-corruption agency as the cure for to 
the problem will be disappointed. Any oversight institution can be subverted by 
motivated corrupt actors. The implications for policy-makers are therefore to focus on 
establishing a strong anti-corruption system instead of relying on a single agency to deter 
corrupt actors. 
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Outline of Dissertation 
Chapter 2 discusses the major concepts of interests for this research, in particular 
the concept of ‘patterns of corruption’ and state-business relationships, before 
developing the theoretical argument. The chapter starts by presenting the attributes for 
an event or behavior to be considered corruption. It then introduces the concept of 
‘patterns of corruption,’ where I deliberately distinguish between corruption types and 
activities, and discusses the causal attributes of the three main types of corruption that 
will be used to assess the transformation of corruption patterns in the CEE countries. 
The chapter also explains in more detail the first and second steps of process tracing to 
explain why the theoretical argument is presented in a slightly unorthodox format. 
Briefly, instead of following the traditional format of reviewing the full literature before 
deriving several hypotheses, I divide the theorized causal mechanisms into its three main 
components. I review the literature for each of these components, labeled causal claim 1, 
2, and 3, separately before I derive testable propositions. This is one difference to the 
more traditional format. The second difference lies in how the three causal claims and 
the propositions are framed, that is in terms of entities and activities. Next, I develop the 
complete causal mechanism, its three components—causal claims 1, 2, and 3—and their 
propositions that I expect to observe in Poland and Hungary. The propositions are not 
only derived from a review of the literature, but they also take case specific contexts into 
consideration. 
Chapter 3 describes the case selection process for Poland and Hungary and the 
corruption cases within each country. The chapter also covers the research design and 
how I intent to establish causality. The chapter then moves on to clarify how I identify 
the concepts of interests, including laying out clearly what indicators I use to distinguish 
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between the three types of corruption. Finally, I describe the data collection process and 
address the issues of reliability and validity of the sources. 
Chapter 4 and 5 are the core of the dissertation as they explore the 
transformation of corruption patterns in Poland and Hungary. The chapters have an 
identical outline. In each chapter, I briefly describe the political and economic context in 
which these countries transitioned as well as discuss its baseline corruption. The first 
substantive part in each chapter examines how corruption patterns have transformed in 
each country. I take the selected corruption cases for each country, paired by sector, and 
categorize the corruption type and activities of each case. The findings provide a first 
answer to the larger research question of how and why competition has transformed the 
patterns of corruption in the CEE countries. The second part of the chapter then analyzes 
in-depth the causal mechanism that links the emergence of political and economic 
competition to the transformation of corruption patterns. 
In chapter 4, I explore the transformation of the patterns of corruption in Poland. 
Six major findings emerge from the analysis. First, I find that the types of corruption, 
contrary to expectations, have not changed over time in Poland. I attribute this to 
particular features of the political system that encourage a fragmented political system, 
where political parties face extensive political competition from within their own ranks 
but also across parties. Second, despite this apparent lack of transformation, when 
probing the four corruption cases that resemble legal corruption, I find that they vary 
significantly in their micro-causal mechanisms, hinting at variation in the underlying 
resource distribution between political and economic actors in the relationship. Third, I 
find no variation in the patterns of corruption across industries, which is contrary what a 
number of other scholars have found. Fourth, process-tracing the causal mechanism that 
links the emergence of political and economic competition to a systematic 
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transformation of corruption patterns supports the theorized causal mechanism and the 
individual causal claims. Fifth, two corruption cases took place around the same time 
and involved the same political party. The cases differ however in the type of corruption. 
Tracing the underlying causal mechanism reveals clearly that the resource distribution 
between the political and economic actors differed, explaining the difference in the 
corruption type. Six, I find that corrupt actors were able to subvert or deactivate existing 
control mechanisms in place to deter corruption. This presents a worrisome implication 
as it reveals that even if strong anti-corruption agencies exist, they can be manipulated 
and so rendered ineffective. 
Chapter 5 investigates the transformation of corruption patterns in Hungary. Five 
major findings emerge. First, the categorized cases display a variation in the types of 
corruption across time, in line with my expectations. All cases taking place in the early 
nineties resemble covert political financing corruption while the cases in the first decade 
of the twenty-first century classify as local capture types. Second, I again find no 
variation in the types of corruption across business-sectors, which corroborates the 
findings in Poland. Third, process-tracing the selected corruption cases also shows 
strong support for the theorized causal mechanism, supporting my previous findings. 
Fourth, one of the selected corruption cases enables me to explore how a change in the 
resource distribution between the same political and economic actors transforms the 
type of corruption. The case reveals that with a change in the resource distribution 
between the actors, the type of corruption transforms. Finally, as in the case of Poland, 
corrupt actors successfully deactivated several control mechanisms. 
Chapter 6 discusses the main findings that have emerged for these two cases 
studies. The chapter also reviews the major contributions this dissertation makes as well 
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as highlights some of its limitations. It then concludes the dissertation by sketching out 
avenues of future research. 
  10 
CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The first step in answering the question of how and why the emergence of 
competition transformed the patterns of corruption present in a country is to define the 
key terms in more detail as well as lay out the causal mechanism and its individual parts. 
The first part of the chapter, therefore, focuses on the concepts of interests. Having a 
clear understanding of what the terms means is crucial to follow the logic of the causal 
mechanism, presented in the second part of the chapter. I conclude by discussing briefly 
the scope and limitation of the theory. 
I will begin by examining the definitions of corruption before presenting the 
framework of ‘Patterns of Corruption.’ The introduction of the framework is vital as 
current typologies of corruption are static and ill-equipped to capture changes in the 
dynamics of corruption. Additional key concepts that I will discuss in this part are the 
state-business relationship, capturing the way political and economic actors interact, as 
well as political and economic competition. 
The second half of the chapter focuses on presenting the causal logic of why and 
how competition transforms corruption patterns. Before I go into details, however, I 
briefly describe the process-tracing approach I use as it shapes how I frame the causal 
mechanism and present my claims. I then develop the theorized causal mechanism 
through which the emergence of political and economic competition transforms the 
opportunity structures of political and economic actors to engage in corruption. This new 
constellation of powerful incentives and weak constraints encourages political and 
economic actors to form a corrupt state-business relationship. The final step which 
determines the type of corruption that emerges is the resource distribution within these 
corrupt state-business relationships. I present the argument in its three separate 
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components by reviewing the existing literature and deriving case-specific propositions. I 
summarize the argument in the penultimate section, labeled ‘Argument Roadmap’. The 
last substantive section of the chapter describes the scope and limitations of the 
argument. 
Concepts of Interest 
In order to understand how the emergence of competition in politics and the 
economy transforms corruption forms, it is instructive to clarify the concepts. Below, I, 
therefore, lay out how the key concepts of interests (corruption and patterns of 
corruption, state-business relationships, and political and economic competition) are 
defined and used in this dissertation.  
Explanation of ‘Patterns of Corruption’ 
In this section, I develop my conceptualization of corruption and what I mean 
with ‘Patterns of Corruption’. Two important clarifications, however, need to be made 
upfront. First, while the framework ‘Patterns of Corruption’ could have been expanded to 
include far more corruption types and activities—its core dimensions—I have limited it 
to those forms that I expect, based on an extensive review of the literature, to occur most 
frequently in the CEE countries. All of these forms need to fulfill the key attributes of 
corruption. Second, I am focused on the (observable) behavior of actors rather than 
developing an all-encompassing terminology. Thus, while I follow the conventional 
understanding of each corruption form, for the sake of analytical clarity, I have refined 
their definitions as needed. 
Definition of corruption 
The majority of corruption definitions can be traced back to Nye’s (1989) 
definition of corruption as "behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public 
role because of private regarding (personal, close family, private clique), pecuniary or 
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status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private regarding 
influence." (Nye, 1989, p. 966). Over time, however, a more popular view of corruption 
as an “abuse of entrusted power for private gain” emerged (Transparency International, 
2009, p. 18).  
Within these two versions, a host of interpretations exist, varying on such 
features as whether corruption needs to involve a public official (Della Porta & Vannucci, 
2006, pp. 23–44; Fisman & Golden, 2017) or not (Schweitzer, 2005, pp. 16–39; 
Stephenson, 2015, p. 92), and whether an event or behavior needs to violate laws (Della 
Porta & Vannucci, 2006; Fisman & Golden, 2017; Stephenson, 2015) or only violate 
norms associated with an office or position (den Nieuwenboer & Kaptein, 2008, pp. 133–
146; Lessig, 2011; Mulcahy, 2012, 2015; Transparency International, 2009, p. 18; Wedel, 
2012). In addition, several conceptualizations of corruption also include the criterion of 
‘harming the public’s interest’ or something similar to it (Lessig, 2013, pp. 2–4; Wedel, 
2012) or they highlight that it is less about the ‘private gain’ for an official and more 
about how she provided some benefit to a third party (Thompson, 1993, pp. 369–381). A 
final aspect on which definitions differ is whether it only involves individuals (Della 
Porta & Vannucci, 2006; Fisman & Golden, 2017; Stephenson, 2015) or whether groups 
or organizations can instigate corruption as well (Lessig, 2013; Teorell, 2007; Wedel, 
2012; Yadav, 2011). Despite such a diverse set of views on what constitutes corruption, 
these interpretations share four core elements—an actor has been granted some kind of 
authority or power, there exist commonly accepted norms that regulate the way the actor 
ought to use her powers, the actor violates these norms, and such a violation benefits the 
actor in some form (Warren, 2004, pp. 328–343). 
Given the difficulty of defining corruption, I want to lay out the key attributes of 
the concept as used in this research project. The aim is to increase the concept’s 
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usefulness by connecting it to my causal argument. As such, I view the following four 
attributes as both sufficient and necessary for a situation or behavior to constitute 
corruption: 
1. Involvement of a political decision-maker  
The first attribute of corruption is that it involves a political decision-maker. This 
can be any public official, who is representing the state or a political organization in the 
course of fulfilling her duties and responsibilities, and either has decision-making power, 
can influence the outcome of a decision, or has set up expectations that she would be 
able to so.  
2. Who has violated the regulations or norms governing the public office 
Second, the public official has violated the laws or the social norms that govern 
the exercise of the official’s position. By social norms, I mean the commonly accepted 
expectations and principles that society considers to be appropriate forms of behavior 
(Ostrom, 2008, pp. 819–848). It is less about establishing what these norms are, but 
about identifying whether, and if so how, any actor violates such norms. As a rule of 
thumb, if a reasonable person considers that a political decision-makers has violated 
these norms, a situation or behavior is corrupt, under the conditions that it also fulfills 
the three other attributes as well. Violating the norms of office, therefore, is broader than 
the legal criteria, as it also includes instances were no laws were broken (Thompson, 
1993). Such violations are, for instance, excluding individuals or groups from processes 
or systems, despite them having a commonly accepted claim to be included in said 
processes or systems (Warren, 2004). In other words, the official’s behavior violates one 
of the basic tenets of democracy—that laws and regulations are implemented impartially 
Cupit, 2000; Rothstein & Teorell, 2008, pp. 165–190).  
3. The official receives some kind of compensation 
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The third attribute that a situation or event needs to possess to constitute 
corruption is that the public official receives compensation for his behavior in some 
form, not necessarily financially. Especially in more established democracies, a direct 
exchange of goods or services for cash is rare (Johnston, 2005). Instead, benefits take on 
more indirect forms, such as campaign contributions, fully paid vacations or by 
increasing the public official’s status or prestige (Nye, 1989, p. 966; Transparency 
International, 2009, p. 39).  
4. The situation or act harms the public’s interest 
Corruption’s fourth attribute is likely the most debated one since the ‘public’s 
interest’ can be interpreted in a variety of ways. I follow Lessig’s (2013) view that an act 
as having harmed the public’s interests if it weakens the effective functioning of a state’s 
entities. This notion is also closely related to Rothstein and Teorell’s (2008) emphasis 
that the violation of the democratic principle of impartiality harms the society. Harming 
the public’s interests can, therefore, also occur if an act or situation undermines the 
efficacy of the democratic process (Thompson, 1993; Thompson, 1995).4 
While these four attributes provide some conceptual clarity, the problem of 
identifying changes in corruption still remains. Even though there exist a multitude of 
corruption typologies or almost typologies (see, for instance, Heidenheimer, Johnston, 
and LeVine (1989) and Søreide (2014) for an overview), they are not able to differentiate 
and categorize a larger variety of corruption forms, while simultaneously capturing 
changes in corruption dynamics in a country over time. One exception is Graycar’s 
(2015) TASP-framework, which allows researchers to categorize any corruption case 
                                                        
4 Another reason for including this attribute is that corruption that affects the public utility sector or social 
welfare has particular pernicious effects on the public. 
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based on the type of corruption involved, the activities used to achieve it, the sector in 
which it took place, and the place where it occurred. However, the framework was 
developed to capture corruption at the lower levels of bureaucracy and not for corruption 
cases involving members of the national political and economic elites of a country. But in 
contrast to other typologies, by distinguishing between corrupt activities and corrupt 
outcomes, the TASP framework is suitable to get to the specific causal mechanisms 
through which actors operate. I take therefore Graycar’s (2015) typology, in particular 
the distinction between types and activities, as a starting point, to expand the idea 
behind ‘patterns of corruption’. 
Identifying of ‘Patterns of Corruption’5 
 ‘Patterns of corruption’ refers to the prevalent configuration of types and 
activities of corruption that actors (e.g., individuals, organizations, or institutions) 
employ in a place (e.g., market sector, federal government, municipality, or other state 
entities). To keep the research manageable and not overextend the usefulness of the 
concept, I only focus on corrupt activities that lead to corrupt outcomes, excluding 
situations where corrupt activities lead to non-corrupt outcomes and non-corrupt 
activities lead to corrupt outcomes. Moreover, ‘patterns of corruption’ focuses just on 
two fundamental questions: ‘what happened?’ and ‘how was it done?’.6 Table 2.1 
summarizes the definition of patterns of corruption. 
                                                        
5 The inspiration for framing my typology in terms of patterns comes from Gutiérrez-Sanín & Wood (2017). 
6 While the questions of ‘who is involved?’, ‘where?’, and ‘how long?’ could have been included, adding any of 
these three dimensions would not have added enough theoretical clarity to offset the risk making the 
framework too complex. Take for instance of ‘where?’ a type of corruption has occurred. While some types of 
corruption are closely associated with a particular state entity or process, others are more general; if needed, 
such a distinction is therefore made captured in the definition of a particular type or activity. Similarly, 
several activities can be carried out by various actors in different circumstances. 
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Table 2.1: Explanation of ‘Patterns of Corruption' 
Dimension Definition Examplesa 
Type What happened? What 
are the (desired) 
outcomes? The prevalent 
kind of corruption that 
occurs in a place. 
Local Capture, Legal 
Corruption, Covert Political 
Finance, … 
Activity How actor(s) carry out 
corruption. The means 
to an end. Asking ‘how 
can you achieve intended 
outcomes noted above? 
(type of corruption)’ 
Patronage appointment, 
Perverting the course of 
justice, Extortion/ 
Solicitation of a bribe, 
Extortion/ Solicitation of 
campaign contributions, 
covert lobbying, providing 
information not intended 
for the recipient (insider 
information), … 
Note: aI will explain more about the various types of corruption below. 
Types of corruption refers to the desired corrupt outcome of actors. The attribute 
‘desired’ is based on the assumption that actors are behaving mostly rationally.7 Actors 
choose the desired type of corruption based on several factors including the general 
political and economic environment in which they operate, their main objectives, and the 
opportunity structure they face. By opportunity structure, I mean the incentives and 
constraints that guides actors’ behaviors by informing their cost-benefit calculation 
under conditions of uncertainty8. Last, the corruption types have different underlying 
dynamics and thus, various corrupt activities can lead to the same type, while the same 
activity can lead to multiple corruption types. The identification of an activity, therefore, 
makes no predictions about the type of corruption resulting from it and vice versa. 
Actors select corrupt activities (i.e., the “how”) based on their desired outcome 
(narrowly, the type of corruption, but more broadly their overarching objectives), the 
institutional environment surrounding them, and their resources. As such, while actors 
might have the same desired outcome and operate within similar environment, their 
means to achieve a desired objective might differ drastically, resulting in the selection of 
different corrupt activities.  
                                                        
7 I assume that actors are rational in the more informal sense of having a set of objectives that they want to 
achieve, and that they will follow the most efficient strategies to achieve them. For example, I assume that 
politicians are focused on their (re)election while economic actors’ objective is to maximize income. 
8 More on this in the section on ‘State-Business Relationships’. 
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The variety of paths that link corruption types and activities complicates any 
attempts of making theoretical predictions. As the following presentation on the type of 
corruption and the likely activities leading to them shows, several corrupt activities can 
be used to achieve multiple corruption types. The definition, aims, and core attributes of 
each corruption type are summarized in Table 2.2. 
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The first type of corruption in the framework is covert political finance, referring 
to a situation where political actors seek funding for some cause through nontransparent 
channels. The main objective of the recipient is to acquire resources (e.g., in cash or in 
kind) with as few commitments as possible in exchange, and where the acquisition 
remains hidden from the public and even other political or economic actors. Its key 
attributes are therefore that (a) the political actor has the power to offer nothing or just a 
few general concessions in exchange for a contribution, (b) the financing of a political 
cause occurs through channels that disguise, or at least attempt to disguise, the origin of 
the resource and/or its recipient, or (c) the political actor refuses to, or at least makes it 
unnecessary difficult, to disclose the origins of its funding, and that in either case, such 
corruption (d) excludes others that have a right to know about such a transaction. It is 
very closely connected to legal corruption and state capture but differs in its aim. Corrupt 
activities that lead to it are: 
• Various activities that can be subsumed under the term Covert lobbying9 
• Embezzlement 
• Reliance on personal and/or professional connections 
• Exploiting or soliciting a bribe10—the difference lies in the power balance 
between actors in an exchange. 
                                                        
9 Lobbying, in general, refers to any activity that is "carried out to influence a government or institution’s 
policies and decisions in favor of a specific cause or outcome" (Transparency International, 2009, p. 29). 
Covert lobbying activities, however, focus on remaining hidden and unregulated (Mulcahy, 2012, p. 27) and 
so harm the democratic process as they hinder citizens and other interest groups to know who is influencing 
how the policy-making process on what issues (Mulcahy, 2015, p. 8). Examples of covert lobbying activities 
are ‘revolving door’, referring "to the movement of individuals back and forth between public office and 
private companies, in order to exploit their period of service to the benefit of their current employer" 
(Mulcahy, 2012, p. 30) or influence-peddling, where private interests use their larger financial power to 
shape the institutional framework in their favor (Fisman and Golden, 2017, p. 44). 
10 In contrast to the aforementioned ‘covert lobbying activities’, the emphasis in this activity is on a one-time 
exchange, where monetary resources are exchanged for goods or services the bribe-giver would otherwise 
not receive. 
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• Lack of implementation or enforcement of rules and procedures that would 
provide greater transparency to interested citizens and interest groups 
• Lack of implementation or enforcement of rules and procedures that would 
require greater accountability of political actors to interested citizens and 
interest groups 
The second corruption type is legal corruption where established democratic 
channels and procedures are used to exercise undue influence on the policy-making 
process and so harms democratic procedures or principles (Lessig, 2011; Mulcahy, 2012, 
p. 10; Rothstein & Teorell, 2008; Thompson, 1993, p. 369). Legal corruption is, for 
instance, what happened around the 2012 World Cup hosted by Brazil. Before then, 
Brazil had a strict no-alcohol rule in its football stadiums, knowing that football and 
alcohol is a bad combination, especially as Brazil had the highest number of football 
related deaths of any nation between 2001 and 2010 (Chappell, March 7, 2012). FIFA, 
the international football association that holds the World Cup, pressured the Brazil 
government to legalize alcohol consumption in the stadiums during the Word Cup 
(Sanders, June 11, 2014). Or as one of the FIFA top-officials put it brazenly: "Alcoholic 
drinks are part of the FIFA World Cup, so we're going to have them. Excuse me if I sound 
a bit arrogant but that's something we won't negotiate" (Chappell, March 7, 2012).  
The aim of actors is not to intentionally violate a nation’s laws, even though this 
might happen, but to operate within a country’s laws and regulations to exercise their 
influence on the state’s institutions and actions (Johnston, 2005).11 What matters is that 
(a) it is either legal or falls into the gray areas of the law, (b) the public official receives 
                                                        
11 But as the example of FIFA and Brazil’s alcohol ban shows—such an influence might just be about 
changing laws so that actions will not further violate laws. 
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his/her benefits indirectly, either through campaign donations or in the form of prestige 
or status increase, (c) the economic actor receives a benefit, or increases its chances of 
receiving a benefit, to which they have claim anyway, and (d) the way the exchange took 
place is considered to be illegitimate by a majority of people (Mulcahy, 2012; Thompson, 
1993, p. 369). The issue is, therefore, one of lack of accountability or even impunity of 
the involved actors (Kaufmann & Vicente, 2011, 195-219; Wedel, 2014) and less of a 
clearly identifiable violation of laws. Examples of common activities that result in legal 
corruption are: 
• Covert lobbying 
• Creating or exploiting conflict of interest situations 
• Reliance on personal and/ or professional connections.  
• Lack of implementation or enforcement of rules and procedures that would 
provide greater transparency to interested citizens and interest groups 
• Lack of implementation or enforcement of rules and procedures that would 
require greater accountability of political actors to interested citizens and 
interest groups 
The third type of corruption is local capture, referring to the capture of either 
specific state procedures or organizations by actors. The former capture can result in 
political actors gaining control over a particular public procedure and so controlling the 
distribution of state assets. The latter refers to the situation where political or economic 
actors manage, or attempt, to get control over one or a few state entities. The aim of both 
modes is to subvert the effectiveness of a state entity or procedure so that it is beneficial 
to a selected group of actors by allowing them to either shape the creation or at least the 
implementation of laws and regulations. 
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Consider the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), which has a steady 
exchange going on between its employees and the senior members of the firms the 
commission is tasked with regulating. When in 2012, the chair of the commission pushed 
for a tighter regulation of the money market funds, a move strongly supported by several 
former chairmen of the commission as the money market funds where one of the major 
triggers of the 2008-2009 financial crisis, former SEC employees played a crucial role in 
lobbying the SEC to withdraw the proposal. One of these former employees was Laura 
Unger, a past SEC commissioner who even held the position of acting chairman of the 
commission for a short time. By 2012, however, she was a special adviser to the 
consulting firm Promontory Financial Group, which in turn, worked for Fidelity 
Investments, one of the dominant players in the industry (Project on Government 
Oversight, 2013). 
The case highlights one of the major danger of local capture; namely, the 
potential of violating the democratic principle of impartiality by undermining agency’s 
independence in the impartial fulfillment of its duties. Thus, among the key 
characteristics of local capture are that (a) it is done by political actors to manipulate a 
state procedure or agency to work in their favor, (b) the functioning of the captured 
entity is now violating either the principle of impartiality, in the case of state institutions, 
or harms the public’s interests, in the case of capture of a procedure, and (c) the capture 
benefits a few actors at the expense of actors with a right of inclusion, and (d) it breaks 
with previously established regulations and norms for such processes. Some of the 
corrupt activities that can lead to local capture are: 
• Patronage appointments 
• Perverting the course of justice 
• Covert lobbying 
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• Exploiting or soliciting a bribe 
• Providing inside information 
• Reliance on personal and/or professional connections. 
In addition to these three main types of corruption, established research on 
corruption in the CEE countries also revealed three additional types of corruption—
Corruption involving the Sale of Public Assets, Public Procurement Corruption, and 
State Capture. The first two involve corruption in the process of selling or purchasing of 
public goods. The third type is about a far more excessive capture of policies, procedures, 
and state agencies. While these are common types of corruption in the CEE countries, I 
consider them all subtypes of local capture because they are either specify what 
procedure or state agency has been captured or are a larger, more far-reaching version of 
local capture. In the case of state capture, the main distinction is the number of state 
agencies that have been captured. The moment at which local capture evolves into state 
capture is fluid; what matters is that at some point all of the key agencies of the state 
apparatus have been captured by a group of actors for their own benefits. In the case-
studies, I will note in the case of local capture, whether one of these three types has 
occurred.  
To summarize, I view a situation or behavior as corruption when it fulfills all four 
attributes: a) involves a political decision-maker, b) the behavior violates established 
norms norms and/or formal laws and procedures, c) the official receives some kind of 
remuneration and d) the actions harmed the public interest. As current typologies on 
corruption are not well suited to capture changes in the forms of corruption, I then 
present the framework of ‘Patterns of Corruption.’ Here, I differentiate corruption forms 
by examining whether they achieve a particular outcome, that is, are a type of corruption 
(What happened?), or whether they are a channel to generate an outcome, that is, are an 
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activity of corruption (How did it happen?). Based on a survey of the existing theoretical 
and empirical research on corruption in the CEE countries, I identified three common 
types of corruption (Covert Political Financing, Legal Corruption, and Local Capture), 
established their causal attributes, and discussed some of the likely activities that 
generate a particular type of corruption. 
Explanation of ‘State-Business Relationships’ 
State-business relationships encapsulate a broad spectrum of ties between a 
diverse set of actors. Broadly, I refer to the longer-term connections between political 
and economic actors. Actors are the main agents in the political and economic 
dimensions.12 The particular interactions of interest are any exchange of resources 
between political and economic actors that allows them to pursue their particular 
interests at the expense of the public over a longer period. The exchange does not need to 
occur every time they interact, nor does it occur on a direct quid-pro-quo basis. 
The core attributes of such state-business relations are the elements that shape 
the patterns of corruption in a country and are both necessary and sufficient to consider 
links between political and economic actors as corrupt state-business relations. First, as 
the term ‘relationship’ implies, the interaction refers to the complex interactions that go 
on over a longer period of time. While the particular time span is difficult to narrow 
down, I can say what is definitely excluded: a one-off interaction between political and 
economic actors in a highly structured, coordinated, and regulated environment. 
                                                        
12 With political actors I mean individuals or organizations with the legal mandate to represent the interests 
of the public, such as current or former politicians at the national and local levels in the parliament, 
ministers and prime minister, the president, political parties and their factions, patronage appointees, and 
senior bureaucrats in state organizations. Economic actor includes any individual or entity that operates in 
the private sectors, such as firms, corporations, self-employed individuals, and state-owned enterprises. In 
short, the main distinction lies in the source of the actors’ power. 
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Second, the relationship is about the exchange of resources. This exchange does 
not need to occur every time they interact, nor does it occur on a direct quid-pro-quo 
basis. Also, the resources exchanged go beyond money, but can include access to state 
assets, the ability to introduce legislation or circumvent a regulation, provide knowhow 
and expertise, or entry to financial markets. Third, through this exchange the actors gain 
access to resources which are either restricted or the way they have been acquired has 
excluded actors that would had a right of inclusion. This element ensures that I focus 
only on relationships that involve corruption as viewed in this dissertation. 
What shapes now the corrupt interactions between power and wealth? Assuming 
that the overall aim of actors is the driving force behind their behavior, economic actors 
will want to reduce uncertainty (Collins, Uhlenbruck, & Rodriguez, 2009, pp. 89–108; 
Markus & Charnysh, 2017, pp. 1632–1665; Winters, 2011), gain a competitive advantage 
through (almost) any means possible (Sadrich & Annavarjulia, 2003, pp. 465–502) or a 
combination of both. Political actors will also want to reduce uncertainty about their 
future. They can minimize uncertainty by aiming to gain access to economic capital to 
finance their political campaigns and, in many newer democracies, to gain control over 
the state apparatus (Innes, 2014, pp. 88–104; Johnston, 2005; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015; 
Yadav, 2011). In either case, under certain conditions that I will explain when presenting 
my argument, these aims create mutual interests between political and economic actors. 
Other factors shaping their interactions are the actors’ opportunity structures, that is the 
incentives and constraints they face, which shape the actor’s cost-benefit assessment, as 
well as the distribution of means between them. 
With incentives, I refer to anything that motivates an action to behave in a 
particular way and are the product of an actor’s environment and the behavior of its 
fellow actors in the field. For instance, incentives to form a state-business relation are 
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shared interests as either side can offer the other something of value, while incentives for 
corrupt behavior could be competitive pressures or access to a cash-cow, that is, a 
financially lucrative situation where actors have control over or access to valuable public 
resources. Perverse incentives are incentives that have unintended and undesirable 
consequences for the incentive makers contrary to their interests, such as it happened 
with the introduction of unconstrained competition in the CEE transition countries. 
Incentives for political and economic actors to join forces and gain from a 
situation takes on various forms. One major incentive is the behavior of other actors in a 
market or an institution. Several business surveys found that managers deliberate about 
their competitor’s behavior when deciding whether to employ corruption. Martin, 
Cullen, Johnson, and Parboteeah (2007), for instance, analyzed 3,769 firms operating in 
38 countries and found that corruption by a firm’s competitors has a significant positive 
impact on a firm’s own propensity to employ corruption. Søreide’s (2006) survey of 
Norwegian firms support these findings. In another survey done in 2006, out of 350 
senior decision-makers at or near board level of international companies from Brazil, 
France, Germany, Hong Kong, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States, 43 percent thought that they have lost new business opportunities to competitors 
in the last five years because of bribe payments by said competitor (Control Risks Group 
Limited & Simmons & Simmons, 2006). Incentives can also come in the form of a major 
influx of foreign aid and investments or the access to valuable public resources (said 
cash-cows). Having the right connections is another way incentives show up, as is having 
the right personal or professional connections, which increase the size of an actor’s and 
so increases their options. As multiple studies have highlighted, an individual rarely has 
all these resources and powers under their control (see, for instance, Cartier-Bresson, 
1997, pp. 463–476; Della Porta & Vannucci, 1999; Gambetta, 1993; Heilbrunn, 2005, 
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pp. 277–296). As a result, networks form where the participants take on the various roles 
that need to be filled. This may be one reason for political and economic actors to join 
forces and establish longer-term relations. 
In contrast to incentives, deterrents refer to those elements in an environment 
that constrain actor’s behavior (North, 1992). In short, they are the specific elements in 
an actor’s environment that determine the actor’s expectation of success by shaping the 
cost-part of the cost-benefit equation. Notice that just because an actor has the 
incentives to employ corruption, depending on the deterrents in place, it might be 
impossible for them to succeed. 
Common formal constraints are oversight agencies responsible for holding 
political and economic actors accountable, such as law enforcement, audit offices, civil 
society, media, and an independent judiciary. Having alternative options available, such 
as being able to report on a corrupt actor to the authorities, reduces the likelihood that 
economic actors will enter in a corrupt relationship with political actors significantly 
(Chen, Yaşar, & Rejesus, 2008, pp. 231–244). Also, regulations and their enforcement 
can be potential deterrents for corrupt behavior as studies on conflict-of-interest 
regulations, freedom of information laws, and lobbying regulations show. Informal 
deterrents are among others the prevailing social norms surrounding an actor (see, 
Fisman and Golden (2017) for an overview of recent works), but also include the 
behavior of fellow actors in a market. These actors are likely to profit from reporting any 
wrongdoings by a corrupt competitor to reduce the number of actors in their market 
(Heller, Kyriacou, & Roca-Sagales, 2016, pp. 681–701). 
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Means refers to the possible rent-generating resources each side has available.13 
For political actors, their dominant rent-generating resource is their political capital that 
increases with their political power. Political actors that managed to concentrate their 
political power in the legislation can then deliver their promises they made to their 
donors (Yadav, 2011) or can shape the political processes by passing laws, appointing 
personnel, and approve budgets for state agencies. This goes beyond having a monopoly 
status over a resource, such as private information or policy-making decision-power 
(Johnston, 2005; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015), but also include the ability to control the 
distribution of public assets or to deactivate the ability of oversight institutions to 
function properly (Jancsics & Jávor, 2012, pp. 62–99). 
Economic actors’ main resource is ownership which they utilize to accumulate 
economic power and increase their market share. Such market concentration in turn 
generates rents for the actor as it enables them to concentrate their efforts to influence 
the other side in the state-business relationship. Interlocking ownership structures 
between economic actors are an especially powerful resource: 
Whenever one firm buys a stake in another firm or one individual owns two 
firms, ownership creates networks of firms. […] ‘Who owns what’ links with ‘who 
knows whom’ to create a structure through which some individuals and 
organizations wield much more influence than others. (Schoenman, 2014) 
Another major resource, especially for economic actors, and which strongly 
correlates to corrupt state business relations, is the existence of previous ties to political 
actors. Such ties represent political capital which those that have it will likely use, as 
Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann’s (2003) study of 22 transition economies found. 
Additional studies in transition economies (see, for instance, Collins et al. (2009) for 
                                                        
13 In broad terms, rents are a form of profit where actors do not produce any additional wealth. 
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India, Holtbrügge, Berg, and Puck (2007) for China, India, and Russia, and Malesky, 
Gueorguiev, and Jensen (2015) for Vietnam) support these findings. The relationship 
also holds in cross-national studies (Campos & Giovannoni, 2007, pp. 1–21) and even 
helps businesses in established democracies (Amore & Bennedsen, 2013, pp. 387–402) 
to substantially increase revenues. 
Being able to draw on existing connections to policy-makers is such a valuable 
resource that it can even replace bribery payments (Campos & Giovannoni, 2007; 
Harstad & Svensson, 2011, pp. 46–63; Hellman et al., 2003). Economic actors that do 
not possess such an asset are likely to engage someone who has them, as the myriad of 
consultants, lawyers, lobbyists, or other intermediaries that are politically active on a 
firms’ behalf suggest (Bayar, 2005, pp. 277–298; Drugov, Hamman, & Serra, 2014, 
pp. 78–99; Moody-Stuart, 1994). The benefit from such ties—even if through 
intermediaries—makes them a favorite rent-generating resource, as a host of studies on 
the lobbying industry in the United States and cross-nationally show (Bray, 2005, 112–
137; Enns, Kelly, Morgan, Volscho, & Witko, 2014, pp. 289–303; Hacker & Pierson, 
2010; Page, Bartels, & Seawright, 2013, pp. 51–73).  
Political & Economic Competition 
While competition refers broadly to the idea of a struggle between actors over 
scare resources, to be of use in this research it requires more clarification. First, both 
political or economic competition refers to the ongoing struggle between actors that are 
operating within an environment. Second, the focus is on the increase in the numbers of 
credible opponents—that is, not the sheer number of actors matters but how credible 
they are in threating the position of the leader. Third, political and economic competition 
are both broad terms for more specific phenomena.  
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Economic competition subsumes privatization and market liberalization. 
Regarding privatization, it is difficult to explicitly define what privatization is in the case 
of the many transition economies (Zijlstra, 1997, pp. 3–4). It can refer to the narrow idea 
of a state off-loading its assets or broadly how much of the economic activity is 
controlled by the state. For this project, I consider as privatization: 
any material transaction by which the state’s ultimate ownership of corporate 
entities is reduced. This definition includes direct divestment by the state, 
divestment of corporate assets by government-controlled investment vehicles as 
well as the dilution of state positions in SOEs by secondary share offerings to the 
non-state shareholders. (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development [OECD], 2009b, p. 5) 
 Market liberalization then refers to those reforms that focus on removing 
restrictions on competition or are otherwise considered pro-business. Overall, I view 
economic competition as the space where economic actors compete against each other in 
a credible manner. Their relative power can be captured by the size of the market that an 
actor occupies as well as the number of credible competitors that also compete in the 
sector. 
Studies of political competition have variously conceptualized it as the number of 
active political parties that compete with each other over votes. Others have pointed out 
that number of actors are not enough, but the relative power they have and whether they 
can establish themselves as credible alternatives matters as well (Alfano, Baraldi, & 
Cantabene, 2013, pp. 1–10). The idea of relative power is commonly captured by 
measuring the ‘effective number of political parties’ (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979, pp. 3–
27), that is, those actors that actually pose a credible threat to the incumbent. And while 
this idea is a popular way to define political competition, several scholars have pointed 
out that it underestimates the role of small political parties that do not pose a credible 
threat but nevertheless play a major role in a stable democracy (Scarrow, 2006, pp. 619–
639). Hence, Grzymała-Busse (2007), for example, emphasizes the inclusiveness of the 
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political system. Despite the justifiable criticism of underestimating the number of small 
political parties, the idea of ‘effective number of political parties’ (ENEP) still captures 
the causal attributes that are relevant for my argument. Political competition, both 
interparty and intraparty, then, is understood as the space where multiple political 
actors, posing a credible threat to each other, compete against each other. Both, their 
relative power as captured by parliamentary seat distribution and votes, and the overall 
number of political parties, thus, are the main characteristics of political competition. 
Collectively, existing theoretical and empirical findings lead me to reassess the 
conceptualization of corruption, present the framework of ‘Patterns of Corruption’, and 
clarify what I mean with state-business relations. In the rest of the chapter, I will first 
discuss briefly the requirements for theory development to ensure the proper application 
of process tracing, before I delve into the details of the causal mechanisms through 
which the emergence of political and economic competition transforms the actors’ 
opportunity structures and thus determines the variation in corruption patterns. 
Explanation of Process-Tracing 
Process-tracing is not simply telling a good story, but an approach to 
systematically evaluate whether the evidence supports the theorized causal mechanism 
(Bennett & Elman, 2006, pp. 250–267; Checkel & Bennett, 2014, pp. 260–275; Collier, 
2011, pp. 823–830; George & Bennett, 2005). One way this comes through is by 
identifying clearly the entities and their activities that drive a causal force along the path 
(Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Another way is its emphasize on causal homogeneity. Causal 
homogeneity refers to the assumption in process tracing that all cases in a population 
share the same causal mechanism (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Due to this assumption, I 
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do not need to rely on a single corruption case or country to investigate the causal 
mechanism—allowing me to expand the universe of cases.14 
As most causal theories in social science do not clearly specify who is doing what, 
the first step is to reconceptualize any causal theory into a testable causal mechanism, 
specifying clearly the entities in question and their behavior. Next, I disaggregate the 
proposed causal mechanism into its constituent parts. Each component is again 
theorized in terms of entities and their activities (labeled causal claims 1 to 3). In the 
following step, I derive propositions about what I should observe if the proposed causal 
mechanism operates as theorized.  
The phrasing of the propositions and their larger causal claims allow me to 
clearly identify instances where the argument or parts of it are wrong in a case. However, 
two caveats are in order. First, disconfirming parts of the causal mechanism does not 
necessarily undermine the entire causal mechanism as the mechanism consists of several 
components. Second, process-tracing as employed in this dissertation follows an 
informal Bayesian logic “where we can never absolutely confirm or disconfirm a theory 
because of the uncertainty of the empirical world” (Beach & Pedersen, 2016, p. 170).  In 
other words, finding disconfirming evidence for a proposition does not fully disconfirm 
the theory; instead, it drastically reduces our confidence in the theory. For the same 
reasons, however, I cannot be 100 percent confident in the causal relationship even if I 
find confirming evidence. This is why fully falsifying the theory will not be possible as 
confidence is not 0 or 100 percent but is found somewhere in-between. 
In addition to the phrasing of the propositions and the causal claims, I am 
addressing potential concerns about falsifying the causal mechanism also by discussing 
                                                        
14 In chapter 3, I will discuss the process of case selection and justification in detail. 
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the kinds of evidence I should find. If I do not find the expected evidence for each 
proposition, the confidence in the proposition has been weakened. 
As can be seen from the description, I am not engaging on a theoretical level with 
alternative explanations for the outcome in interest, even though methodologist have 
promoted process tracing’s capacity to deal with competing explanations (George 
& Bennett, 2005). Despite the high likelihood that alternative explanations for social 
science phenomena are not mutually exclusive, a majority of these scholars still advocate 
creating mutually exclusive explanations. For example, Fairfield and Charman (2017) 
provide explicit guidelines on how to transform a set of nonrival explanations into 
mutually exclusive hypotheses (2017). Such an approach, however, would expand the 
number of testable hypotheses ad infinitum when applied for the various steps in a 
longer causal chain. Therefore, I will limit myself to considering only alternative 
explanation for key pieces of evidence and not for the outcome in question. This 
approach allows me to side-step the challenge of identifying and fairly treating all 
plausible alternative explanations, especially as they are likely to not only not be 
mutually exclusive (Zaks, 2017, pp. 344–362), but also that they can at various points in 
the mechanism overlap with my own explanation. 
My Argument 
Having clarified how I conceptualize political and economic competition and 
corruption patterns, I can now theorize about the mechanisms through which the causal 
force moves. As I explain in more depth below, I argue that the emergence of 
competition in the political and economic domain had unintended consequences. 
Instead of constraining opportunities to engage in corruption, their emergence 
transformed the actors’ opportunity structures to engage in corruption. Political and 
economic actors now faced powerful incentives for and weak constraints against 
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corruption, encouraging them to form corrupt state-business relationships. Ultimately, 
the resource distributions within these corrupt relationships led to a change in the 
patterns of corruption. This change, however, did not occur by chance. Instead, they 
were the result of a systematic transformation in how political and economic actors 
engage with each other, specifically, how power is distributed in their relationship.  
After discussing briefly the contextual conditions in which the theorized causal 
mechanisms takes place, I illustrate the argument in more detail by presenting the causal 
logic in three separate components. The first component, causal claim 1, draws on the 
existing literature to theorize how the emergence of competitive processes in politics and 
economy transformed the opportunity structure of actors to engage in corruption. Causal 
claim 2 then explores how this change in the opportunity structures of actors encourages 
them to establish corrupt state-business relations. Causal claim 3, the final part of the 
causal mechanism, draws on existing scholarship to probe deeper into the characteristics 
of these relations and establishes how the distribution of power between political and 
economic actors in a corrupt state-business relation determines the type of corruption 
that emerges. For each causal claim, I derive three propositions that take the case-
specific context into consideration. 
Contextual conditions 
At this point, it is relevant to address briefly the contextual conditions in which 
the transformation of corruption patterns occurs. In essence, these are the main 
environmental elements in which the emergence of competition took place, and which 
triggered the shift in corruption types and activities. I do not, however, propose that they 
are either necessary or sufficient for my causal mechanisms to take place. These factors 
will be addressed in the section on ‘scope conditions’ further below. 
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The first distinctive feature of the countries of interest are their shared 
communist past—whether institutional or cultural. First, the ‘shortage economy’ (Kornai, 
1992) that existed during communism in the CEE countries fostered particular corrupt 
practices. As the term implies, shortage economies are characterized by an extensive 
shortage of goods and services across sectors that occurs repeatedly and shapes the 
behavior and actions of the people in the economy (Kornai, 1992, p. 233). Under these 
conditions, citizens developed their own informal networks that allowed them to 
circumvent regulations to acquire the necessary goods and services. By relying on 
personal and professional connections, instead of state institutions, the participants 
became socialized in some forms of corrupt practices and learned to circumvent official 
rules and procedures. Second, communism as a cultural legacy also shaped these 
societies.  
A large body of research has documented the strong impact that culture has on 
corruption—whether captured through ethnicity, language, religion, geography, or 
historical legacy. These studies vary in their use of indicators for corruption and at the 
level of analysis (for a comprehensive overview see Fisman and Golden (2017), 
Marquette (2015), and Mungiu-Pippidi (2015)). Despite the extensive research on the 
link between culture and corruption, no conclusive answer has yet emerged on the topic 
apart from the knowledge that such a link exists. For the argument it is also not of such 
an importance; what matters is that by including a shared communist past, I control for 
a number of features that these countries shared, such as a one-party rule and a state-
controlled market economy that is characterized by shortages. 
The second contextual condition focuses on the change in the aims that actors 
experienced with the fall of communism and the introduction of inclusive institutions 
(Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, & Yared, 2008, pp. 808–842; North, 1990). One of the 
  36 
foundational principles of democracies is the continuous contest among rival political 
actors to realize their interests. For political actors in these new democracies, this meant 
acting as (symbolic) representatives of groups of peoples and to compete over votes and 
resources. Their aims, therefore, shifted from fulfilling the communist party line to the 
hunt for votes. Economic actors went through a similar experience. The main aim of 
firms and their owners, as quintessential economic actors operating in a market society, 
is to maximize revenues (North, 1992, p. 10). This changed from fulfilling production 
quotas in a controlled economic market, to succeeding in open markets with an 
increasing number of competitors. 
The third condition was the high levels of uncertainty associated with the 
transition. In such an environment, the emergence of intensive competition will affect 
corruption differently than when competition emerges in markets that are part of a 
stable regulatory framework with effective oversight agencies that provide the necessary 
security for actors to plan ahead. For instance, economic actors experienced a rapid 
increase in competition driven by extensive market liberalizations in the CEE countries 
and the ongoing privatization campaigns (Borish & Noel, 1996). And despite reforms 
having started already in the eighties in some of the countries, the countries still 
possessed weak economic institutions in the early nineties (Berg, 1994, pp. 165–188), 
especially surrounding property rights security, tax and customs enforcement, and 
access to credit lines, all of which were desperately needed by domestic economy actors, 
including state-owned enterprises (Li & Ferreira, 2011, pp. 371–376). Political actors 
experienced similarly high degrees of uncertainty as their linkages to society were weak, 
resulting in high electoral volatility (Bielasiak, 2002, pp. 189–210; Birch, 2003; 
Mainwaring & Zoco, 2016, pp. 155–178; Sikk, 2005, pp. 391–412; Tavits, 2005, pp. 283–
298). And while high political competition, fostered by insecurity, is supposed to 
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constrain corruption (O'Dwyer, 2006; Vachudová, 2006), high levels of insecurity also 
shorted the time-horizon of actors and thus, increased the chances of them ‘raiding’ state 
resources as quickly as possible (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). In the end, insecurity and 
political competition have a significant impact on corruption, whether positive or 
negative depends on additional elements, which I will discuss in the following section. 
Causal Claim 1 
In this section I present my propositions for how the emergence of competitive 
processes in politics and economy transformed the opportunity structure of actors to 
engage in corruption. I suggest that the emergence of competition in politics and the 
economy has created considerable incentives for actors to engage in corruption, while it 
has done little to constrain them. For this, I draw on the relevant literature to investigate 
the channels through which competition transforms the incentives for and deterrents 
against engaging in corruption for political and economic actors, before presenting my 
propositions and the expected evidence. 
The first channel focuses on the actors’ incentives to engage in corruption. 
Existing research on the topic of competition and corruption identified two broad 
reasons for how and why the emergence of competition reshapes actors’ incentives to 
engage in corruption: first, it motivates actors to violate established rules or norms, and 
second, competition might drive out actors that are unwilling or unable to participate in 
corruption. 
In highly competitive markets, economic actors face tremendous pressure to 
succeed. Economic actors are therefore far more likely to circumvent the rules regulating 
a market when they believe that the costs of getting caught are low but the costs of not 
engaging in corruption are high. A large body of research, predominantly cross-sectional 
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studies, has identified competitive intensity as a major driving force for economic actors 
to employ corruption (e.g., Martin et al., 2007; Beesley, 2015; Clarke and Xu, 2004). 
Another group of scholars reasons that firms that are unwilling or unable to 
participate in corruption are driven out (Bliss & Di Tella, 1997, pp. 1001–1023). 
Empirical support for this argument comes from Karlinger (2009), who finds in her 
empirical study on 45 OECD, transition, and developing countries from 1995 to 2000, 
that firms move into the underground economy when faced with intense market 
competition, especially in countries with low taxes, high corruption, and a poorer public 
service system. 
Similar with intense political competition: political actors are more likely to 
engage in corruption when confronted with intense political competition as the pressure 
increases to collect more and more funds. Moreover, winning early elections means that 
the winner is able to set the ‘rules of the game’ and thus institutionalize rents.15 
For one, one of the foundational principles of democracy is the continuous 
contest among rival political actors to realize their interests. In most democracies, this 
requires political parties to compete for votes and resources to gain these votes. An 
increase in political competition also means that more actors require even more funds to 
sustain their activities. Political actors need to establish themselves among a wide field of 
other possible candidates—all of them competing for votes, and this struggle for votes 
requires resources. This leads to a rise in the demand for more funds for electoral 
campaigns and the expenses related to the day to day functioning of parties (Austin & 
Tjernström, 2003; Bryan & Baer, 2005; Warner, 2007). Research on electoral behavior 
                                                        
15 A common example of institutionalizing rents in the postcommunist countries was the introduction of 
electoral reforms that favor the incumbents at the expense of the opposition Smilov and Toplak (2007, 
p. 24). Another example of institutionalizing political rents can be the way public funding for political parties 
are distributed (van Biezen, 2004, pp. 701–722). 
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suggests that in newly emerging democracies, electoral volatility is especially high 
(Mainwaring & Zoco, 2016; Powell & Tucker, 2014, pp. 123–147; Tavits, 2008, pp. 537–
555), raising the stakes of the electoral arms-race even more. 
Furthermore, with the emergence of a multiparty democracy in transition 
countries, political actors have the major task of creating a stable and inclusive political 
and economic environment. Political actors, or at least the electoral winners, controlled 
the creation of the legislative framework that would set the new rules of the game for 
many years to come. And with this came the risk of entrenching political or economic 
rents (Hellman, 1998, pp. 203–234; Innes, 2014; Vachudová, 2006, p. 14). The risk was 
especially high when countries started market liberalization slightly apart from 
transitioning to a pluralistic democracy (Grzymała-Busse, 2003; Tavares, 2007, 
pp. 1053–1076). 
The second channel through which the emergence of competition transforms 
actors’ opportunity structures occurs by transforming actors’ constraints and thus their 
propensity to engage in corruption. Previous studies have identified three broad 
mechanisms through which competition can constrain an actor’s ability to engage in 
corruption: (a) by increasing the risk of exposure, (b) by actors willingly self-constrain 
themselves, and (c) either by introduce best practices of corporate governance (in the 
case of economic actors), or by creating viable electoral alternatives (in the case of 
political actors). 
Economic competition might deter corrupt behavior of an actor as its competitors 
would benefit from exposing it. Competition acts as a ‘light beam’ shining light on any 
wrong doings by competitors. The reasoning behind this is that economic actors would 
have incentives to expose any criminal activities of their competitors as such an exposure 
would weaken the competitor and might even allow a firm to gain market shares. 
  40 
However, empirical studies find exactly the opposite—firms are unlikely to report 
suspicions of corruption by their competitors, even if they lost a business opportunity. 
For instance, in a survey of Norwegian exporters, Søreide (2006) found that while two-
thirds of firms believed they have lost business because of corruption, the majority of 
them were unwilling to report it. In another survey of senior executives of 350 firms 
across seven countries, the majority of respondents reported that they would unlikely 
take any recourse in such cases of corruption, doubting the ability of the local law 
enforcements to adequately deal with such cases (Control Risks Group Limited & 
Simmons & Simmons, 2006). The same reasons were provided by respondents from the 
newer EU member states in a Special Eurobarometer on Corruption (European 
Commission, Directorate-General for Home Affairs, 2014). The respondents from the 
newer member states, in contrast to respondents from the old member states, were far 
more likely to believe that the main reasons why instances of corruption were not 
reported was that one does not want to get into trouble with law enforcement and that it 
hardly matters as such cases are already known (2014, p. 107).  
In addition, actors’ might willingly constrain themselves, recognizing that 
corruption costs them more than they are willing to pay. Firms might form business 
associations to represent their interests and protect them from extortion by the state 
(Doner & Schneider, 2000, pp. 261–288; Markus, 2007, pp. 277–304), or informally 
vow to not employ corruption.16 For instance, Collins et al. (2009) find that in India, 
firms whose managers belong to business associations, are less likely engaged in 
corruption than those firms where managers do not belong to any association. Despite 
                                                        
16 One famous example of economic actors coming together voluntarily comes from the extractive industry. 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), launched in 2003, works to implement global anti-
corruption standards by, among others, the full publication and audit of company payments and government 
revenues from oil, gas and mining. 
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these positive findings, there are some indications that business associations in the CEE 
countries have not established themselves as strong anti-corruption mechanisms. 
Third, a potential mechanisms through which increased market competition can 
deter corruption is through the entry of foreign firms and their introduction of best 
corporate governance practices (Kwok & Tadesse, 2006, pp. 767–785; Malesky et al., 
2015). One line of argument suggests that foreign firms, especially those from OECD 
countries, are less likely to engage in corruption because of stricter anti-corruption 
regulations in their home countries. Circumstantial evidence for this argument comes 
also from the robust findings in the IPE literature that ownership of firms, especially 
whether foreign owned, de novo, or former SOE enterprises, plays a significant role in 
the extent to which economic actors engage in corruption (see, for instance, Clarke & Xu, 
2004; Hellman et al., 2003). 
Two CEE-specific features, however, make the third mechanism an unlikely 
candidate for deterring corruption in the countries in question during the early nineties. 
For one, at that time there existed only one major anti-corruption legislation with 
international reach (the American Foreign Corrupt Practice Act, prohibiting any firm 
that operates on U.S. soil to bribe a foreign official). In addition, while the political 
economy literature found that variation exists in the propensity of firms to engage in 
corruption depending on their ownership structure, these works viewed corruption as 
equal to bribery. The studies thus, neglected to examine whether these firms where 
engaging in other corrupt activities, such as bid-rigging, collusion, or price-fixing (see, 
for example, Campos & Giovannoni, 2007; Kaufmann & Vicente, 2011). 
Turning again to competition and actors in politics, we find that while there is the 
potential for similar constraints, these constraints were again ineffective due to context-
specific features. Previous research suggests several reasons for why political 
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competition—within or across political actors—is supposed to constrain actors’ behavior 
(Dahl, 1966). First, with the emergence of more political actors, the risk of exposure of 
wrongful activities by political actors increases (Balán, 2011; Emerson, 2006, p. 195). An 
increase in political competition therefore allows parties to monitor each other’s 
behavior (Bauhr & Nasiritousi, 2012, pp. 541–566; Berliner, 2017, pp. 641–661). Because 
of wanting to win votes and resources, political competitors have reasons to monitor the 
actions of other political parties and so deter each other from institutionalizing a rent-
seeking system (Vachudová, 2006, p. 15). Another way that political parties can 
constrain their own, and their competitors’ corrupt behavior is by strengthening the 
capacities and powers of oversight agencies. One panel study on the U.S. finds a strong 
positive relationship between the resources available to the public prosecution and the 
number of corruption convictions (Alt & Lassen, 2014, pp. 306–338). It is therefore not 
surprising that increasing the available resources of the public prosecution, judiciary, law 
enforcement, and others state agencies is a commonly proposed anti-corruption 
initiative (Austin & Tjernström, 2003; OECD, 2009b; Speck & Baena Olabe, 2013). The 
situation in the early years of the transition, however, did not indicate that oversight 
mechanisms and agencies were a priority. What little legislation relevant to corruption 
existed was rarely enforced (Berg, 1994, p. 166; Zijlstra, 1997), following the communist 
tradition of strict anti-bribery laws but little enforcement (Hankiss, 2002, pp. 243–
259).17 
                                                        
17 Of course, there is the potential that political competition does constrain actors but we might not know 
about it. For one, parties could be more likely to collude with each other in the distribution of political rents, 
or, that even if they monitor the corrupt behavior of their opponents, they do not publicize any potentially 
damaging material they have about each other and instead might use it as campaign munition (Heller et al., 
2016, pp. 681–701; Ledeneva, 2006). 
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Second, an increase in political competition also constraints actors as it offers 
voters electoral alternatives, giving them the option to elect non-corrupt political parties 
(Schleiter & Voznaya, 2012, pp. 1–20; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993, pp. 599–617). This is 
especially likely when linkages between political parties and voters are not yet strong, as 
is the case in young democracies, where political parties have not yet established their 
credibility (Keefer, 2007, pp. 804–821). Except in the CEE countries, political parties 
where hardly able to offer a plausible alternative as they were limited in what they could 
offer programmatically, and instead had to compete over operating styles (Innes, 2002, 
pp. 85–104). Combined with the higher levels of distrust and skepticism in political 
parties by citizens (Mishler & Rose, 1997, pp. 418–451; Rose, 1994, pp. 18–30), and the 
repeated claims of corruption that occurred throughout the transition, voters had little 
faith that any one party could act as a plausible alternative. 
Third, with an increase competition, political actors in power might willingly 
constrain themselves, in order to constrain future government’s ability to act corruptly. 
For instance, Berliner and Erlich (2015) examined the passing of access to information 
laws in 31 Mexican states from 2001 to 2007. The authors find that political actors are 
more likely to pass such laws when they faced more intense political competition, ceteris 
paribus. Their study is part of a larger literature that argues that under conditions of 
intense political competition, actors are more likely to introduce reforms that constrict 
their own powers (Alt, Lassen, & Rose, 2003, 30-57; Geddes, 1994). Why? Because such 
self-restricting reforms also restrict the actions of their political opponents, limited their 
ability to abuse their powers. In a comparative study of nine postcommunist countries, 
robust political competition turned out to be the deciding factor for whether political 
parties willingly constrained their actions and established oversight institutions 
(Grzymała-Busse, 2006, pp. 271–300). 
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Overall, the larger theoretical and empirical literature suggests that competition 
should have had a deterring effect on corruption. This stands in sharp contrast to the 
continued presence of corruption in the CEE countries, despite the dramatic increase in 
competition in these countries after the transition (also see figure 1.1). The experiences of 
these countries hints instead at a much darker picture where the emergence of 
competition has created strong incentives for engaging in corruption while 
simultaneously undermining existing constraints for such behavior. 
To explain this discrepancy, I propose that the emergence of political and 
economic competition at the national level transforms the opportunity structure of 
actors in favor of actors engaging in corruption. From this causal claim 1, derive three 
case-specific propositions. In other words, I suggest that the emergence of competition 
in the political and economic domain (a) transforms the opportunity structures of actors 
in favor of corruption, (b) undermines the effectiveness of existing deterrents against 
corruption, and (c) develops few new deterrents against corruption.18 These three 
propositions are presented in table 2.3. 
                                                        
18 I have not included a proposition about any effective deterring impact that the emergence of competition 
had on corruption in the countries as this is not part of the theorized causal mechanism. This does not mean 
that such positive effects did not occur, just that they are not part of the causal story for now. 
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Table 2.3: Presentation of Causal Claim 1 and its three propositions 
Causal Claim 1: Emergence of competition transforms opportunity structures to 
engage in corruption for political and economic actors 
P1 
Emergence of Competition encourages political and economic actors to engage 
in corruption, or more broadly, violate established norms and regulations. 
P2 Emergence of competition weakens existing constraints on corruption. 
P3 Emergence of competition develops few new constraints on corruption. 
 
To support my first proposition about the increased incentives to engage in 
corruption and other deviant behavior, I would ideally find accounts in interviews and 
other sources emphasizing that actors were willing to engage in corruption and that 
political actors also desperately searched for funding. Evidence for the second 
proposition about competition weakening existing corruption deterrents should show up 
in the historical accounts and statements about a limiting of powers and reduction of 
resources for existing oversight institutions. For my third proposition about competition 
not introducing new deterrents, I expect to encounter only a few traces about the 
introduction of constraints to the corrupt behavior of actors. And even if I find such 
initiatives, I expect to find that they have rarely been implemented. In the case of 
political actors, such evidence would come in the form of laws and regulations focusing 
on reforming the larger party system.  
In line with existing literature, I therefore suggest that the emergence of 
competition transformed the opportunity structures of actors. Competition, I suggested, 
generated far more incentives for actors to engage in corruption than it created 
deterrents. Given the contextual conditions of high insecurity and the transition of the 
political and economic domains, the emergence of competition created a situation where 
incentives for corruption far outweighed the effect of any deterrents, thus, tilting the 
favor towards corruption. 
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The counterfactual to the first claim about the emergence of competition 
at the national level in politics and the economy transforming the actors’ 
incentives for and constraints against engaging in corruption would then be the 
continued absence of said competition. Without the emergence of competition in 
both areas, the existing corrupt practices would have continued as competition 
triggers the needed change in the actors’ opportunity structures. 
Causal Claim 2 
With the change in the opportunity structures of actors (claim 1), political and 
economic actors are encouraged to establish corrupt state-business relationships. Causal 
claim 2 now focuses on how the constellation of incentives and constraints encourages 
actors to enter into corrupt state-business relations. In particular given the contextual 
conditions of high uncertainty, communist past, and a change in the actors’ aims, I 
predict that in the emerging arrangement of incentives for and deterrents against 
corruption, the former outweigh the latter dramatically, thus encouraging actors to form 
corrupt relationships. Just as before, I first review the relevant literature for this claim 
before presenting my propositions: (a) political and economic actors have mutually 
compatible interests, (b) they face few constraints for their corrupt activities, and (c) the 
existing control mechanisms are not able to deter the formation of corrupt state-business 
relationships. At the end, I briefly describe the kinds of evidence I expect to encounter. 
Economic actors, driven by a change in their constraints and incentives, have 
several options available to them to achieve their aim of revenue maximization. They can 
expand into other markets, go underground (Karlinger, 2009), or strengthen their hold 
over their market positions or property rights. The latter especially can be achieved by 
focusing on political decision-makers, who have the power to change the legislative 
framework or its enforcement (Boehm, 2007, p. 3). Such corporate political activities are 
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a strategic tool in a firm’s arsenal on ‘weapons’ to employ. They are a common tactic in 
established market democracies and in transition economies and can take on multiple 
forms, not all of which are legal and/or legitimate. 
Another reason for economic actors to form state-business relations with political 
actors are pre-existing ties to policy makers. Such connections form another ‘tool’ and 
can be viewed as a kind of political capital of economic actors that lowers transactions 
costs (Boehm, 2007). In their seminal study of 22 transition economies, Hellman, Jones, 
and Kaufmann (2003) find that the firms’ use of existing political connections replaces 
bribe payments to policy-makers.  
Such business connections also benefit political actors (Smilov & Toplak, 2007, 
pp. 17–18) as new political parties in the transition countries needed resources to attract 
voters. Funding sources for political actors can be broadly grouped into three categories: 
state subsidies, membership dues, or campaign contributions. But for the new political 
parties in the transition countries, most of these funding sources did not provide enough 
income, leaving them heavily reliant on a highly-limited pool of funding sources (Austin 
& Tjernström, 2003, pp. 75–77). 
Consider, for example, the income from membership dues. Income from 
membership fees has been declining across the established democracies (van Biezen & 
Kopecky, 2001, pp. 401–429), and never really established itself as a reliable income 
source for parties in transition countries (Austin & Tjernström, 2003, pp. 75–77; 
Walecki, 2007, pp. 123–142). Moreover, while most of the postcommunist countries 
introduced some form of state subsidies (van Biezen & Kopecký, 2007, pp. 235–254), 
they are often not enough to cover parties’ expenses (Smilov & Toplak, 2007, pp. 24–25). 
In addition, campaign expenses for political parties went up but state subsidies remained 
largely the same. Political actors, therefore, had to cover a larger and larger share 
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through campaign contributions, which generally ends up coming from economic actors 
(NDI, 2005, p. 10; Smilov & Toplak, 2007, p. 10). But even if state subsidies would be 
able to keep up with rising expenses, any political actor knows that their competitors 
have access to largely the same amount of funding, or at least is able to roughly estimate 
the amount the other side receives given eligibility criteria and allocation formula. To be 
able to outspend their opponents, political actors will look for additional funding (Pinto-
Duschinsky, 2002, pp. 69–86). 
Having new political parties turn to campaign contributions as their main source 
of income is in itself not corruption; as long as these contributions are transparent, 
regulated, and come from a large enough number of sources that the political actor is not 
dependent on a single contributor (Austin & Tjernström, 2003; Speck & Baena Olabe, 
2013, p. 41). The issue is that this is not the case in the CEE countries where economic 
actors end up being the main funding source for political parties (Smilov & Toplak, 2007, 
p. 10). These contributions are rarely fully transparent, given the lack of oversight in 
place, and also not well-enough regulated to deter covert funding. 
One additional issue with party financing from economic actors relates to the use 
of hidden channels. In many new democracies, expenses for elections have gone up, 
including illegal expenses such as vote buying, bribing officials, etc. As these expenses 
around illegal political tactics have gone up, so has the demand of political parties for 
more funds; and often parties prefer these funds to be covert so as to avoid having to 
declare them and account for their spending (Smilov & Toplak, 2007, pp. 16–17; Yadav, 
2011). 
Bringing these two sides together shows that when faced with increasing 
competition in their respective markets, political and economic actors develop mutually 
compatible incentives. Political actors’ main concern, in particular at the early stages of 
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the transition, is to secure funding, as only with adequate funding the actors are able to 
strive to fulfill their larger aims, whether voter maximization or control over the state 
apparatus. What they can offer in return is direct access to policy makers. In contrast, 
economic actors have strong incentives to circumvent enforcement of existing 
regulations if they consider them cumbersome for business, introduce more beneficial 
policies, or gain access to credits and loans. To achieve any of these objectives, access to 
policy-makers becomes crucial. In return, they can offer political actors funding. Thus, 
parallel emerging competitive processes in politics and economics create mutually 
compatible interests for political and economic actors, summarized in table 2.4. 
Table 2.4: Mutually compatible interests between political & economic actors 
  Resources Exchanged 
Actors Aims Supply Demand 
Political 
Maximize chances of 
(re-)election; 
Personal enrichment 
Access to political 
decision-making 
process 
Financial or non-
financial resources 
Economic Maximize revenue 
Resources, especially 
financial 
Access to political 
decision-making 
process 
I want to stress that even though both sides having mutually compatible interests 
in establishing a corrupt state-business relationship, it does not necessarily mean that 
both sides equally gain from it. When one actor dominates the corrupt relationship, it 
might coerce the other side to participate in the corrupt exchange, especially if the 
weaker actor’s alternative option is to exit its domain entirely. 
Last, in addition to developing mutually compatible interests to establish a 
corrupt state-business relationship and potentially gaining from it, the corrupt actors 
face few effective deterrents. Political actors, for one, need to fear little from their 
competitors, as they experience similar pressures to acquire funds. When these 
competitors also engage in corruption to increase their funds, the likelihood increases 
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that both sides will tacitly accept each other’s corrupt practices to continue their own 
corrupt activities (Heller et al., 2016). Such collusive agreements among political actors 
are one of the unintended side-effect of establishing party competition in these 
countries. 
Second, several studies found that after first one or two elections, the winners of 
elections in former communist countries often tended to establish a pseudo-competitive 
electoral environment, where the country would continue to have elections, but the 
outcome would often be pre-determined. Through collusion in the background, these 
reform winners were able to manipulate the reform process for their benefits (Hellman, 
1998; Hellman et al., 2003). Third, neither the civil society sector nor the media were 
effective deterrents for corrupt actors in the CEE countries in the nineties (Holmes, 
2006; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2010). Civil society was not yet well-developed, at least, if 
measured by membership in voluntary organizations (Nałęcz & Bartkowski, 2005, 
pp. 163–187; Uhlin, 2010), and those that existed, paid little attention to corruption 
(Mudde & Kopecky, 2002). The media faced similar limitations. Broadcasting media, for 
one, remained state property for several more years (Lyman, November 27, 2014, A12; 
Örnebring, 2012, pp. 497–515), Meanwhile, print media became independent, but it had 
to compete for revenues in a tight market, just as any other economic actor (Jakubowicz 
& Sükösd, 2008). Moreover, both media sectors were still subject to political interference 
(Bajomi-Lázár, 2008, pp. 73–84), which means that reporting on such sensitive subjects 
as corruption involving the higher echelons of politics and the economy would have been 
discouraged. 
Another major oversight mechanism that was ineffective in deterring corrupt 
actors from entering in a corrupt state-business relationship, has been the executive and 
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judicial authorities in the CEE countries.19 For one, the legal system underwent its own 
transformation. Law enforcement agencies and the judiciary both had their own 
problems. The transition countries faced a dramatic rise of organized crime groups in the 
nineties (Los, 2003, pp. 145–169). Several region-wide surveys and anecdotal evidence 
from that period suggest that both entities were themselves involved in corruption on a 
large scale and so could not be relied upon to constrain corruption in an adequate 
manner. Summarizing the results of several World Bank surveys as well as his own 
surveys in the region, Holmes (2006) concludes that law enforcement was perceived as 
highly corruption in nine out of the eleven post-communist countries investigated during 
the nineties (and moderately corrupt in the remaining two countries). Trust in the 
judiciary was only slightly better. Out of the eleven countries, in seven court officials, 
including judges, were perceived to be highly corrupt; again, in the remaining countries, 
they were considered to be moderately corrupt. This suggests that neither oversight 
agency would have been well-suited to deter political and economic actors from entering 
into corrupt relationships. 
Because of their mutually compatible interests, political and economic actors had 
strong incentives to form state-business relations. Moreover, because of the lack of 
efficient control mechanisms, these actors had few deterrents that would have kept them 
from forming corrupt state-business relations. In other words, the resulting arrangement 
of incentives and deterrents encouraged political and economic actors to enter into 
corrupt state-business relations. 
                                                        
19 While in causal claim 1 I examine how the emergence of competition in the political and economic domain 
weakened existing constraints and hampered the development of new constraints against actors engaging in 
corruption in general, causal claim 2 examines how oversight mechanisms and agencies were ineffective in 
deterring political and economic actors from establishing a corrupt state-business relationship. 
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Under these conditions, political and economic actors confronted with powerful 
incentives for entering into corrupt relations and few constraints, it is hardly surprising 
that these actors established corrupt relations. Combining the findings of the theoretical 
and empirical works leads to the conclusion that the specific constellation of incentives 
and constraints encourages political and economic actors to form corrupt state-business 
relationships—the argument of causal claim 2. From this, I derive three propositions to 
test the claim: (a) the existence of mutually compatible interests among actors 
encourages them to form state-business relations, (b) that at least one side in the 
exchange benefits substantially from their corrupt relationship20, and (c) control 
mechanisms are ineffective in deterring actors from entering into corrupt state-business 
relationship.21 Causal claim 2 and its three propositions are listed in Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5: Presentation of Causal Claim 2 and its three propositions 
Causal Claim 2: The constellation of incentives and constrains encouraged political 
and economic actors to enter into corrupt state-business relations. 
P1  Mutually compatible interests encourage political and economic actors to enter 
into state-business relations. 
P2 
At least one of the actors in the state-business relationship benefits substantially 
from their relation. 
P3 
Control mechanisms are unable to deter actors to form corrupt state-business 
relations. 
In the absence of memorandums by actors recording their reasons for entering in 
a corrupt state-business relation, I should observe a combination of elements to 
substantiate the three propositions of the second causal claim. The first proposition 
                                                        
20 Recall that in certain situations, the more powerful actor might coerce the other side to participate in the 
corrupt exchange, especially if the weaker side considers participation as the lesser of two evils (e.g., exit 
from a domain would be the alternative). 
21 Proposition 1 suggests that actors have interests that encourage to work together. Propositions 2 and 3 
then provide the conditions under which actors will act upon these interests. 
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requires evidence that actors from the political and economic domain enter into state-
business relations, which are viewed as a long-term exchange of resources that are either 
restricted or the acquisition of these resources excludes actors that would have a 
commonly accepted right of inclusion. Evidence for the second proposition comes ideally 
from accounts about the profitability of said relationship but also by examining the 
resource exchange in the case studies and references in secondary sources. For the third 
proposition I should observe only a few attempts of constraining corruption through 
effective preventive or punitive anti-corruption measures. Such measures could be the 
introduction of effective new conflict-of-interest regulations or party financing 
legislation in the case of prevention or increasing the cost of getting caught by 
strengthening the laws and regulations related to corruption and investing in law 
enforcement and the prosecution by increasing their resources. 
What remains is the question of how the corrupt relationship between political 
and economic actors now determines the type of corruption. To understand the internal 
dynamics of the corrupt exchange and how it determines the type of corruption, we have 
to look at the power distribution between actors next. 
Causal Claim 3 
In this section, I present the last part of the theorized causal mechanism. Causal 
claim 3 concentrates on how the distribution of power between political and economic 
actors in a corrupt state-business relationship determines the type of corruption that 
emerges. First, I develop causal claim 3, where I argue that the resource distribution 
between political and economic actors, especially the concentration of power each actor 
holds in their area, plays a crucial role in their (corrupt) exchange. Second, I present my 
propositions for causal claim 3 and the rationale for them. In essence, I suggest that 
covert political financing, local capture, and legal corruption are the result of a particular 
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arrangement of concentrated (or fragmented) political and economic power. Finally, I 
describe what kind of evidence I should find if the theorized causal claim holds. 
When I previously explained my conceptualization of corrupt state-business 
relationships, I noted that political power concentration is a major resource for actors, 
but only hinted at the various advantages that can be achieved through it. As mentioned, 
gaining legislative control allows political actors to institutionalize their rents, meaning 
that it can create laws and regulations that favor the incumbent, among other ways.22 
Another major asset that political actors gain by dominating the legislative making 
process is the control over the distribution of state assets (or purchase of goods or 
services for the state). Both areas can easily be abused as cash-cows, where those in 
control over the agency or procedure profit from their positions significantly. To 
‘translate’ these cash-cows into personal gain, two additional steps are indispensable. 
For a political actor, having power allows it to influence the legislative-making process, 
have control over the distribution of state assets (and their purchase), as well as control 
oversight agencies and procedures tasked with keeping abuses of power in check. 
Concentration of power comes in degrees, thus, the more concentrated political power an 
actor has, the less other political actors can interfere with using this power for personal 
gain, thereby violating the democratic principles of impartiality and inclusion. 
First, corrupt actors need to deactivate any internal and external control 
mechanisms that protect their targeted cash-cows. This can be achieved by taking over 
policy-making process and constructing a political system with in-built biases favoring 
                                                        
22 Admittedly, such behavior can be expected from any rational self-interested actor, and political actors act 
in accordance with their assumed larger aim to acquire votes and resources. Shaping the surrounding 
environment within one has to act to one’s benefit is not only common behavior, but it is, under certain 
conditions, also legal. But as discussed above, legal corruption is not about breaking the law but about 
exercising undue influence on the democratic process. 
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the incumbent (Smilov & Toplak, 2007, p. 24). Or actors can undermine the ability of 
such state agencies by manipulating appointments, cut budgets, or reduce their 
personnel (Jancsics & Jávor, 2012, pp. 89–90; Yadav, 2011, p. 48). On a smaller scale, 
deactivating controls can also focus on circumventing or manipulating the standard 
operating procedures set in place to constrain corruption.23 
Second, even once the political actors deactivate the control mechanisms, they 
still require additional actors with complementary skill sets to translate these resources 
into personal gains. These actors are economic actors, which have the necessary 
knowledge and capabilities to siphon off or launder money, avoid taxes, and generally 
keep any personal gains from being discovered by state authorities. 
Here bargaining power comes into play—in situations where the economic actor 
is weak (e.g., enough other economic actors are able to provide the same goods or 
services) and has little ability to ‘walk away from the exchange’, the political actor can 
easily take advantage of their dependence. Weak economic actors are then in essence 
‘tools’ for the political actors, open to exploitation. If the economic actor, however, has 
bargaining power, for instance by dominating a market to such an extent that the other 
side has no similarly capable alternative, it then can demand something in return for 
their goods or services. The concentrated economic power of the actor allows it to 
leverage it against any pressures coming from the political actor. 
                                                        
23 Political power concentration does not necessarily mean that all political actors belong to the same party - 
they can also belong to a social network, unrelated, or not fully determined by party affiliation. Nevertheless, 
if the social network is coordinated enough, they still have the ability to translate state assets into personal 
benefits and circumvent or subvert oversight institutions. Heilbrunn (2005) provides an excellent 
illustration of such subversion of oversight agencies in his study on corupt networks in France He analyzes 
how a corrupt network of political and economic actors can, under the guise of a respectable alliance, 
undermine the state agencies tasked with controlling the actors. 
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But what about a situation where the political actor is weak or fractured?24 So far, 
I have theorized about the political actor as a political party but when the party has little 
concentrated political power, the individual politician within the party gains in relative 
strength. Once the political actor loses its political power, it move into a lower bargaining 
position in its relationship with the economic actor as it cannot provide the same levels 
of services anymore. Firms are then confronted with a situation where no political actor 
has enough political power to control the legislative-making process or deactivate 
control-mechanisms. The economic actor’s options are therefore to enter into 
relationships with one or a few legislators and ask for a change in the details of policies, 
something a small number of legislators are far more likely able to deliver. Chances for 
success are especially high if the policies in question focus on issue-areas that are not of 
interest to anyone but those directly affected and/or are about complex and obscure 
issue-areas. 
In summary, for causal claim 3, I suggest that the key factors determining the 
type of corruption that emerges is the distribution of resources, and therefore their 
power, between actors in a state-business relationship. Table 2.6 shows the three ideal 
resource distributions that can occur in a corrupt state-business relationship. While 
these are ideal scenarios which ignore that the resource distribution is in reality a matter 
of degrees, they do highlight the core element of the final part of my argument—
depending on who holds concentrated power in their relationship has a significant 
impact on the type of corruption that will emerge. 
                                                        
24 Weak political actor means either that the political actor is confronted with more competition, as it 
becomes one among many, or that there is an internal fracture or little internal cohesion implying that the 
political party cannot translate their formal political power into informal power (e.g., when individual 
legislators are not voting according to the party line). 
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Table 2.6: Presentation of Causal Claim 3 and its three propositions 
 
Political Power 
Concentrated Fragmented 
Economic 
Power 
Concentrated Local Capturea 
Legal 
Corruptionb 
Fragmented 
Covert Political 
Financingc  
Xd 
Note: aRepresenting proposition 2; cRepresenting proposition 1; bRepresenting proposition 3; dThe fourth 
quadrant remains empty as the constellation has not appeared in the CEE countries. 
Each cell, therefore, indicates the predicted type of corruption given the 
distribution of power between political and economic actors. First, when political power 
is concentrated but economic power is weak, I expect to encounter examples of covert 
political financing. As a reminder, covert political financing takes place when the 
political actors are in the position to exploit the economic actor. In this situation, the 
economic actor is also unlike to benefit substantially from the corrupt state-business 
relationship. Alternatively, when both actors have concentrated power in their domain, 
the likely outcome will be local capture, or one of its sub-types. Local capture requires 
the most resources as the political actor has to control a state entity, while the economic 
actor has to have the resources to entice the political actor to make use of its political 
power to the benefit of both sides. Finally, when political power is fragmented, but 
economic power is concentrated, the final type will be legal corruption.25 Legal 
corruption aims to change the details in policies; a task that can be achieved by a small 
group of legislators. Enticing a few legislators likely requires fewer resources and is less 
costly than local capture, as individual politicians cannot counter the economic actors’ 
power. 
                                                        
25 The lower right quadrant remains empty as the arrangement of resource distribution has not been 
observed in the CEE region; in particular under conditions of weak political and economic power within an 
uncertain environment that has a cultural-historical legacy of communism and corruption. 
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What are some of the expected observable manifestations of these propositions? 
For the first proposition about covert political financing, I should find evidence 
highlighting the dependency of economic actors on political actors, that is evidence 
emphasizing the existence of a power-asymmetry in their relation. Moreover, the 
references will need to showcase that corrupt actors intentionally obscured, or at least 
attempted to obscure, the sources and final destination of their funding. 
Evidence for the second proposition about the emergence of local capture, should 
ideally come in the form of accounts of capture as a valid political objective. Other 
observable manifestations that I should encounter if this proposition holds are the 
occurrence of significant number of patronage appointments at the highest and even 
middle management in state agencies once a political actor has accumulated a majority 
in the legislative-making body. Another indicator for local capture are accounts of formal 
oversight institutions criticizing state agencies for failing in their tasks or duties. In 
addition, I expect to find traces of a fruitful exchange between political and economic 
actors, that is an exchange where both sides obviously gain from their relationship. 
To support the third proposition of fragmented political power confronted with 
concentrated economic power leading to legal corruption, I should ideally find accounts 
of other state agencies criticizing particular changes in the details of policies as 
benefiting a few economic actors or a particular industry, at the expense of the majority. 
In addition, evidence in support for this proposition can also come by tracing the 
language of a bill resembles the language put forward earlier by the economic actor or a 
business association in their reports or white papers. 
Argument Roadmap 
Together, the individual parts of the causal mechanisms provide me with nine 
testable case-specific propositions. In addition, I have also discussed the kind of evidence 
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that I should encounter if the causal mechanism and its individual parts have occurred as 
theorized. 
The causal mechanism takes place under conditions of social-historical 
communistic legacy and high insecurity, where the large-scale regime transformation 
changed the aims of actors. In causal claim 1, the emergence of political and economic 
competition in such an environment transformed the incentives and deterrents for 
corruption of political and economic actors. The new arrangement of powerful incentives 
and weak constraints encouraged these actors to enter into corrupt state-business 
relationships, the argument of causal claim 2. Causal claim 3 focuses on the 
characteristics of such corrupt relationships and states that the distribution of power 
within the relationship determines the type of corruption that emerges. Table 2.7 
illustrates the causal mechanism, including the nine propositions. 
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Table 2.7: Argument Roadmap 
Causal Mechanism: Emergence of competition in politics and the economy transforms the 
opportunity structure of actors, resulting in changes in their interactions, leading to a shift in the 
Patterns of Corruption. 
Contextual Conditions:  
(a) communist legacy, (b) shift in the aims of actors, and (c) high levels of uncertainty  
Causal Claim 1: Emergence of competition in politics and the economy transforms the 
opportunity structure of actors to engage in corruption. 
P1 
Emergence of Competition encourages political and economic actors to engage in 
corruption, or more broadly, violate established norms and regulations 
P2 Emergence of competition weakens existing constrains on corruption. 
P3 Emergence of competition develops few new constrains on corruption. 
Causal Claim 2: The constellation of incentives and constraints encouraged political and 
economic actors to enter into corrupt state-business relations. 
P1  
Mutual compatible interests encourage political and economic actors to enter into state-
business relationship. 
P2 
At least one of the actors in the state-business relationship benefits substantially from 
their relationship. 
P3 
Control mechanisms are unable to deter actors to form corrupt state-business 
relationships. 
Causal Claim 3: The distribution of power between political and economic actors in a corrupt 
state-business relationship determines the type of corruption that emerges. 
P1 
Concentrated political power combined with weak economic power results in covert 
political financing. 
P2 Concentrated political and economic power results in local capture. 
P3 
Weak political power combined with concentrated economic power leads to legal 
corruption. 
The mechanism is obviously limited in its application, given the contextual 
conditions in which it takes place. This leads me to the last point in this chapter: the 
scope and limitations of my argument. 
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Limitations & Scope Conditions 
The claims of the theorized causal mechanism should apply in countries 
experiencing regime transitions that meet three scope conditions 26, based on the 
emphasis on causal homogeneity27: (1) in a post-communist country, where (2) 
competition emerged in the political and economic domains, and (3) within a few years. 
The causal mechanism is not expected to operate in post-conflict or post-colonial 
countries, or even in those post-communist countries that experienced more violent 
transitions (Bunce, 1999) as in these transitions, larger cleavages between the elites and 
mass population or even within the elites exist. In these situations, the emergence of 
competition is more likely to result in other kinds of corruption than those theorized 
here (see, for instance, Hale (2015) and Radnitz (2010)). 
As in any research, some limitations apply. My attention on the why and how the 
emergence of competition determines corruption patterns in the CEE countries leaves 
several equally interesting questions unanswered. For instance, I am not addressing 
whether the patterns of corruption have changed in a similar direction at the subnational 
level, across all sectors in each country, or even across the CEE countries. Furthermore, 
given the scope and initial starting conditions laid out above, the argument does not 
travel well to countries outside a narrow set of nations. Despite that limitation, a thick 
explanation of a few cases contributes more to theory and especially policy-creation than 
a broader explanation of a larger number of cases. In particular, given the few success 
                                                        
26 This is in contrast to the above discussion about the contextual conditions that described the conditions 
that trigger the causal mechanism. 
27 Causal homogeneity refers to the assumption in process tracing that all cases in a population share the 
same causal mechanism (Beach and Pedersen, 2013). Naturally, this assumption limits the number of cases 
in a population drastically; however, a trade-off that has its benefits. 
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stories of anti-corruption in comparison to the large number of failed anti-corruption 
efforts. 
Conclusion 
The chapter began with a discussion of main concepts of interests, particularly 
their definitions and causal attributes. In the case of corruption, I presented the 
framework of ‘Patterns of Corruption’ on which the subsequent case studies rely, as well 
as described the causal attributes based on which I can identify each type. I then 
discussed the definition of a corrupt state-business relationship and mentioned the 
resources each side has available to shape the relationship. I then briefly described how I 
employ process tracing in this dissertation before moving on to illustrate the causal 
mechanism. 
To answer my research question of how and why competition transforms 
corruption patterns, I theorize a causal mechanism, which I split into three components 
for easier testing. Based on a review of existing literature, I specified each of the causal 
claims as well as derived several propositions for each claim. First, the emergence of 
competition in the political and economic domain transformed the opportunity 
structures, that is the incentives and deterrents, of actors in both domains to engage in 
corruption. Second, the new constellation of powerful incentives combined with a lack of 
effective deterrents lead to the formation of corruption state-business relations between 
political and economic actors. Third, the distribution of resources between the actors in 
such relations then altered the types of corruption. In the following chapter, I will 
discuss the research design used to test the proposed causal mechanism, describe how I 
can identify a phenomenon that is hard to define and even harder to observe, as well as 
present the data collection and analysis process. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
The previous chapter began with specifying the concepts of interests that play a 
fundamental role in answering the research question of how and why the emergence of 
competition in the political and economic domain transformed the patterns of 
corruption in the CEE countries. For each of the key concepts—types of corruption, state-
business relationships, and political and economic competition—I also presented their 
causal attributes for identification purposes. 
At the end of the previous chapter, I developed an argument in answer to the 
research question. The emergence of competition transformed the opportunity 
structures of political and economic actors, which in turn encouraged actors to form 
corrupt state-business relationships. The actors’ resource distribution within these state-
business relationships then determines the type of corruption that develop. However, as 
this argument is not readily testable, I separated the argument into three parts, labeled 
causal claim 1, 2, and 3, framed in terms of entities and their activities. And while this 
approach is not yet common in political science, it does allow me to better trace the 
micro-mechanism that links the emergence of competition to a change in corruption 
patterns. How I trace the causal mechanisms is the subject of this chapter. 
Chapter 3 starts out with a discussion of the case selection process—both at the 
country level and at the corruption case level. The section describes the reasons for why 
Poland and Hungary where selected. Political economists have labeled these two 
countries repeatedly as top performers in the CEE region, and expected a dramatic 
decline in the countries’ corruption levels. As such a decline in corruption has failed to 
appear, these two present therefore exemplary test-cases. The section also describes the 
rigorous selection process for the corruption cases in each country. Following the case 
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selection discussion, I then explain how the data is analyzed. Specifically, I describe the 
research design, which aims to first establish that a systematic transformation of 
corruption patterns took place and second, trace the causal mechanism that links the 
systematic transformation of corruption patterns to the emergence of political and 
economic competition. In this section on the data analysis process, I also explain in 
detail how process tracing allows me to test the three parts of the causal mechanism. The 
chapter ends by outlining the data collection process employed. In particular, it describes 
how to recognize the key concepts in the real world, discusses the data sources utilized, 
and ends by addressing issues that arose during the data collection process. 
Case Selection and Justification 
Case selection occurs on two levels.28 First, I select two countries from among the 
CEE countries. Second, I select from the corruption cases that have occurred within each 
country. 
Country case selection. 
My argument is about the impact the emergence of political and economic 
competition has on the transformation of the patterns of corruption in a country under 
conditions of high uncertainty with a historical-cultural communist legacy. For this, I 
                                                        
28 In this thesis, I follow Beach and Pedersen (2016, p. 5) who define a case as "as an instance of a causal 
process playing out, linking a cause (or set of causes) with an outcome.” This differs from Gerring’s (2004) 
definition of ‘case’ as "a single unit” that belongs to “a larger class of (similar) units" as the focus is more on 
the underlying causal process that links the cause with the outcome. Beach and Pedersen (2016) point out 
that their definition of case “in practical terms of temporal and spatial scope and unit of analysis is then 
contingent upon the theoretical claim we are making. The scope of a case determines the bounds of what one 
is making a causal inference about. Therefore, the definition of 'case' is the unit in which a given causal 
relationship plays out, from the occurrence of the cause to the theorized outcome." (Beach and Pedersen, 
2016, p. 5). The individual corruption cases are, therefore, my main units of analysis, whose transformation I 
am studying over time (by comparing selected corruption cases from different points in time) as well as 
across sectors. As the focus of the study is not on how much corruption has transformed, but how 
competitive processes shaped it, I am purposefully examining only instances where corruption cases have 
been discovered. I, therefore, focus more on the causal mechanism that shape a country’s corruption 
dynamics—the comparative method being most suitable for this (Tarrow, 2010, pp. 230–259). 
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require countries that experienced a rapid transformation in their political and economic 
domains within the same narrow period. The region of Central and Eastern Europe 
(which I narrowly define as Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic)29 
provides an excellent test-case for my research question. Multiple countries rejected 
their communist rulers just a few months apart and began the difficult process of 
establishing market-democracies. The countries have had a similar historical 
relationship with their communist neighbor Russia, and now share similar political and 
economic trajectories with the EU and the NATO.  
Last, and especially pertinent for the case analysis, are the similar party-financing 
models in the four countries as well as their baseline corruption. All CEE countries 
established party-centered party financing models where the political party is the 
dominant political actor in the political domain (Ikstens, Pinto-Duschinsky, Smilov, & 
Marcin Walecki, 2002, pp. 21–39).30 
The details of the corruption forms and practices that existed in the CEE 
countries in the early nineties have been elaborated in detail in several works (Holmes, 
1993; Holmes, 2006; Jancsics, 2012; Karklins, 2005). What is important for our purpose 
is the following. During communism, the shortage economy led to a formation of 
informal networks among its citizens (Holmes, 2006; Sajó, 2002, pp. 1–21). The 
informal networks among the general population  
were fluid groupings of friends and family members, neighbors, co-workers, and 
other social contacts. Goods were exchanged informally, at times on an 
                                                        
29 I am aware that several different conceptions of Central Eastern Europe exist; I want to be explicit as to 
what countries belong in this group for this research. The main reason for such a narrow selection is to 
ensure ‘causal homogeneity’ within the sample of possible corruption cases. 
30 The main difference between party-centered and candidate-centered models of party financing are who 
“are the main political actors in terms of political financing”, i.e., who is mainly responsible for raising funds, 
receives state subsidies and decides over expenses Smilov and Toplak (2007, pp. 3–4). 
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immediate quid pro quo basis, at times with an implied promise of future 
reciprocity (Karklins, 2005, p. 78).  
In contrast, the informal networks that flourished among the elites resembled 
patron-client relations, where career advancements and other benefits depended largely 
on the power of one’s patron (Tarkowski, 1991). Both kinds of networks, however, 
fostered a culture of informality and a disregard for laws and regulations.  
With the transition to a democracy then, the old informal networks that relied on 
personal connections were disrupted as the network’s enforcement mechanism stopped 
working. The promise of reciprocity did not matter anymore if the other side had nothing 
to offer to an actor. Those that could sought out other actors with valuable resources, 
leaving behind those participants that could not leave. 
Because of the strong similarities in the CEE countries’ historical-cultural past 
combined with their parallel political and economic developments since then, I can 
plausibly assume causal homogeneity within these four countries. Causal homogeneity is 
one of the prerequisites for case-selection for the kind of process-tracing employed here. 
All four countries are parliamentary republics that are predominantly Roman 
Catholic and held their first free parliamentary elections in 1990/1991. They all 
eventually adopted a party-model financing system (Smilov & Toplak, 2007, pp. 3–4) 
and joined the EU together in 2004. Moreover, the four countries also show great 
similarities across a host of indicators, as seen in table 3.1. Most of the indicators in the 
table are standard indicators to illustrate a nation’s political, economic, and social health 
that scholars have found to impact corruption. When possible, I provided the values of 
these indicators at the start of their transition in 1989/1990 and 2010, the endpoint for 
this study. Last, to better frame these indicators, I also provided the averages of the 12 
EU member states in 1990. This helps to establish that it is reasonable to expect these 
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four countries to have a similar causal mechanism at play in the transformation of their 
patterns of corruption, that is, the countries are likely to show causal-homogeneity. 
Table 3.1: Comparison of CEE countries and EU-12 averages 
Indicator Year Poland Hungary 
Czech 
Republica 
Slovakiaa EU-12b 
Legislative 
Systemc 
 
Bicameral Unicameral Bicameral Unicameral NA 
Electoral Systemc 
 Proportional 
Representation 
for Lower 
House; 
First-Past-The-
Post voting for 
Upper House 
Mixed 
Member 
Proportional 
System 
Proportional 
Representation 
for Lower 
House; 
First-Past-The-
Post voting for 
Upper House 
Proportional 
Representation 
NA 
Quality of 
Government (0 to 
1) 
1990 0.69 0.79 0.79 (1993) 0.82 (1993) 0.85 
2010 0.64 0.64 0.67 0.61 0.82 
Privatization 
Strategy 
 Shock therapy 
Gradual 
Approach 
Shock therapy Shock therapy NA 
Freedom to Trade 
Internationally 
1990 4.97 3.90 7.9 (1995) 6.81 (1995) 8.28 
2010 7.42 7.95 7.79 8.06 8.20 
Population (in 
million)e 
1990 38.2 10.4 10.3 (1993) 5.3 (1993) 19.1 
2010 38.6 10.0 10.5 5.4 45.2 
Human 
Development 
Index d 
1990 0.712 0.703 0.761 0.738 0.775 
2010 0.829 0.821 0.861 0.829 0.885 
GDP per capita 
(in current US 
dollar) 
1990 1,727.38 3,563.88 3,912.84 2,577.76 19,083.85 
2010 12,425.80 13,006.53 19,703.43 16,553.12 45,184.33 
Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
 0.12 0.15 0.32 0.25 0.21 
Source: Quality of Government Datasets (2018) unless otherwise noted. 
aCzech Republic and Slovakia separated in 1993. 
bEU values are the average of the EU-12: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, und the United Kingdom. Averages are own calculations. 
cThe Inter-Parliamentary Union Parline database (Inter-Parliamentary Union, P., 2018). 
dUnited Nations Development Programme, Human Development Reports (2018)  
Of those four countries, Poland and Hungary have often been hailed as the top 
performers, not only among the CEE countries but the new democracies of 1990 in 
general. As these two countries are commonly compared in similar research, I select 
Poland and Hungary as countries from which I will select the corruption cases. I want to 
emphasize, however, that I do not to make any cross-country comparisons, which is not 
the aim of this research. 
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The study focuses on corruption cases that have occurred between 1990 and 
2010. While 1990 is an obvious starting point, I chose to end with 2010 as the focus of 
this research is on the causal relationship between the introduction of multiple 
competition-oriented reforms and corruption in a climate of high uncertainty and 
rapidly changing state institutions. While 2010 might seem like an arbitrary cut-off 
point, Hungary’s political trajectory after 2010 would have altered any with-in case 
comparisons too much; its current corruption dynamics require their own explanation.31 
Corruption case selection. 
What is a ‘corruption case’? As I rely on a broader definition of corruption that 
does not view corruption as a necessarily illegal act, the universe of possible corruption 
cases includes several cases that have not resulted in a corruption-related conviction for 
some of the involved individuals. Instead, the emphasis is on cases that may not have 
been illegal but were still harmful to the proper functioning of public institutions (Lessig, 
2013, p. 2; Transparency International, 2009, p. 39; Warren, 2004, p. 334). Such a 
broader scope of corruption allows me to capture corruption types that are not viewed as 
corruption as defined by the law of a country but are still considered as corrupt by the 
public. These forms of corruption are commonly known as cases of ‘institutionalized’ 
(Lessig, 2011, 2013; Teorell, 2007) or ‘mediated’ (Thompson, 1993) corruption. 
To isolate the impact of competitive processes from that of many other potential 
factors that shape corruption dynamics, I compare corruption cases that have occurred 
at different points in time, but within the same business sector. This approach is a 
                                                        
31 When the current ruling party Fidesz won the absolute majority in the parliamentary elections in 2010, it 
ushered in a new phase of corruption, where the emergence of political and economic competition has been 
replaced by the activities of the ruling party, specifically its prime minister Victor Orbán, as main driver of 
corruption patterns. 
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combination of Tarrow’s (2010) ‘Strategy of Paired Comparison’ and George and 
Bennett’s (2005) ‘Method of structured, focused comparison.’ I focus on examining the 
same broad features of each corruption case (e.g., the corruption type and activities, and 
how my explanatory factors have shaped it) in cases that have been paired based on 
three criteria: public officials involved (actors), the industry sectors in which these actors 
operated (sector), and when the case occurred (period). 
Actor: The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) as well as 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and other international organizations have 
identified particular groups of individuals as being at a higher risk of participation in 
corruption, money laundering, terrorism financing, or similar criminal activities. They 
emphasize that high-ranking public officials (both appointed and elected), due to their 
influential position, face a higher risk of being involved in corruption, money laundering, 
and other similar criminal offenses (FATF, 2013, p. 3). The FATF defines such a 
"politically exposed person (PEP) […] as an individual who is or has been entrusted with 
a prominent public function." (FATF, 2013, p. 3). Examples of such PEPs are, among 
others,  
individuals who are or have been entrusted domestically with prominent public 
functions, for example Heads of State or of government, senior politicians, senior 
government, judicial or military officials, senior executives of state owned 
corporations, important political party officials (FATF, 2013, p. 5).  
I selected based on this criterion as it allows me to focus on those individuals that 
actually have the opportunity to abuse their entrusted powers, not just the incentives, – 
as the latter group will always be larger than the former. 
Sector: For corruption cases to be paired together, they will have to have 
occurred within the same sector. Numerous studies have shown that particular economic 
sectors, for instance, public utilities, energy, or construction, are especially at risk of 
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corruption.32 In these sectors, economic actors are often subject to stricter regulations, 
which in turn increases their incentives to engage in corruption. To classify economic 
actors, I employ a slightly modified version of the Industry Classification System of the 
European Union, called NACE, Nomenclature générale des activités économiques dans 
les Communautés Européennes (General Industrial Classification of Economic Activities 
within the European Communities).33 I categorize economic actors, and therefore the 
corruption cases, into following broad sectors: 
• Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing  
• Energy 
• Manufacturing 
• Utilities (such as electricity, water supply, waste management, etc) 
• Construction 
• Trade (Wholesale and Retail) 
• Accommodations and Food Services 
• Real Estate Activities 
• Financial and Insurance Activities 
• Professional, Scientific, and Technical Activities 
• Education and Health Care;  
• Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 
• Information and Communication (incl. broadcasting, telecommunications, and IT-
related activities) 
                                                        
32 See, for instance, Søreide (2014) for an overview. 
33 The use of NACE is mandatory within the European statistical system and therefore offers a useful 
categorization of businesses that corresponds with quantitative data. 
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• Other service-related activities 
• Public Administration (see category ‘Actor’) 
Period: The third criterion focuses on when the cases took place. The first 
corruption case in any pair needs to have occurred at the beginning of the transition 
process where the competitive processes have not yet gained momentum or have not yet 
even emerged. The second corruption case has to have occurred in the late 2000s, 
preferable after 2004 (the year of EU accession). At this point in time, I assume that 
enough time has passed to observe a transformation in corruption patterns caused by the 
emergence of competition and its impact on the actors’ opportunity structures. I am able 
to observe any consequences of interaction among the competitive processes. In the ideal 
case, the first corruption case would have occurred between 1990 to 1995, the second 
between 2005 to 2010. However, as I rely on uncovered cases with enough publicly 
available material, which have been already selected based on political actors involved 
and sectors, only a few cases fit this last criterion ideally. I therefore selected corruption 
cases as close as possible to the ideal scenario. 
To get a full list of major corruption cases for each country, I examined media 
reports, corruption cases mentioned in documents by the EU Accession Monitoring 
Program, the anti-corruption evaluations by international organizations, reports by 
Transparency International and its local chapters, a review of recent dissertations on 
corruption in Hungary as well as by contacting several experts working in the field. 
Based on this information, I ended up with 44 corruption cases in Poland and 17 in 
Hungary. When filtering these cases by whether they have involved PEPs (28 in Poland, 
11 in Hungary), in what business sectors they took place in and whether I can pair them 
up with a second corruption case, as well as the time period, I end up with three 
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corruption pairs in Poland and two and a half in Hungary. The selected corruption cases 
are presented in table 3.2.  
Table 3.2: Selected Corruption Cases in Poland & Hungary 
 Name Period Sector 
Poland 
Pair 1 
Concession for Polsat 1994 
Arts & Entertainment 
Rywingate 2002 
Pair 2 
Afera Automatowa 2002-2003 
Gambling 
Afera Hazardowa 2008-2009 
Pair 3 
Afera InterAms 1994-1995 
IT 
Infoafera 2008-2010 
Hungary 
Pair 1 
Tocsik Affair 1996 
Real Estate 
Hunvald Case 2003-2004 
Pair 2 
BKV/ Metro 4 2003-2006 
Construction 
Rise of Lajos Simickaa 1990-2010 
Pair 3b Energol Kft 1993-1995 Energy 
Note: The names of corruption cases generally come from its most prominent actor(s) involved or another 
striking characteristic. Unless otherwise noted, I have kept the name of the corruption case with which it is 
commonly referred to. 
aThe case of Lajos Simicka, who for a long time had been a close associate of Hungary’s current Prime 
Minister Victor Orbán, presents two types of corruption as the duration of their relationships allowed me to 
explore a change in the resource distribution between actors. 
bThe final corruption pair in Hungary lacks a counterpart as there was not enough data for a third pairing. 
The case of Energol Kft., nevertheless, highlights the lack of variation in types of corruption across 
industries. 
While I only ended up with two pairs in Hungary, one of the cases included 
creates special conditions through which I can test my argument of political and 
economic competition transforming systematically the corruption patterns over time. 
When investigating the details of one of the corruption cases in the construction sector in 
Hungary—the rise of the construction firm Közgép while the rest of the construction 
sector barely survived the economic crisis of 2008—I have found that the same political 
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and economic actors where involved in two other cases on the list. I therefore consider 
the relationship of these two actors—Lajos Simicska and Victor Orbán—as the corruption 
case under investigation. Because their relationship spans the entire period examined, it 
allows me to test the argument over time and involving the same actors but across 
multiple sectors. This contrasts well with the other corruption pairs, where I hold the 
sector constant but not the actors involved or period. I was not able to collect enough 
data for a second corruption case in the energy sector to form a third pair. Nevertheless, 
I briefly discuss this last corruption case as it offers the opportunity to test whether there 
exists any variation across industries, as conventional arguments suggest that we should. 
Within the class of known corruption cases there is little reason to assume that 
these cases are atypical. For one, the cases have been uncovered through various means, 
such as through investigations of law enforcement investigations or journalists, 
sometimes even in the course of another investigation, or because one of the involved 
actors came forward. Moreover, the environments in which these corruption cases took 
place suggest that the individuals that have operated within them were driven by the 
same overarching aims—profit maximization or maximizing votes and/or resources. 
Polish Corruption Cases. 
Corruption Pair 1: Arts & Entertainment Sector. 
Concession for Polsat: The case is about how Polsat (a private television 
company) received its broadcasting license in late January 1994. The National Council of 
Radio Broadcasting and Television (Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji, KRRiT) 
allegedly showed favoritism when granting the first and only nationwide TV-license to 
Polsat, in return for bribery payments. Investigations by the Office for State Protection 
(Urząd Ochrony Państwa, UOP) found evidence of previous criminal wrongdoings by the 
owner of Polsat, Zygmunt Solorz-Żak. The regional prosecutor, however, declined to 
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investigate the allegations further, citing lack of evidence. What makes this case 
interesting is that Zygmunt Solorz was at that time already one of the wealthiest 
individuals in Poland, having made his fortunes in the seventies and eighties abroad 
under dubious circumstances. The KRRiT, established in the early nineties, is 
responsible for issuing national broadcasting licenses and regulating the public media. 
Through these duties, its decision had an immense impact on shaping the Polish media 
landscape for the next decades. 
Rywingate: In several meetings taking place in July 2002, Lew Rywin—a Polish 
movie producer with international acclaim—apparently offered senior members of 
Agora, a Polish media conglomerate, the inclusion of a profitable provision in a new law 
on broadcasting. In particular, he promised that Agora would be able to buy Polsat, 
which the present version of the law prohibited. In return for his service, he asked for a 
substantial donation to a ‘powerful group of people close to the government.’ During the 
meetings, Rywin implied that the group consisted of high-ranking members of the then-
ruling SLD (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, Democratic Left Alliance) government, who 
had the discretionary power to remove an anti-monopoly-clause in the new law, thus 
allowing Agora to purchase Polsat. In return, it would need to pay USD 17.5 million, 5 
percent of the estimated market value of Polsat. The offer became public when one of 
those present in the meetings published the recordings of Rywin’s offer. Despite lengthy 
investigations, including a parliamentary inquiry committee, only Rywin ended up in 
jail. 
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Corruption Pair 2: Gambling Sector. 
Afera Automatowa: In 2002, during the introduction of a new bill to restrict 
gambling further, allegations arose that the SLD’s representatives in the Sejm34 proposed 
several provisions that would work contra that aim—for instance, businesses that had 
gambling machines on their property would need only pay a EUR 50 gambling fee 
instead of EUR 200. Several investigations later (including a parliamentary inquiry) the 
full story has only gotten more interesting. It turned out that senior MPs of the ruling 
Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO) also made such suggestions during the 
preparation stage of the bill. Any documents that would have supported these 
investigations were destroyed, including minutes of the parliamentary committee 
meetings. 
Afera Hazardowa: In this case, several allegations of corruption were made, 
including that the office of then-Prime Minister Donald Tusk leaked information about 
an ongoing investigation by the Central Anticorruption Bureau (Centralne Biuro 
Antykorupcyjne; CBA) to the targets—members of the prime minister’s (PM) own party, 
the PO. In fall 2009, the head of the CBA informed the prime minister in a secret 
meeting that the agency suspected that several high-ranking party members colluded 
with representatives of the gambling industry to eliminate certain restrictions in a new 
gambling law that was about to be passed in Parliament. The head of PO’s parliamentary 
club and the Minister of Sport and Tourism met with Ryszard Sobiesiak, an 
entrepreneur, in secret to discuss the potential of changing specific provisions in the law, 
including levying new taxes on gambling. The additional income would go the Ministry 
of Sports that was already preparing for the EURO 2012. Apart from these two PO 
                                                        
34 The Sejm is the lower house in Poland’s bicameral legislative, the upper house is the Senate. 
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politicians, also Grzegorz Schetyna, then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the 
Interior and Administration (Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji, 
MSWiA), were among the accused and dismissed from their positions. The head of the 
CBA Mariusz Kamiński, was also dismissed from his position. 
Corruption Pair 3: IT-Sector. 
Afera Interams: During his premiership from 1994 to 1995, Prime Minister 
Waldemar Pawlak and leader of the Polish People’s Party (PSL), allegedly helped a long-
term friend to win several large public procurement contracts for the computerization of 
multiple state-owned enterprises by organizing meetings between his friend and the 
directors of these firms. The accusations were levied at him because the firm Interams 
won these contracts against the recommendations of the tender committee and was 
almost bankrupt at the time of the tenders. Pawlak apparently also was a shareholder of 
Interams. Later, the Supreme Audit Office investigated and found several irregularities 
in how the contracts were awarded. Pawlak resigned a few months later. 
Infoafera: Between 2008 and 2010, several IT companies, including IBM and 
HP, bribed high-ranking government officials, such as the Director of the Centrum for 
IT-Projects of the MSWiA. The director apparently stood at the center of a large-scale 
corruption case involving public procurement contracts worth billions of zloty. The CBA 
and the Public Prosecution Office eventually arrested over 40 persons connected to the 
case, including the Directors of Sales of IBM and HP, as well as multiple public officials 
from the Centrum. 
Hungary Corruption Cases. 
Corruption Pair 1: Real Estate Sector. 
Tocsik Affair: In 1995, Hungary’s state agency for privatization (Állami 
Privatizációs és Vagyonkezelő Rt., ÁPV) hired the lawyer Márta Tocsik to negotiate the 
  77 
ÁPV’s outstanding payments to the municipalities in return for having privatized their 
lands. Tocsik received 10 percent of the money saved for the agency. When the details of 
this scheme became public, local authorities started investigating. They found out that 
she was approached by two men—Lászlót Boldvai and György Budai. Boldvai was the 
treasurer of the Hungarian Socialist Party (Magyar Szocialista Párt, MSZP) while Budai 
was a businessman close to the Alliance of Free Democrats, (Szabad Demokraták 
Szövetsége, SZDSZ). At that time, a coalition government between the reformed ex-
communist party MSZP and the liberal SZDSZ ruled the country. Tocsik confessed (but 
later withdrew it) that to keep her assignment, she was forced to pay a significant 
amount of the money into the budget of the MSZP and the SZDSZ. In 1996, after the 
scandal became public, the Minister for Privatization, Tamás Suchman, and the leaders 
of the ÁPV had to step down. 
Hunvald Case: Several major figures of the local government of the VII district of 
Budapest, including its mayor György Hunvald, participated in a corrupt real estate 
scheme between 2003 and 2005.35 With the aid of a real estate developer, the president 
of the district’s economic council and the mayor organized the sale of several valuable 
and publicly-owned buildings. They managed to sell the buildings below their market 
values, despite that the district has been declared an UNESCO World Heritage site and 
most residing tenants had a pre-emption right.36 Overall, the actors sold 17 buildings 
below their market value by subverting the oversight mechanisms in place to prevent 
                                                        
35 Every city district in Budapest has its own mayor in addition to the ‘chief mayor’ of the whole city. The 
VII. district is the famous Erzsébetváros district, a major tourist attraction. The historic Jewish quarter of 
Pest, including the Dohány Street Synagogue, which is the largest functioning synagogue in Europe, are 
located in the VII. district. 
36 A pre-emption right means that existing tenants had the first right to acquire ownership over their 
apartments. In also includes a clause about eviction procedures, “which require landlords to find alternative 
housing for those they want to evict” (Borish and Noel, 1996, p. 4). 
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exactly such corruption. The police eventually arrested over a dozen members of the 
city’s government and several economic actors and charged them with various 
corruption-related crimes. 
Corruption Pair 2: Construction Sector. 
BKV/ Metro-4: The BKV Zrt., Budapest’s public transportation company, began 
with the planning of the construction a fourth metro line in early 2000. The construction 
evolved into the largest case of corruption and fraud in Hungary in recent times. The 
entire project was worth around EUR 1,747,313,606, of which around EUR 1,053,372,541 
were affected by irregularities and fraudulent contracts. As the construction involved 
several European-wide tenders, multiple European firms participated in the 
construction. The beneficiaries in this public procurement corruption scheme where thus 
the international and national firms that won the contracts fraudulently and on the other 
hand several political actors that helped these companies win the contracts, including 
the former Prime Minister Péter Medgyessy. 
Lajos Simicska: Throughout the nineties and 2000s, the businessman Lajos 
Simicska was a close friend of Victor Orbán, head of the right Fidesz (Fiatal Demokraták 
Szövetsége) and current prime-minister of Hungary. Their names have shown up in 
several corruption cases on the full list of cases. The earliest case was the dubious sale of 
Fidesz’ Headquarter organized by Simicska in 1992. Orbán covered up where the money 
from the sale went. In the late 1990s, they were implicated in a tax-evasion scheme 
involving 14 companies who allegedly owned the Hungarian tax authorities over HUF 
400 million.37 By the late 2000s, Simicska’s economic fortunes again gained media 
                                                        
37 The case of ‘Kaya Ibrahim and Josip Tot’ took place in 1996 but only became public knowledge in 1999. 
Kaya Ibrahim and Josip Tot were the names of the new owners of the firms. However, neither of these two 
individuals was in Hungary at the time of the purchase. Copies of their passports were apparently enough to 
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attention. His construction company Közgép managed to make significant profits at a 
time when the rest of the construction sector barely managed to survive the economic 
crisis. Investigative reports revealed that Közgép made most of its money from public 
contracts.  
Because of the links among these various corruption cases, I will not analyze the 
case of Közgép alone. Instead, I consider it part of the larger corruption case that centers 
around Simicska and Orbán’s relationship from 1990 to 2010. The case also expands to 
include other sectors as well. As such, it offers an excellent test case to study whether the 
changes in the patterns of corruption hold across time and sectors. 
Corruption Pair 3: Energy Sector. 
Energol: When Hungary liberalized its oil-sector in 1990, the oil prices soon 
came close to world market prices. As Hungary went through an economic crisis at that 
time, it subsidized heating oil as otherwise its population would have been unable to 
afford it. The heating oil was in substance very similar to gasoline, which was higher 
priced and also more highly taxed. Because of these price differences between the 
subsidized heating oil and the gasoline, a large smuggling network soon sprung up. 
While at the beginning, a lot of small time corruption entrepreneurs took part, by 1994 
the firm Energol became one of the economic actors that controlled the distribution of 
the oil within Hungary. One the political side, several major political figures were 
accused of having profited from the corruption scheme. Overall, the Hungarian 
government lost several billion forints in tax revenues before the legal loophole that 
created the price differences was closed in 1995. Despite several investigations, including 
a parliamentary investigation, the full corruption case was never fully resolved. 
                                                        
legally transfer ownership of these companies. The real owners remain unknown. 
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There was not enough publicly available data to pair Energol with a second case 
in the energy sector. I will still examine Energol, to investigate whether Energol shares 
the corruption patterns of the other corruption cases occurring in the nineties or whether 
we observe any variation across sectors. 
Drawing Causal Inferences 
How do the selected corruption cases help answer the research question? I now 
turn to the research design used and how the research design, combined with detailed 
process-tracing, allows me to establish the causality between the emergence of 
competition in the political and economic domain and a transformation of corruption 
patterns. 
Research design setup. 
The fundamental assumption that underlies the research question of why and 
how the emergence of political and economic competition transformed the ‘Patterns of 
Corruption’ is that such a change in a country’s corruption pattern take place. To fully 
investigate the research question, I, therefore, first need to establish that such variation 
in corruption patterns exists, before delving into the causal mechanisms leading to said 
changes. The setup of the two case study chapters reflect this requirement. The first part 
of each case study examines the changes in corruption patterns across time in each 
country. For this, I start with categorizing the types of corruption involved in each case 
based on whether the core attributes, established in chapter 2, are fulfilled. I then move 
on to investigate the variations in the types and activities of corruption within each 
country. Through this approach, I can establish that corruption not only has not been 
constrained over the years, but also that a transformation of its types and activities has 
occurred. 
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In the second part of the case analysis, I move towards examining the causal 
process that links the emergence of competition in the political and economic domain to 
a shift in the corruption patterns in a country. In chapter 2, I presented the three causal 
claims that I expect to observe if the proposed causal mechanism manifests as expected. 
While I draw mostly on secondary sources for the analysis of the first claim, to 
investigate the second and third causal claims, I take the second corruption case in each 
pair and test whether the collected evidence supports the causal claims. In this way, I can 
trace the causal force that moves from the emergence of competition in politics and the 
economy to a transformation in the opportunity structures of actors (causal claim 1), 
which in turn encourage actors to form corrupt state-business relations (causal claim 2). 
These developments, in turn shape the balance of power within the relations, and thus 
determines the patterns of corruption (causal claim 3). Table 3.3 provides a visual 
representation of my research design.38 
                                                        
38 The research design is not about testing if one or more alternative hypotheses are better or worse in 
explaining an outcome, but concentrates on rigorously testing one causal mechanism and whether it has 
occurred as expected. 
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Table 3.3: Research Design 
Question answered How? (Analytical Strategy) 
Where in the 
dissertation?
How have ‘Patterns of 
Corruption’ changed over 
time in each country? 
For each country: 
- Identify the ‘Patterns of Corruption’ 
for each corruption case 
- Compare them within each sector 
First part of 
each case 
study 
Why has the emergence of 
political and economic 
competition transformed 
the ‘Patterns of Corruption? 
For each country: 
- Select the second corruption case 
(case having occurred in the 2000s) 
- Trace the outcome back to the causal 
factors, i.e., emergence of 
competition 
Second part of 
each case 
study 
In chapter 2, I developed a theoretical argument of why the emergence of 
political and economic competition transforms a country’s patterns of corruption. As the 
proposed causal mechanisms is too complex to examine it in one piece, I separated it 
into three parts, labeled causal claims 1, 2, and 3. To test whether a causal claim 
manifested as expected, I derived several propositions for each claim. The causal claims 
and propositions are framed as entities that take an action, in contrast to the 
covariational approach of presenting propositions in terms of variation of the 
independent and dependent variables. The difference in these two ontological 
approaches becomes even more visible in how evidence is presented and evaluated.39 
First, the examination of the propositions, and thus, of the causal claims, follows 
more the logic of a criminal trial, where the prosecutor first presents the individual 
observations, before explaining how they all connect together and combined provide 
evidence of a subject having committed a crime. In a similar fashion, I will first describe 
all the observations relevant for a proposition, before I evaluate the evidence and present 
                                                        
39 A note on terminology: while data refers to the information that I have collected on the topic, it still 
includes both signal and noise. Signals are those elements of the information that are relevant for answering 
the research question, i.e., the sum of the individual observations that are presented in support of a 
proposition are labeled evidence. Noise refers to those elements that are irrelevant and are more of a 
distraction. 
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my inferences. While this approach is unusual, it is not entirely unique. Fairfield (2013) 
combines the more traditional causal narrative format with a rigorous application of 
process tracing in the format of observations and inferences in her appendix. And while 
some might find the causal narrative format easier to read, it is ill-suited for explicitly 
evaluating evidence in support of a proposition (Bennett & Checkel, 2014, 3-37). I, 
therefore, privilege the presentation of clearly stated propositions about the underlying 
causal mechanism and the evidence in support of them at the expense of reading flow. 
My apologies to the reader. 
Second, evidence is systematically evaluated along two dimensions: uniqueness 
and measurement accuracy (Beach & Pedersen, 2013, p. 167).40 Uniqueness assesses 
whether plausible alternative explanations can explain the evidence for one of the 
propositions. Measurement accuracy, as the term implies, refers to the reliability of the 
evidence, such as whether the sources are unbiased.41 I combine these two dimensions to 
evaluate the inferential weight of the evidence which comes from multiple sources with 
varying degrees of accuracy.  
The ideal kind of evidence, and which provides the strongest support for a 
proposition, is direct evidence. Such evidence does not require additional assumptions to 
support a proposition and also has a high degree of uniqueness. Circumstantial or 
indirect evidence, in contrast, requires additional inferences to support a proposition 
                                                        
40 The dimensions create a table very close to the by-now famous four ideal tests for causal inferences in 
process-tracing - straw-in-the-wind, hoop, double decisive, and smoking gun tests (some recent works that 
give a throughout explanation of these four tests of causal inferences are Bennett and Checkel (2014), Collier 
(2011), and Mahoney (2012)). Fairfield (2013) provides an excellent example of how to employ these tests in 
practice. While I will not employ these four tests, the idea behind them is useful to establish general 
guidelines on how to weight the various observations and thus the evidence put forth in favor of a 
proposition. 
41 When describing the data collection process below, I also explain how I ensure the reliability of the data 
sources. 
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and has a lower degree of uniqueness, meaning that plausible alternative explanations 
exist for why we could have observed the evidence. The adjectives weak, moderate, or 
strong then refer to the level of measurement accuracy of the evidence. In short, by 
stating in advance how I will evaluate evidence, I can clearly identify when evidence does 
(not) support a proposition or causal claim.42 
Discussion of data sources & operationalization. 
The last section concentrates on the data collection process, in particular, how I 
identify the key concepts of interests, as well as what data sources I use. The section 
covers also the crucial question of how I intent to ensure measurement accuracy. 
Keeping the definitions of the key concepts from chapter 2 in mind, I now turn to 
the issue of how to operationalize them. To operationalize competition and opportunity 
structures, I follow the conventional approach. 
Identifying concepts of interest 
Multiple indicators exist to capture competition, especially when assessing the 
variation in the number of actors within the political or economic domain. For instance, 
in the case of political competition, the number of effective party competition (ENEP, 
referring to the number of parties that are strong enough to impact the political decision-
making process), but also voter concentration, and electoral volatility can all provide 
information about changes in the competitive environment. I operationalize economic 
competition also in multiple ways. The number of enterprises in a market, introduction 
of competition-oriented reforms, and also financial openness to foreign investments, are 
                                                        
42 The risk of falling prey to confirmation bias, i.e., overestimating the weight of evidence that supports one’s 
theory while underestimating the value of evidence that weakens said theory, is a major challenge for process 
tracing researchers. By making it clear how I intend to evaluate evidence, I hope to mitigate the risk to a 
certain degree. 
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among some of the indicators that are employed to analyze the level of competition in a 
market. To capture the actor’s opportunity structures, that is the actor’s incentives and 
constraints, I follow the two approaches common in social sciences—examining the legal 
framework that surrounds them and observing the actor’s patterns of behavior. 
The concept of state-business relations is harder to operationalize. In chapter 2, I 
presented the five causal attributes that need to be present for a relationship to be of 
interest. Each of these attributes, however, can manifest itself through various 
indicators, depending on the context. In table 3., I present an overview of the attributes 
and their possible indicators. First, long-term relationships can either occur through 
personal or professional ties between the actors, such as related to each other by blood or 
by marriage or by being connected through business ties (FATF, 2013, p. 5). Second, the 
resources exchanged between the actors can be categorized into material and non-
material resources. Estimating the value of the latter, however, is far harder as these 
kinds of resources need to be first transformed.43 
                                                        
43 Imagine a stockbroker receiving inside information about an upcoming dismissal of the CEO of a firm; the 
information has no value unless the stockbroker also acts on this information. 
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Table 3.4: Causal Attributes and Indicators of corrupt state-business relations 
Causal Attributes Indicators 
Long-term relationship 
between political and economic 
actors 
• Personal connections through familial ties or 
friendships 
• Professional ties through some formal connections 
between actors or their businesses. E.g. Sitting on 
the Board of Directors, senior positions in a 
company or state agency, or having shared 
ownership over businesses,  
Political and Economic Actors • Official source of power of an actor 
Resources exchanged • Material resources such as money or goods 
• Non-material resources, or those that will need to 
be transformed into money such as access to 
privileged information, expertise, favoritism, or 
access to policy-makers. 
Element of corruption in the 
relationship 
• Violation of laws and regulations 
• Exclusion of other actors that also would have had a 
right of inclusion. 
• Criticism of exchange by other relevant authorities, 
such as state audit offices, or the European Union. 
Third, the element of corruption in the actors’ state-business relationship 
concentrates on how the exchange of resources took place. Did the exchange follow the 
standard channels commonly used for such an exchange, either regulated by laws or 
through social norms, or have actors circumvented these channels? Last, to establish 
whether a state-business relationship involves corruption, several indicators are useful. 
The most obvious indicator of such corrupt state-business relations will therefore be any 
violations of legislation as stated in court documents or similar reports. Another 
manifestation can take the form of violating social norms and procedures that are not 
always formally acknowledged. In these cases, a strong indicator is criticism of the 
exchange by other governmental agencies, such as the Ministry of Finance or the 
European Audit Office. The element of corruption in a state-business relationship also 
requires that the exchange has excluded actors that had a right of inclusion. An example 
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of such an exclusion can be a public procurement where only one actor is invited to 
submit a tender and automatically wins it, while the official (or standard) procedures 
require that a specific number of firms are invited. These other economic actors, thus, 
have been excluded even though they had the right of inclusion. If combined with a 
judgment by an arbitration court, for instance, suggesting that the process was not in 
accord with the rules, it provides an even stronger indicator for corruption. 
All forms of corruption are notoriously difficult to investigate empirically. 
Chapter 2 developed the three main types of corruption and their causal attributes: 
covert political finance, local capture, and legal corruption. Now, I describe some of the 
expected empirical manifestations of the three types of corruption, that is, I explain how 
the causal attributes of each corruption type can be identified in the selected cases (also 
illustrated in table 3.5).44 
                                                        
44 The following discussion differs from what I have described in chapter 2. In the previous chapter, I have 
described what kinds of evidence I ideally expect to find if the argument is true. Here, I describe how I 
identify, based on the data collected, each concept. 
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Covert political financing is likely to exist when we can observe that the political 
actor is the main beneficiary in the exchange and the sources of the contributions are 
hidden from outsiders to the organization but might even be hidden from internal 
oversight mechanisms. Strong indicators for this type of corruption are the presence of 
complex transfer structures, especially when it involves offshore accounts or otherwise 
entities that ensure anonymity, the absence of records indicating that the income has 
been reported to the relevant oversight institutions, as well as signs that the exchange 
mainly benefited the political actor. 
Local capture is characterized by state agencies, policies, or procedures being 
manipulated to benefit a few actors at the expense of many, and such a manipulation 
harms either the public’s interest or violates the principle of impartiality. Major signs 
that local capture has taken place are when the captured entity deviates from its 
standard behavior in similar instances, and when other official agencies critique the 
entity for its behavior, especially criticizing it for violating the principle of impartially or 
harming the publics interests. In addition, actors that have a commonly accepted right of 
being included in a procedure, for instance, are excluded for fraudulent reasons. An 
example of this would be when a company gets excluded from a bidding process despite 
having fulfilled all the requirements. Evidence that their exclusion was for fraudulent 
reasons might then come in the form of an arbitration court ruling their exclusion 
invalid. 
Legal corruption is a particular fuzzy concept to capture as the corrupt behavior 
is by definition legal or at least falls into the gray areas of the law. What matters is that 
the manner of the exchange is viewed by the majority of people as illegitimate. Such 
signs of an illegitimate exchange can then be that the public, once it becomes aware of 
the transaction, decries it as unfair or unethical, or that the manner in which the 
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exchange took place is atypical and does not confirm with standard procedures. The 
benefits for the economic actors, or at least the higher chances of securing the benefits, 
are achieved because of the economic actor’s access to the political actor. The political 
actor in turn, receive some kind of gain but these depend on several factors, in particular 
on the time horizon of the political actor and the services involved in the exchange. For 
instance, in case the political actor believes they will continue holding a political office, it 
can be paid through campaign contributions but it might prefer to be paid in form of 
“private resources that have particular value for the corrupt political: influence over the 
mass media or votes for example.” (Della Porta & Vannucci, 1999, pp. 61–62). 
Data sources & validity and reliability concerns. 
While corruption is a sensitive topic to research, it is not impossible. One of the 
key challenges of studying corruption is finding enough data to test one’s argument. I 
therefore use a combination of pre-existing material and in-depth interviews. Examples 
of such pre-existing material are economic and political data sets, produced by 
international organizations such as the World Bank (WB) or national state agencies, 
reports by media, non-governmental organizations, and foreign governmental 
investigative bodies, as well as government records and other official documents 
produced by state agencies. 
Seventeen interviews were collected during field work in Poland and Hungary in 
June and July 2017. I selected the participants based on their knowledge about and 
experience with relevant corruption cases in the country. Their professional background 
included scholars from various disciplines, investigative journalists, civil sector, and 
public officials in the state administration. As such, the interviewees were not selected 
because of their (alleged) involvement in a corruption case but based on their knowledge 
about the ‘nuts and bolts’ of already closed corruption cases. Journalists were particular 
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helpful in adding knowledge about the nuances that they often had to leave out when 
reporting on corruption cases that they have uncovered. Moreover, the interviewees 
often provided crucial information about the context in which cases occurred. For 
instance, media would report on how corruption in the public procurement process took 
place, but rarely would the accounts include information on how such procedures 
generally operate. To obtain such information, I interviewed individuals familiar with the 
public procurement process and were able to place the events in context. Last, when 
referring to interviewees, I do not include details that would make it possible to identify 
individuals, due to the nature of the research topic. 
While corruption is a sensitive topic to research, it is not impossible. Two major 
challenges that any researcher on corruption faces are that sources provide biased or 
even false information, or the data needed to confirm a proposition is unavailable. 
Regarding the first problem of people ‘mis-remembering’ certain events, I corroborate 
any relevant material through other sources, independent of the first. For instance, 
statements made in a media report can be verified in official records (e.g., court 
documents or parliamentary inquiry reports) or other reliable material (e.g., reports 
published by non-government or international organizations). 
To address potential reliability issues in sources, I draw mostly on sources that 
have distinguished themselves by providing a factually accurate picture. Especially in 
instances where I rely on the reports of one or two investigative journalists, I previously 
checked their reputation. One sign for high quality journalism, for example, is when the 
reporters or their employers have won international awards for investigative journalism. 
In addition to the above-mentioned challenge of dealing with bias in sources, 
another problem that can occur during the data collection process is not being able to 
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collect enough data.45 Three possible explanations for such a situation come to mind. 
First, and the most obvious one, is that not finding the expected evidence for a causal 
claim or one of its propositions invalidates parts of the proposed causal mechanism. But 
there are two alternative explanations for not finding the expected evidence. 
One possibility is that the lack of evidence that I have encountered, without 
finding any obvious explanation (e.g., an authoritarian regime or major political events), 
is in itself a sign of a hitherto unknown phenomena. The logic follows what Defense 
Secretary Rumsfeld once called the ‘unknown unknowns’ in a 2002 interview.46 Another 
possibility is that the lack of data can be in itself evidence, especially if I can reasonably 
expect to find an empirical manifestation of my theory and there are obvious reasons for 
why the data cannot be collected (Beach & Pedersen, 2016, p. 191), such as not gaining 
access to an archive, material classified as national security, corrupt actors are actively 
hiding potential evidence, and so forth. Given the research questions, the latter option is 
likely to occur. 
There are two approaches I have developed to deal with such a lack of data. First, 
I look for alternative empirical footprints that the causal claims could have left behind. 
In other words, it challenges me to think creatively about other data sources that can 
help me answer the research question (Kapiszewski, Maclean, & Read, 2015). Second, if 
                                                        
45 In Poland, for instance, I was confronted with an unexpected lack of willing interviewees. While it is not 
entirely surprising that I have encountered the problem given the research topic, the extent to which 
interviewees were unavailable is unexpected. And while this lack of interviewees has had some negative 
effect on my ability to collect data, it does not necessarily refute the entire argument. It only meant that I 
have to look for data elsewhere. 
46 At a press conference, Rumsfeld made the following memorable statement: "Reports that say that 
something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; 
there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there 
are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don't know we don't 
know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category 
that tend to be the difficult ones." Rumsfeld (2002). 
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the first solution does not prove adequate, I state explicitly what kind of evidence I 
expect to find (as previously) but also add where, given the case-specific context, I expect 
to find it. Through this, I want to clarify why the lack of evidence is not yet a sign to 
reject a proposition or the larger causal claim; instead, it leaves open the option to verify 
the proposition once access to the material is granted. 
In this chapter I have described how I trace the micro-mechanism that links the 
emergence of competition to a change in corruption patterns. I have started out by 
discussing the logic behind my case selection of the two countries and of the corruption 
cases. While the selection of Poland and Hungary has been straight-forward, the 
selection of the corruption cases was more complex, as it required me to filter the cases 
based on the PEP involved, the business sector, and the time period, before pairing them 
up. As a result, I ended up with three corruption pairs in Poland and two-and-a-half in 
Hungary. In the data analysis section that followed I presented first the research design, 
before explaining in more detail how I use process-tracing to trace the causal mechanism 
through its separate parts. In the final section I explained the data collection process 
employed. Specifically, I discussed the indicators used to identify the key concepts of 
interests, which are patterns of corruption, corrupt state-business relations, opportunity 
structures, and political and economic competition, and the data sources used in this 
research. 
The next two chapters explore how the causal mechanism—split into three causal 
claims—played out in Poland and Hungary. Chapter 4 is a case analysis of how the 
emergence of political and economic competition transformed systematically the 
corruption patterns in Poland. Chapter 5 is a case analysis of the transformation of 
Hungary’s corruption patterns. Both chapters follow the outline discussed in the 
research design section in this chapter. The first part of each case study chapter 
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categorizes the corrupt types and activities of each corruption case. The second part of 
each case study then traces the micro-causal mechanism through which the 
transformation of corruption patterns occurred. Consistent with the theoretical 
framework from chapter 2, where I have explained the constituent claims of the causal 
mechanism, I test each causal claim individually before assessing the validity of the 
entire causal mechanism. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CASE STUDY: POLAND 
In the last chapter, I presented my research design and described the method and 
data sources that I will use. One of the major conclusions of the third chapter was that I 
will need to unpack my research question about how and why the emergence of 
competition in politics and the economy transformed the corruption patterns in the CEE 
countries. For this, I have selected six corruption cases for Poland and Hungary, based 
on three criteria: the involvement of a PEP47, the business sector, and the time period. 
For Poland, I ended up with pairs of corruption cases in the Art & Entertainment sector, 
the Gambling sector, and the IT-sector.  
In chapter 2, I argued that the emergence of competition in politics and the 
economy transforms the opportunity structures of actors in a form that encourages them 
to enter into corrupt state-business relationships. The resource distribution within these 
corrupt state-business relationships will in turn determine the type of corruption that 
emerges. Chapter four now explores how well the theorized causal mechanism--split into 
its three causal claims--holds up when examining the case of Poland. Underlying this 
argument is, however, the assumption that such a transformation of patterns has indeed 
taken place. The first part of the research question therefore concentrates on how the 
corruption patterns differ. To answer the question, I will identify the corruption type and 
activities for each of the selected corruption cases.48 With these findings in hand, I can 
turn to the second part of the research question, where I ask why the emergence of 
                                                        
47 Recall from chapter 2 that a PEP, i.e., a political actor, is not necessarily an elected official, but someone 
with decision-making authority at the higher levels of the state administration. 
48 I have discussed the causal attributes for the three main corruption types and the most common activities 
that will be employed in each type in chapter 2. 
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political and economic competition has transformed Poland’s patterns of corruption. As 
I have separated the causal mechanisms into its three main components—causal claim 1, 
2, and 3—I can examine each of these claims individually. This approach enables me to 
investigate the underlying micro-causal mechanisms that link competition to corruption. 
The chapter begins with a brief review of the political and economic situation in 
Poland in the nineties. I also sketch out the baseline corruption forms that have existed 
to highlight the emerging differences. The substantive body of the chapter are its two 
parts: the categorization of the corruption cases and tracing the causal mechanism 
between competition and the type of corruption that emerges. The chapter ends by 
discussing the key findings and a preliminary review of how well the theorized causal 
mechanisms has held up when confronted with the conundrum of human behavior. 
Background information 
In June 1989, Poland initiated a chain reaction that transformed the political 
landscape in over a dozen countries. After long-winded negotiations between the ruling 
communists and the opposition group Solidarity lasting throughout 1988, the parties 
finally agreed to allow open elections for one-third of the seats to the Sejm, the lower 
house, and all seats of the reestablished Senate, the upper house. In the elections of 
1989, the Solidarity movement won most of the open seats and eventually ended up in 
government, headed by Tadeusz Mazowiecki. A few months later, the country then held 
its fully free presidential elections, were Lech Wałęsa, one of the leaders of the Solidarity 
movement, received the majority of votes and became president. In October 1991, Poland 
then held its first free parliamentary elections, and a coalition government formed 
between different factions of the Solidarity movement. 
When Mazowiecki's government took over in September 1989, its main priority 
was to improve the country’s economic situation. The previous communist government 
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had already introduced several liberalizing reforms and privatizations programs. The 
main contribution of the last communist government was to make it simpler for 
individuals to establish new firms and provided a legal basis for transforming state-
owned enterprises (SOE) into private entities (Błaszczyk & Dabrowski, 1993). These 
efforts, however, were too little too late, and Poland’s economy continued to decline 
(Borish & Noel, 1996, p. 151). Mazowiecki's government, therefore, introduced a new and 
radical economic program, later dubbed the 'Balcerowicz Plan', which concentrated on 
rapid privatization (Błaszczyk & Dabrowski, 1993, p. 14). The program received its name 
from its creator, finance minister Leszek Balcerowicz, a technocratic economist from the 
Solidarity movement (Innes, 2002, p. 94). Over the next years, Poland’s economy 
opened up to foreign economic actors, experienced further privatizations, and became 
one of the largest economies in Europe, its GDP rising from USD 65.98 bln in 1990 to 
USD 142.14 bln in 1995, and USD 171.89 bln in 2000 (World Bank, 2018). 
In contrast to the country’s economic transition, its political transition was less 
steady. The political landscape has been characterized by a certain ‘stable electoral 
volatility’, or what Grzymała-Busse (2003) termed ‘robust party competition’. Two main 
features stand out. First, throughout the years, Poles would constantly be confronted 
with new electoral options as political actors kept changing their names and alliances 
(Fidrya, 2013, pp. 95–104; Holmes, 2006, p. 188). Second, similar to Hungary, it also 
experienced a repeated ideological turnover in government, moving from a post-
Solidarity right government in 1991, to a post-communist left coalition between the SLD 
and the PSL (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, in English: Polish People's Party) in 1993, 
back to right government led by the Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza 
Solidarność, AWS), whose leaders had their roots in the Solidarity movement, and back 
to a post-communist left coalition of the SLD and the PSL in 2001. Despite these political 
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tumultuous times, however, Poland did manage to slowly stabilize their political party 
system (Sikk, 2005, p. 396). 
Just as the political and economic regimes transformed, so did Poland corruption 
dynamics. And while there exists no systematic analysis of the changes in the country’s 
corruption during that time, the few studies that exist provide some insights.  
One illuminating study, addressed already the changes in corruption dynamics 
that took place with the introduction of economic reforms in the 1980s. It finds that 
before reforms where introduced, the most common forms of corruption were either 
'legalized corruption', that is, the privileges granted to the communist elites that included 
access to highly valuable goods and services, and the illegal abuse of power by these 
elites.49 During the reform era, corruption changed to a more symbiotic relationship 
between the growing private sector and public officials. What has not changed through 
these phases was graft—horizontal exchanges, commonly barter exchanges, to procure 
additional resources (Tarkowski, 1989, pp. 51–62).  
Kamiński (1997) examined more closely the differences in the kinds of corruption 
practices by the various elites, both communist and the opposition, in the late eighties 
and early nineties. He argues that while communist nomenklatura relied on its privileged 
status to concentrated on redistributing state assets into their own accounts, the anti-
communist Solidarity movement, in contrast, practiced a more opportunistic form of 
corruption where they used the privatization process to strengthen their power-base and 
showed a willful ignorance of conflict-of-interest situations (see also Holmes 2006). 
Holmes (2006) adds that political actors continued attempting to build up patron-client 
                                                        
49 The establishment of Solidarity and other opposition movements was, in fact, in response to the elites’ 
excessive corruption (Garton Ash, June 13, 1991; Holmes, 1993; Holmes, 2006). 
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networks as “as a form of self-protection in uncertain times”. In sum, these studies 
suggest that corruption in Poland was typical to what took place in the other CEE 
countries as well. Citizens participated in everyday graft, that is, bribery, to obtain 
necessary resources and services, while they also relied on horizontal and vertical 
informal networks, to receive additional resources but also to obtain protection. 
Categorization ‘Patterns of Corruption’ 
Before exploring how competitive processes transformed the patterns of 
corruption in Poland, I need to establish that such a change in patterns has indeed 
occurred. Hence, in the following section, I identify the corruption type and the activities 
involved for each of the selected corruption cases. The section presents each pair 
separately, starting with the pair of corruption cases in the Arts & Entertainment sector, 
followed by the second pair of cases in the gambling sector. The last pair of cases takes 
place in the IT sector.50 
Corruption Pair 1: Arts & Entertainment Sector 
 Concession for Polsat. 
Case Summary: Two days after the private TV-station Polsat won the first 
nationwide broadcasting license on January 28, 1994, President Lech Wałęsa publicly 
announced that the head of the National Broadcasting Council KRRiT took a bribe from 
Polsat’s owner Solorz-Żak. While Polsat’s competitors did not immediately claim that 
bribe payments were involved, they did claim that the tendering process involved 
                                                        
50 As will become clear in the following pages, Poland exhibits some interesting features when it comes to 
the types of corruption that have been identified. Out of the six cases, four have been categorized as 
instances of legal corruption, the remaining two have both taken place in the IT sector. Without going into 
details here on the underlying reasons, I attribute the dominance of legal corruption to particular 
institutional features that prevent political actors from accumulating too many resources. The lack of 
resources, in turn, placed the political actors in a weaker position in the corrupt state-business relationship 
with the economic actors. 
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favoritism. Marek Markiewicz, the Head of KRRiT, denied these accusations vehemently. 
What makes the president’s charges particularly interesting is that Wałęsa himself 
appointed Markiewicz as Head of KRRiT. The KRRiT consists of nine members, who are 
in theory apolitical. Because three are appointed by the Sejm, by the Senate, and by 
President, respectively, the council is viewed as a political body. Wałęsa ordered then the 
Office for State Protection UOP to investigate the matter.51 But before the UOP could 
report on their findings, Wałęsa removed Markiewicz from his position an hour after the 
latter signed the concession agreement with Polsat on March 1, 1994. Wałęsa claimed 
that by signing the agreement, Markiewicz violated Article 36 of the Broadcasting Act, 
which states that no concession should be granted to anyone that intends to broadcast 
programs that threaten Poland’s culture, do not exhibit good manners or harm the 
country’s interests. As the dismissal was heavily disputed it was brought in front of the 
Constitutional Court. In May the Court declared the removal as unauthorized and 
allowed Markiewicz to return to his position. He was, however, unavailable. He had 
already taken a new job with Polsat.52 
                                                        
51 While the UOP’s investigation were kept confidential, a few findings became public. The agency’s 
investigation revealed that Solorz helped launder money for Nicoli Grauso, the owner of the illegally 
broadcasting TV-station Polonia 1. Unfortunately, I could not find any explanation for why Solorz would help 
one of his competitors in such a manner. 
52 While the actual ‘corruption’ is difficult to identify, the case fulfills all the necessary attributes of 
corruption: (a) it involves an political decision-maker in the form of Markiewicz, the Head of KRRiT, (b) who 
violated the norms or laws regulating his office, as he took a position within Polsat a month after leaving his 
office, (c) the official receives some kind of competition, again in the form of new position, and (d) the 
official’s decision harms the publics interests, as the granting of a nationwide broadcasting license to a 
businessman whose past suggests highly criminal activities and who lied on his broadcasting application. 
Intensive media investigations revealed that Solorz-Żak owned four different ID-licenses with different ID-
numbers as well as ten passports, with various names. In several in-depth articles the conservative-liberal 
newspaper Rzeczpospolita explained how Solorz not only acquired these documents over the years but also 
traced the criminal origins of his early fortunes. In one of the articles, the newspaper revealed how Solorz 
managed to intentionally overestimated Polsat’s capital and so mislead KRRiT. 
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Corruption Type & Activities: The case provides an illustration of legal 
corruption. For one, it falls within the gray zones of law. When the UOP’s report about 
Solorz’ criminal past appeared in May 1994, the prosecution started to investigate. But 
just a few days later it closed its investigation again, due to an apparent lack of evidence 
of any criminal activities. Second, the public official, in this case the head of KRRiT 
Markiewicz, received his compensation indirectly—perfectly symbolized by him receiving 
a job with Polsat, while the Constitutional Court was still deciding on whether his 
removal as head of KRRiT was legal. The third attribute of the legal corruption type 
requires that the economic actor either receives a benefit or at least manages to increase 
its chances of receiving a benefit to which the actor has a right to anyway. Solorz, as the 
owner of a TV-station, had the right to bid for the national broadcasting concession. 
Last, the way the exchange took place was illegitimate and showed signs of favoritism. 
Such favoritism became even more apparent when Polsat received the concession and 
was allowed to keep it despite serious irregularities in Solorz’ application as the UOP 
report showed. 
That the entire situation symbolizes legal corruption becomes even clearer when 
we consider the corrupt activities that took place. As theorized in chapter 2, the case 
involved instances of covert lobbying, creating conflict-of-interest situations, relying on 
personal and political connections, and the lack of implementing existing regulations to 
foster accountability. Covert lobbying as well as creating a conflict-of-interest situation 
are visible in Markiewicz taking a job at Polsat a month after his dismissal from KRRiT. 
He had signed the concession agreement with his future employer. At this time, the 
Constitutional Court was still considering whether his dismissal from his position as 
head of KRRiT was legal. Several of Solorz’s close associates at Polsat and in the TV 
branch where politically connected persons. For instance, there were Piotr Nurowski, 
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former propaganda secretary of the Central Committee of the PZPR in Warsaw, and 
Andrzej Majkowski, former secretary and vice-president of the Union of Socialist Youth. 
There was also Wiesław Walendziak, the general director of Polsat responsible for the 
program who has been linked to the far-right. On January 1, 1994, Walendziak became 
the head of the Polish state-TV TVP. 
 Rywingate. 
Case Summary: During two weeks in July 2002, Lew Rywin, a famous Polish 
movie producer involved in Oscar-winning movies such as Schindler’s List and The 
Pianist, met with the president of the Polish media and publishing empire Agora. During 
these meetings, Rywin proposed to lobby on Agora’s behalf. At that time, a bill 
overhauling the existing Media Law made its way through the legislative process. In the 
current version of the bill, the anti-monopoly provisions were so strict that they would 
have prevented Agora from purchasing Polsat, which it has been wanting to do since 
2001 Polsat (Siemieniec & Makarczyk, November 7, 2001). In exchange for Rywin’s 
lobbying activities for Agora, the firm was supposed to pay USD 17.5 million to his firm 
Heritage Film, which he would transfer to ‘People in Power’53. He implied during these 
meetings that he was representing the top of the government, even hinting that he spoke 
for Prime Minister Leszek Miller (SLD). 
The meetings and the lobbying offer were just the latest attempts to manipulate 
the bill. Already in its early drafting stage at the KRRiT, some of KRRiT’s members 
showed unusual interest in the anti-monopoly provision. In January 2002, fellow KRRiT 
members became suspicious when Włodzimierz Czarzasty not only criticized each draft 
of the provision that a legal scholar drafting the rest of the bill proposed. Czarzasty even 
                                                        
53 In Polish: „grupy trzymającej władzę”. 
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went so far to write the final draft himself. The KRRiT passed his version only due to a 
loophole in their decision-making procedure. When the draft then moved to the 
government, the Deputy Minister for Culture started to show a remarkable interest in the 
bill, again concentrating most of her attention on the sections pertaining to the anti-
monopoly phrasing. By the time Rywin made his offer to Agora, several other individuals 
not formally involved in the legislative processes have participating in amending the bill, 
among others the President of TVP. 
When Rywin met with Agora’s president mid-July, she emailed afterward the 
editor-in-chief of Gazeta Wyborza, a national daily newspaper and Agora’s crown jewel, 
informing him of the offer.54 They concluded that offer was a trap. To find out more 
about the organizers behind Rywin’s offer, they invited Rywin to Michnik’s office, where 
the Editor tried to elicit the names of the ‘people in power’. Rywin did not explicitly 
mention the Prime minister’s involvement, but he continued to persist that the ‘people in 
power’ could make the appropriate changes to the law. The editor recorded the entire 
conversation. In the next months, Gazeta Wyborza concentrated their efforts on 
exposing these ‘people in power’, but their investigations failed to uncover any evidence. 
By December 27, they published their recording of Rywin’s attempt to solicit a major 
bribe payment. Soon afterward, a parliamentary inquiry commission started to 
investigate the affair. In the end, Rywin went to jail for two years, and several political 
actors such as Czarzasty and the Deputy Minister also faced criminal charges. The prime 
minister also ended up resigning in May 2004, in part for his lack of handling the matter. 
                                                        
54 Gazeta Wyborza’s editor-in-chief is Adam Michnik, a leading figure during the Solidarity movement and 
member of the Round table. Ironically, Michnik has always been an outspoken critic of corruption, and even 
was jailed for his criticism of the communist regime in the eighties. 
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Corruption Type & Activities: The case is unique in this sample of corruption 
cases as it presents a failed case of corruption. Agora did not take up the offer of Lew 
Rywin, who had been acting on behalf of several members of the ruling SLD. It seemed 
that idiosyncratic factors predisposed Agora to not take part in the corrupt exchange, 
such as the past of Gazeta Wyborza’s editor-in-chief, and less any outside deterring 
factors, such as the authorities. 
While the case falls under legal corruption, it exhibits features making it 
analogous to local capture. The difference lies in what one considers to be the center of 
the case, either the continuous attempts within the SLD to manipulate the bill or the 
outright involvement of economic actors. As the focus of the research is on the 
interaction between political and economic actors, I will concentrate on the latter aspects 
of the case. 
The first attribute of legal corruption requires the most comprehensive 
explanation. Rywin’s offer explicitly called the USD 17.5 million that Agora ought to pay 
a bribe. The entire setup of the transfer, however, falls more in line with what we can 
observe whenever a firm lobbies a political actor. The reason for the label bribe is likely 
because by 2001, Poland had outlawed any campaign contributions of legal entities, such 
as Agora, to political parties.55 
The second attribute of legal corruption requires that the exchange between the 
political and economic actor is illegitimate. Any exchange between Agora and Rywin, 
acting on behalf of a group of political actors, would have fulfilled the criteria. The case 
sparked one of the largest public outcries about corruption in Poland and subsequently 
lead to the introduction of several tough anti-corruption measures (Corruption in 
                                                        
55 I will go in more depth on the topic of political financing in second part of chapter four. 
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Poland, April 17, 2003; PL 001, personal communication, 2017, Jun 19. Location: 
Warsaw, Poland; PL 002, personal communication, 2017, Jun 27. Location: Warsaw, 
Poland). The case also possesses the third attribute, as Agora’s chances of receiving a 
more favorable legislation would have undoubtedly improved if they would have 
participated in the deal. In summer 2002, the SLD formed together with the UP and the 
PSL a coalition government. As the largest partner in the coalition, SLD occupied the 
most significant positions in the government and state administration, such as the prime 
minister’s office, the deputy prime minister’s office, the Ministry of Interior MSWiA), 
and the Ministry of Culture. The fourth attribute, demanding that the political actor 
receives their rewards indirectly is also fulfilled. The plan was for Agora to transfer the 
money to the accounts of Rywin’s firm, who in turn would transfer the money to the 
SLD. Not only would Agora not directly transfer the money to the party, but the money 
would also not be transferred to a few individuals within the party.  
As to the involved corrupt activities, several of those mentioned in chapter 2 
occur here as well. Rywin emphasized his close professional and personal connection 
with the prime minister to illustrate to Agora’s president how he would lobby on the 
firm’s behalf. Rywin also attempted to create a conflict of interest situation as he wanted, 
in addition to the financial remuneration he would receive as intermediary, the position 
of president of Polsat once Agora took over the TV station. Last, the entire scheme would 
have involved covert lobbying activities at several key points in the legislative process, in 
addition to those that apparently already existed.  
Corruption Pair 2: Gambling Sector. 
Afera Automatowa. 
Case Summary: From Fall 2002 to Winter 2003, the Sejm debated a new bill on 
gambling. At the center of the scandal stood Maciej Skórka, owner of Nowapol and a 
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major player in the gambling industry, and Jerzy Jaskiernia, the head of the SLD’s 
parliamentary faction in the Sejm.56 The story broke with the publication of a strange 
testimony of a mafioso and the statement of an independent member of parliament (MP) 
who has overheard the conversation between the head of the National Prosecution 
Service and a Dutch lobbyist. Both stories claimed that Jerzy Jaskiernia received bribe 
payments in the summer of 2003. Further investigations by the media revealed that 
Maciej Skórka had almost unlimited access to the MPs in the Sejm and its various 
subcommittees as he was registered as a voluntary assistant (społeczny asystent) for the 
SLD during the previous year. In addition, several amendments that had been 
introduced by various SLD members while the bill passed through the legislative 
committees had been written by Nowapol’s lawyer. Skórka also seemed to have paid over 
USD 50 thousand to ensure that the new gambling law would not harm Nowapol’s 
business activities. Apart from Jaskiernia, reports also mentioned that thirty other SLD 
MPs had been supportive of Nowapol’s en deavors. However, the investigations could 
not establish any direct link between these MPs and Nowapol. While the prosecution 
launched several investigations, they were soon shut down again due to ‘lack of 
evidence’. The only visible consequence was Jaskiernia’s resignation as head of the SLD’s 
parliamentary faction in 2004. 
Corruption Type & Activities: The four causal attributes of legal corruption are 
all present in the corruption case. First, we can observe the issue of legality and how even 
law enforcement was not always certain that any laws have been broken—especially 
when it came to Maciej Skórka’s access to MPs. Second, while most of the political actors 
                                                        
56 In Poland, the representatives of a given party in the Sejm or Senate form themselves into a parliamentary 
faction. This group assumes responsibility for implementing the party’s program in the Sejm and translating 
the party’s program into state policies. 
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have received only indirect benefits, Jerzy Jaskiernia apparently also received direct 
bribe payments.57 Third, the economic actor Nowapol had increased their chances of 
receiving a particular benefit, such as the passing of a favorable gambling law, through 
their corrupt behavior. Last, the way the exchange took place has been viewed as 
illegitimate. When investigations revealed the unlimited access that Skórka had to 
Jaskiernia and the other MPs, the Marshal of the Sejm introduced a major overhaul of 
the regulations dealing with voluntary assistants in February 2004. 
Most of the common corrupt activities surrounding legal corruption have been 
present in this corruption case. There were the close personal and professional ties 
between Skórka and Jaskiernia that Gazeta Wyborza traced back to the mid-nineties. 
Already then, these two already worked together on gambling regulations. Additionally, 
we find covert lobbying activities by several lobbyists from the gambling industry, 
foremost by Skórka and the Dutch lobbyist. 
 Afera Hazardowa. 
Case Summary: The second case surrounding Poland’s gambling legislation took 
place during the government of Prime Minister Donald Tusk (PO) in 2008 to 2009. At 
its center stood the allegations that the head of PO’s parliamentary faction Zbigniew 
Chlebowski and several other senior members of the PO had been intentionally 
manipulating the drafting of the new gambling bill. One of the issues was the removal of 
a highly disputed provision requiring an additional gambling tax. The additional revenue 
through this gambling tax would go to the Ministry of Sports which was already 
preparing for the EURO 2012. Zbigniew Chlebowski had close ties to Ryszard Sobiesiak, 
                                                        
57 While bribe payments rarely occur in legal corruption (see chapter 2 for more on this), they do take place 
on occasion. 
  108 
a former football player and entrepreneur in the sport and gambling sector, whose family 
businesses had a tendency to be at least unethical if not fully illegal. 
Poland’s Anti-Corruption Agency CBA had recorded a conversation between 
Sobiesiak and Chlebowski in July 2008,58 where they discussed how Chlebowski could 
block unfavorable amendments in the draft of the new gambling bill. Over the next few 
months, the CBA continued investigating the matter and discovered that apart from 
Chlebowski, several other high-ranking government officials were involved, among 
others the Minister of Sports Mirosław Drzewiecki and the Minister of the Interior 
Grzegorz Schetyna. Schetyna was also the deputy prime minister at that time. On the 
business side participated also the lobbyist Jan Kosek. He was the deputy head of the 
Union of Employers of Lottery Games and Mutual Betting. Sobiesiak and Kosek had 
been discussing blocking unfavorable provisions in the bill with each other and the 
political actors’ numerous times in the Spring and Summer of 2008. Several of the later 
activities by the politicians appeared to be in line with what they discussed with the two 
lobbyists. 
The case became even more complicated as it became the playground for the 
intense political rivalry between the PO and its main political opponent, the party of Law 
and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS). The head of the CBA, Mariusz Kamiński, has 
been a close associate of the PiS, and soon after the allegations became public in October 
2008, PO supporters accused the CBA of being politically driven. The CBA in turn 
accused the prime minister’s office of having leaked information about their 
investigation to Sobiesiak and Chlebowksi, after Kamiński informed PM Tusk about the 
first findings in August 2009. By January 2010, Chlebowski, Drzewiecki, and Schetyna 
                                                        
58 The agency had been investigating Sobiesiak in connection to another corruption case. 
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were dismissed from their positions, but Tusk emphasized that the dismissal was not due 
to them being in any way guilty. Instead, they were dismissed because their activities had 
harmed the reputation of the party. Tusk also dismissed Kamiński from his position as 
head of the CBA. The Sejm launched a parliamentary inquiry committee in November 
2009 into the entire affair. The committee sat until August 2010 and concluded that 
Kamiński’s allegations against PM Tusk’s office were unfounded, that Drzewiecki did not 
know what he was doing59, and that there was not enough evidence of any criminal 
activities by the other PO politicians being accused. In their official report, the 
commission admitted that Chlebowksi had acted unethically in his dealing with 
Sobiesiak. The prosecution, whose also had started an investigation into the case, 
discontinued their investigations in 2011. The new Gambling Act of 2009, replacing the 
Gambling Act of 1992, came into force on January 1, 2010, with an even stricter 
regulation of the gambling sector than anticipated. 
Corruption Type & Activities: Afera Hazardowa represents another case of legal 
corruption, fulfilling all causal attributes established in chapter 2. First, the activities of 
Chlebowski and the other politicians appear to fall within the gray zones of the law. 
Neither their peers within the PO and the members of the parliamentary inquiry 
committee nor the prosecution had found signs of violating any laws. Chlebowski himself 
excused his behavior in front of the parliamentary inquiry committee as just having 
represented his constituencies, in line with his responsibilities as an elected MP. Second, 
the benefits for the involved political actors are difficult to establish as the media did not 
uncover any financial relationship to the political actors. They have only found some 
                                                        
59 Despite his Ministry being the main beneficiary of the additional gambling tax, he had sent a letter to the 
Ministry of Finance, which was drafting the bill, that he agreed to the removal of the disputed provision. 
Previously he had been against the removal. His excuse was that he did not know what he was signing. 
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earlier campaign contributions to Chlebowski by Sobiesiak and Kosek in 2005 and 2006. 
Benefits such as status increase and prestige are harder to identify and tie them to the 
political actors’ activities on behalf of the lobbying industry. Nevertheless, most of the 
political actors experienced career advancement soon after their dismissal of their office. 
For instance, by Summer 2010, the former Ministers of Sports and the Interior, 
Drzewiecki and Schetyna, already sat in the Sejm for the PO. Schetyna even got elected 
as Marshalek (Speaker of the Sejm, the most powerful position in the Sejm).  
The third causal attribute requires that the economic actor receive a benefit, or at 
least increase their chances of receiving a benefit, to which they have a right anyway. 
Sobiesak and Kosek’s activities were within the law insofar that they were acting as 
representatives of the lobbying industry, which naturally was opposed to additional taxes 
on their business. Fourth, the way the exchange took place was considered to be 
illegitimate by a majority of the people. This criterion is visible in several instances. Not 
only did the parliamentary inquiry commission concluded that Chlebowski’s behavior 
was not in line with standard conduct of a MP, but also the PO’s image and reputation 
had suffered as a result of the scandal. Their popularity had taken a dramatic hit when 
the news about the scandal came out in 2009 (Pytlakowski, October 13, 2009). Last, 
even though the political actors occupied senior positions within the party or the 
government, including that of the deputy prime minister, they did not have the full 
backing of the political party. The lack of organization by the party’s top leadership is 
visible in the quick dismissal from their position, but also that several other key positions 
in the legislative process apparently were not involved. For instance, the powerful 
position of the Speaker of the Sejm had been entirely left out. Similarly, the PO was 
confronted with a strong opposition in the form of its main rival PiS and predecessor in 
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the government. Some of the key positions in the state administrations were still 
occupied by PiS people, including the CBA. 
In line with my expectations, the case involved the most common corrupt 
activities associated with legal corruption. At its center is the use of covert lobbying 
activities by Sobiesiak and Kosek, including influence peddling. But they also made some 
campaign contributions to Chlebowski, an accepted and legal activity. In addition, 
Sobiesiak also had personal connections to Chlebowski and the other political actors.60 
He used these connections extensively to further his own the business interests and 
those of his son, exploiting several times existing conflict-of-interest situations. 
Corruption Pair 3: IT-Sector. 
 Afera Interams. 
Case Summary: Between 1993 and 1994, the computer company InfoAms II had 
signed multiple lucrative contracts with some of Poland’s largest SOE as well as several 
state agencies, including the Office of the Council of Ministers, that is the Polish 
government.61 The catch? The company had made losses since 1992 and even ended up 
filing for bankruptcy in November 1994 (Gazeta Wyborcza, November 15, 1994, p. 3). 
The firm had been IBM’s Polish representative and one of the top ten computer 
                                                        
60 Among those ties that neither side denies were Sobieskiak’s and Schetyna’s business cooperation in the 
early 2000s, which they apparently continued to have even in 2009. One of Drzewiecki’s close associates at 
the Minister of Sports intervened on the behalf of Sobiesiak’s daughter to the Ministry of Finance for a 
position at the state-owned Totalizator Sportowy. Then there is the personal friendship between Sobiesiak 
and Chlebowski, which goes back to the nineties and included spending holidays together. The names of 
Chlebowski and Drzewiecki also show up in connection to two other business dealings of Sobiesiak - both 
having been investigated by the regional prosecution for suspicion of corruption. The two politicians 
allegedly used their high-ranking positions to pressure local politicians or state officials to favor Sobiesiak’s 
firm in a tender or grant it a construction permit. 
61 State agencies that signed improper contracts with InterAms II were, among others, Ministry of 
Education, Bank Gospodarki Żywnościowej (BGŻ), Social Insurance Institution, Agricultural Social 
Insurance Fund, the Agricultural Property Agency, and the State Treasury (Nowakowska, June 22, 1995; 
Wielowieyska, August 30, 1995). 
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companies in Poland in the late eighties and early nineties (Gazeta Wyborcza, November 
15, 1994, p. 3). During that time, Poland invested heavily in upgrading its outdated 
technology, including placing computers in public offices and schools.  
InfoAms would buy computers and other equipment from IBM Polska, IBM’s 
local subsidiary, and equip its customers with the necessary hardware and software. The 
problem was, however, that it had to pay IBM Polska in US Dollar, whereas its customers 
paid in Polish Zloty. The president of InfoAms, Paweł Zdunek, claimed that when the 
Zloty devalued several times in 1991 and 1992, he had difficulties repaying IBM and so 
incurred substantial losses. He failed to mention, however, that tax authorities had 
identified major mismanagement by Zdunek and others in InfoAms II, including 
fraudulent loans and high-risk financial investments (Kęsicka & Nowakowska, December 
2, 1994, p. 3; Nowakowska, December 3, 1994, p. 3; Wielowieyska, August 30, 1995, 
p. 3). The scandal burst open when journalists published that then-Prime Minister 
Waldemar Pawlak (PSL) arranged for Zdunek to meet with the heads of state-owned 
enterprises or state agencies. Pawlak was at that time head of a coalition government 
between the SLD and the PSL. Pawlak’s party, the PSL, was the junior partner in the 
coalition, just occupying 7 out of the 20 cabinet positions (excluding the post of prime 
minister). Surprisingly, all of the state agencies that had signed a dubious contract with 
InfoAms II were under the control of the PSL.  
Once the media had revealed these irregularities, prosecutors and the national 
supreme audit office Najwyższa Izba Kontroli (NIK) started to investigate these 
contracts. It turned out that the state agencies that had signed these improper contracts 
with InfoAms—which the firm never ended up completing—had have paid a large part of 
the contract sum in advance. NIK’s investigation also revealed that the state agencies had 
failed to follow the proper public procurement procedures and conduct a basic due 
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diligence about InfoAms financial health (Wielowieyska, August 30, 1995, p. 3). In the 
end, the investigations into Zdunek’s business were dropped, while Prime Minister 
Pawlak had to resign from his position in March 1995. While doubts remained about the 
corruption element in the case, it meets the elements of corruption set out in chapter 2. 
Corruption Type & Activities: The case fulfills the causal attributes of local 
capture. First, Pawlak apparently abused his informal authority as prime minister to 
provide favors for his personal friend Zdunek by arranging meetings between Zdunek 
and heads of state agencies and pushing them to sign large contracts with Zdunek’s firm. 
Second, as the final report by NIK concludes, a lot of these contracts ended up wasting 
tax payers’ money. For instance, in the case of providing computer equipment for 
schools, a contract that InfoAms signed with the Ministry of Education, the ministry had 
to pay 20 percent of the contract value upfront. Once InfoAms showed them the bills of 
having bought the equipment from IBM, the ministry had to transfer another 60 percent 
to InfoAms. Despite having paid 80 percent of the value—there were still no computers 
in school. The total value of the contract: USD 1,200,000; computers delivered: zero 
(Wielowieyska, August 30, 1995, p. 3). 
The third attribute concerns the benefits for a few actors at the expense of others 
that have a right of inclusion. In several cases, other computer firms, such as Dell and 
Computerland, had both been selected as best choices by public procurement 
committees. Both companies had provided better offers at lower costs. However, in each 
case, the head of the agency had overruled the decision of the public procurement 
committee and signed the contract with InfoAms (Wielowieyska, August 30, 1995, p. 3). 
Fourth, while Pawlak rightly pointed out that the Public Procurement Act had only 
entered into force on January 1, 1995, the NIK had identified several instances were 
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existing public procurement procedures had been subverted, as the example above 
shows (Wielowieyska, August 30, 1995, p. 3). 
The main corrupt activities that can be identified in this corruption case, have 
been the reliance on personal connections and perverting the due process. Direct 
benefits for the involved political actors could not be identified, but the absence of 
evidence is not evidence of absence. 
 Infoafera. 
Case Summary: The second case in the IT-sector centers around on the Center 
for IT Projects (Centrum Projektów Informatycznych, CPI), part of the MSWiA. At the 
end of October 2011, the CBA arrested seven individuals, among others the former 
director and deputy director of the CPI, on suspicion of corruption during their tenure at 
the center from 2008 to 2010. 
In 2008, former Minister of MSWiA Grzegorz Schetyna (PO) established the CPI 
under the supervision of his deputy minister Witold Drożdż (PO). The CPI’s main task 
was to coordinate the public procurement of Poland’s largest IT-projects, such as: 
• PESEL 2—modernizing the existing national ID-cards system 
• ePUAP 2—developing a nationwide platform that allows citizens to do basic public 
administration tasks online 
• OST 112—establishing a national telecommunication operating system to support the 
EU’s 112 emergency telephone number 
• Digital radio communication system—developing a nation-wide rescue and crisis 
service to allow different emergency organizations to better communicate with each 
other in crisis situations 
• SIS II—the project relates to the integration of Poland into the Schengenzone 
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• e-Usługi—building an online platform to allow the public to communicate with the 
police 
• E-posterunek—developing an internal platform for the police 
The total estimated value of these projects—over PLN 2 billion (Czubkowska, 
March 4, 2014; Krawczyk, October 10, 2011; Socha, 2013). 
The problem? The director of the CPI Andrzej Machnacz had abused his position 
in the CPI and previously as Head of Office of Communications and Technology at the 
National Police Headquarter (Komenda Główna Policji, KGP). He enriched himself and 
those close to him by extorting (according to the statement of one of the other 
individuals convicted in the case) or of accepting bribe payments (according to the 
indictment presented by the prosecution) of almost PLN 5 million. The bribe-givers were 
several IT-companies, including the international IT-giants HP, IBM, and Oracle, and 
IBM’s largest representative in Poland, Netline Group. In exchange, Machnacz would 
manipulate the tenders for the IT-projects in the companies’ favor by splitting them into 
smaller projects and so being able to use single-bidding or by ‘forgetting’ to acquire the 
source codes of a software, or at least the right to change any software they had acquired 
(Czubkowska, March 4, 2014; Engelberg & Socha, March 20, 2013; Jałoszewski, July 2, 
2015). By 2014, over 40 individuals have been arrested in connection with the corruption 
case; the most important ones on the side of the political actors were the former director 
Andrzej Machnacz and his deputy director at the CPI, as well as the deputy-minister 
Witold Drożdż at the MSWiA. From the business side, the directors of sale from HP and 
IBM as well as the vice-president of Netline Group have also been charged (Czubkowska, 
March 4, 2014; Engelberg & Socha, March 20, 2013; Socha, 2013). Moreover, U.S. law 
enforcement agencies also investigated IBM and HP on suspicion of violating the U.S. 
Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (FCPA). While the investigations into IBM’s activities in 
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Poland were closed in Summer 2017, HP ended up paying USD 108 million to settle with 
the authorities (Czubkowska, March 4, 2014; Darrow, July 27, 2017; Engelberg & Socha, 
March 20, 2013; Krajewski & Viswanatha, April 4, 2014; Northern District of California, 
2014, pp. 1–44). 
Corruption Type & Activities: The case meets the four causal requirements of 
local capture, specifically the capture of the public procurement process. First, 
Machnacz, together with several other corrupt actors, had manipulated the function of 
the CPI to work in their favor. Second, the functioning of the CPI had been subverted to 
ensure that favored economic actors would win the public procurement contracts. In this 
way, the capture of the agency did not only violate the principle of impartiality, but the 
agency also acted against the public’s interest as these contracts would often include 
provisions that were harmful to the state. In the case of the e-posterunek, the program 
even had to be dropped due to irregularities with the contracts and subsequent 
supervision of the vendors. By that time the state had already invested several millions 
zloty into the design and implementation of the program (Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, 2013; 
Zawadka & Kacprzak, January 8, 2014; Zieliński, November 25, 2011).62 
Third, the capture of the CPI benefited a few actors at the expense of others by 
excluding firms from tenders that had similar qualifications as the recipient of the 
tender. In the case of PESEL 2, for instance, Machnacz had split the contract worth 
around PLN 71 million. Machnacz decided to split the tender into four lots—the first one 
was valued at around EUR 14.000, well below the value at which he was required to 
initiate an open tender. CPI conducted a restricted tender, where they invited only five 
                                                        
62 In the second part, I examine in-depth how the actors violated the principle of impartiality and harmed 
the public’s interest. 
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firms to submit their bids. Only two responded and the CPI selected IBM after only 20 
days—an unusual short time considering the complexity of the project at stake. And as 
the CPI failed to secure the copyrights for the program, IBM ended up being the only 
‘valid’ vendor for the remaining three lots of the tender—worth PLN 71 million 
(Czubkowska, March 4, 2014). In this way, the CPI had prevented other IT-firms to 
compete for the full project. 
Last, the capture of the CPI resulted in several clear violations of established 
regulations. The UZP as well as NIK have identified multiple occasions where the CPI 
violated the law. For instance, in the case of PESEL 2, the UZP found that the CPI had no 
basis for their decision to split the contract into four lots (Czubkowska, March 4, 2014; 
Jałoszewski, November 24, 2014). 
I find indications for several common corrupt activities that have been employed 
by the actors. Machnacz as well as several other individuals have relied on their personal 
and professional connections within the MSWiA and several other state agencies. 
Machnacz had also provided the firms with inside-information, and together with other 
political actors used of bid-rigging to manipulate tenders. In contrast to the previous 
case of local capture, I also find extensive use of bribe payments by economic actors to at 
least one political actor.63 
In the first part of this chapter, I have identified the types of corruption that each 
corruption case resembles. I find that out of the six cases, four cases exhibit the causal 
attributes of legal corruption, whereas the third pair of corruption cases both resemble 
local capture, summarized in table 4.8.  
                                                        
63 It is likely that also other political actors received some form of compensation for their ‘services’, however, 
I could not find adequate information about this. For a variety of reasons, among others the lead up to the 
EURO 2012 and other major ongoing political issues, at that time the case received not the attention it ought 
to, given the financial harm it had caused for Poland. 
  118 
Table 4.8: Results of categorizing Poland’s Corruption Cases 
 Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3 
Name 
Concession 
for Polsat 
Rywingate 
Afera 
Automotowa 
Afera 
Hazardowa 
Afera 
InterAms 
Infoafera 
Period 1994 2002-2003 2002-2003 2008-2009 1994-1995 2008-2010 
Sector Arts & Entertainment Gambling IT 
Type of 
Corruption 
Legal  
Corruption 
Legal  
Corruption 
Legal  
Corruption 
Legal  
Corruption 
Local  
Capture 
Local  
Capture 
 
The early findings challenge the main argument about a transformation of 
corruption patterns taking place when political and economic processes are introduced 
in parallel. As table 4.8 reveals, there has been no transformation of corruption patterns 
in any of these industries. But rejecting the argument would still be premature. The 
categorization of the corruption cases also has uncovered a major element that speaks to 
the causal argument presented here.  
Recall that Rywingate and Afera Automatowa had taken place at the same time, 
under similar conditions: it involved an organized economic actor—either a major 
corporation or a large business association—and a disparate group of politicians that 
have attempted to coordinate legislative amendments. I find that in both cases, the result 
has been legal corruption, regardless of industry. Similar conditions existed in the cases 
of Afera Hazardowa and Infoafera: the same political party at the same time but 
different industries. This time, however, the two corruption cases exhibited different 
types of corruption. Afera Hazardowa resulted in legal corruption whereas Infoafera 
had all the signs of local capture. So what lead to these different outcomes?  
Afera Hazardowa involved a group of political actors, each with their own 
political power center. The major political actors, while all belonging to the PO, had their 
own power centers by standing on top of a major institution, either as Marshal of the 
Sejm, or as ministers. Internally, the political side was fragmented. In contrast, the 
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events of Infoafera all took place within one ministry. For the political actors, this meant 
that they had more resources, at least so far as the economic actor did not have an 
alternative—if they wanted to win a public tender for any of the major IT-projects, they 
would have to deal with the MSWiA, in particular with the CPI. 
These differences at the micro-level of the cases hint at a feature that so far has 
received little attention by scholars—the role that the resource distribution in the corrupt 
state-business relationship plays. I will take this point up again in the second part of the 
chapter. But before I examine the resource-distribution within the corrupt state-business 
relationship, I first investigate how the emergence of political and economic competition 
has transformed the opportunity structures of actors (causal claim 1). I then examine 
how the particular constellation of powerful incentives and weak constraints encouraged 
political and economic actors had encouraged them to form corrupt state-business 
relationship (causal claim 2). And only then will I analyze the role of resource 
distributions in the corrupt state-business relationship, and how it impacts the 
transformation of corruption pattern (causal claim 3). 
Linking Competition to the Transformation of Corruption Patterns 
Above, I have examined how patterns of corruption have transformed, by 
categorizing the six selected corruption cases according to their corruption type and 
activities. The results diverge from my expectation about the transformation about 
corruption patterns. Four out of the six cases fulfilled the causal attributes of legal 
corruption. The remaining cases, both taking place in the IT-sector, were classified as 
examples of local corruption, specifically corruption in the public procurement process. 
To explain these findings, I hinted that institutional features particular to the Polish 
political system might have biased the resource distribution in favor of the economic 
actors. I will pick up the role that resource distribution between political and economic 
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actors has played in shaping the patterns of corruption that emerge in causal claim 3. 
Moreover, I have also identified that the same actor will not always resort to the same 
type of corruption—visible in the comparison of Afera Automatowa and Infoafera. Such 
a finding is suggestive of a more complex relationship that ties competitive processes and 
corruption together.  
The second part of chapter 4 aims to probe this complex link in more depth, by 
answering the question why the emergence of political and economic competition 
shaped the patterns of corruption in a systematic fashion? The chapter therefore focuses 
on evaluating the validity of the causal mechanism that I proposed in chapter 2. As the 
causal mechanism has several moving elements, I have divided the mechanism into its 
three constituent parts. Each part, represented by the three causal claims, presents the 
specific process that I expect to observe if my theory holds. Specifically, to examine how 
the emergence of competition in politics and the economy has transformed the patterns 
of corruption, I first examine the impact that the emergence of competition in both 
domains had on the opportunity structures of actors in these domains (causal claim 1). I 
suggest that the opportunity structures will evolve so that actors have strong incentives 
for and only weak deterrents against forming corrupt state-business relationships 
(causal claim 2). The last element moves to the core of my argument as it probes the 
resource distribution within these corrupt state-business relationships. In essence, I 
suggest that the emerging types of corruption are not random but follow predictable 
patterns, depending on actors’ resource distribution within a corrupt state-business 
relationship (causal claim 3). In table 4.2, I present a visual reminder of the complete 
argument, containing the causal claims and their propositions. 
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Table 4.2: Argument Roadmap 
Causal Mechanism: Emergence of competition in politics and the economy 
transforms the opportunity structure of actors, resulting in changes in their 
interactions, and so leads to a shift in the Patterns of Corruption. 
Causal Claim 1: Emergence of competition in the political system and the economy 
transforms the opportunity structure of actors to engage in corruption. 
P1 
Emergence of competition encourages political and economic actors to engage in 
corruption, or more broadly, violate established norms and regulations. 
P2 Emergence of competition weakens existing constraints on corruption. 
P3 Emergence of competition develops few new constraints on corruption. 
Causal Claim 2: The constellation of powerful incentives and weak constraints 
encouraged political and economic actors to enter into corrupt state-business 
relationships. 
P1  
Mutual compatible interests encourage political and economic actors to enter into 
state-business relationships. 
P2 
At least one of the actors in the state-business relationship benefits substantially 
from their relationship. 
P3 
Control mechanisms are unable to deter actors to form corrupt state-business 
relationships. 
Causal Claim 3: The distribution of power between political and economic actors in a 
corrupt state-business relationship determines the type of corruption that emerges. 
P1 
Concentrated political power combined with weak economic power results in covert 
political financing. 
P2 Concentrated political and economic power results in local capture. 
P3 
Weak political power combined with concentrated economic power leads to legal 
corruption. 
 
The following section follows the outline described in chapter 3. Specifically, I 
examine the separate parts of the whole argument in a similar manner as a criminal 
trial.64 I present the observations for each proposition before drawing any inferences. 
                                                        
64 This also includes how I deal with alternative explanations. I focus not on alternative explanations for the 
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While causal claim 1 will only be examined from with national level data, the 
propositions in causal claims 2 and 3 are examined with micro-level data. Specifically, I 
contrast them with the three selected corruption cases. The inferences drawn from these 
examinations are then aggregate these inferences from a causal claim to evaluate how 
well the claim holds up in light of the presented evidence. In the last step, presented in 
the conclusion of this part of the chapter, I combine the results for each causal claim to 
assess the validity of the full causal mechanisms. In this manner, I hope to answer the 
question set out at the beginning—why the emergence of political and economic 
competition shapes a country’s corruption patterns. 
Causal Claim 1: Transforming the actors’ opportunity structures. 
The emergence of political and economic competition transforms the opportunity 
structure, that is the incentives and constraints, of actors to engage in corruption. The 
causal claim examines in-depth how the introduction of competitive processes 
transformed the opportunity structures and thus encouraged them to participate in 
corruption by analyzing its three proposition. To support the first proposition about the 
emergence of competition encourages actors to violate established norms and 
procedures, and more importantly, to engage in corruption, I ideally find sources that 
emphasize the willingness of actors to engage in corruption and that they were driven to 
it by the developments in their respective domains. The second proposition concentrates 
on how competitive processes have weakened already existing control mechanisms, 
especially established oversight agencies. The evidence for the proposition should be 
visible in the historical accounts and statements about the limited resources that these 
agencies had. The third proposition analyzes how competition had hindered the 
                                                        
outcome in question but on alternative explanations for the presented observations. 
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establishment of new deterrent of corruption. The ideal evidence that I can encounter for 
it comes in the form of only a few traces of anti-corruption initiatives by actors—largely 
due to the competition these actors encounter. 
Proposition 1. 
The emergence of political and economic competition encouraged actors to 
engage in corruption. The first five observations deal with the emergence of political 
competition and how it created incentives for political actors to engage in corrupt 
behavior. Observations 6 to 8 address the emergence of economic competition and its 
impact on economic actors. The last two observations present how corrupt behavior, in 
general, became more noticeable after the transition. Overall, I find strong and direct 
evidence in support of the first proposition. 
Observation 1: At the first fully free parliamentary elections in October 1991, 
voters could choose among 111 political parties and electoral coalitions.65 Of these, 
however, only 29 received a seat in the Sejm.66 At the parliamentary elections in 1993, 
only 35 parties had registered, of which only 6 received at least one seat.67 This trend in 
fewer and fewer parties or political alliances standing in the elections continued for the 
next few years until 2005, were 22 political parties entered into the parliamentary 
elections. Despite the large number, only 6 parties managed to win representation in the 
Sejm. Columns 1 to 5 in table 4.3 summarize this description. 
                                                        
65 The Political Party Act of 1990 allowed any political group to register when they had collected 15 
signatures (1990; Szczerbiak, 2001, p. 12). 
66 The Sejm is the lower house with 460 seats. The upper house is the Senate with 100 seats. In contrast to 
the U.S., the power between these two houses is not equally distributed as the Sejm is the main legislative 
body in Poland. 
67 The main reason for this dramatic fall in registered party was the introduction of the Law on Elections of 
1993, which set the electoral threshold to 5 percent (Szczerbiak, 2001, p. 29). 
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Table 4.3: Dynamics in Polish Party System (1989-2010) 
Year of 
Election 
Number of 
Contenders 
Stood in 
Previous 
Election 
New 
Formations 
Number of 
Winning 
Partiesa 
Won Seats in 
Previous 
Elections 
1991 111 - - 29 - 
1993 35 26 9 6 4 (SLD, PSL, UD, 
KPN) 
1997 21 12 9 5 3 (SLD, PSL, UW) 
2001 14 8 6 6 2 (SLD-UPb, PSL) 
2005 22 8 14 6 6 (SLD, PSL, PO, 
SO, LPR, PiS) 
2007 10 7 3 4 3 (PSL, PO, PiS) 
a Poland has a German Minority Party that stood at every election but not as a political party. It has been 
therefore included in the 1991 election count. 
b The SLD was the dominant partner in this coalition. While the UP stood in the 1993 election, in failed to 
gain any seats in the 1997 election. 
Sources: own calculations and table 3 from Millard (2009) 
Observation 2: Column 6 in table 4.3 illustrates the extensive political party 
volatility in the political landscape over the years. Of those political parties that 
participated in the 1991 elections, only 12 reappeared in the 1993 elections. And only four 
of them had won seats in the Sejm. When we compare the number of parties that had 
won at least one seat in the 1993 parliamentary elections with the parties of 1997, only 
three parties managed to reenter the Sejm—the Labour Union (UW)68, SLD (the 
communist successor party), and the PSL. By 2007, none of these political parties gained 
a seat in the Sejm anymore—they have either disappeared, merged with other parties, or 
otherwise transformed themselves to such an extent that they are viewed as new political 
parties. 
Observation 3: As mentioned in the background section, Poland’s only constant 
in their selection of government was their repeated turnover in government from post-
solidarity to post-communist parties (Baylis, 2007, pp. 81–106; Vachudová, 2006, 
pp. 59–60). In addition to no party being reelected, no party has managed to win a 
                                                        
68 UW is a merger of the UD and the Liberal Democratic Congress KLD, both post-Solidarity parties. 
Scholars generally view the UW as their successor and not as a new political party (Millard, 2009, pp. 781–
798). 
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majority, thus, being forced to form coalition governments. And while these coalitions 
ran along ideological lines, where post-Solidarity governments would enter only into 
coalitions with each other and so leaving the SLD and the PSL to form coalitions when 
needed, these coalitions rarely were stable (Millard, 2008, pp. 367–393; Millard, 2009, 
p. 793). 
Observation 4: Legislative instability, that is, “the proportion of amendment laws 
in the total legislative output” (Goetz & Zubek, 2005, p. 8), has been another 
characteristic of the first two decades after Poland’s transition. When exploring the 
annual legislative output of the Sejm between 1998 and 2004, Goetz and Zubek (2005, 
p. 8) find that almost 60 percent of all laws passed in a term have been amendments to 
existing legislation, in contrast to the Czech Republic and Hungary were the proportion 
of amendments to new legislation was significantly less.  
Observation 5: Between 1991 to 2001, political actors experienced an exponential 
rise in their expenses. As figure 4.1 indicates, parties had to lead increasingly costly 
campaigns to remain competitive. And only in 2001, with the adoption of the Statute on 
Elections to the Sejm and to the Senate of 2001, a campaign expenditure ceiling of PLN 
29 million has been introduced (Fuszara, Kopińska, & Kurczewski, 2002, pp. 393–450; 
Group of States against Corruption [GRECO], 2008, p. 11).69 
                                                        
69 Unfortunately, I could neither update nor expand the figure to include the expenses of other political 
actors for several of reasons: (i) before 1997, the financial reports by political parties were rather unreliable 
as they faced no sanctions for misreporting their finances (Walecki, 2007, p. 124); (ii) the financial reports of 
this period are also not available online from the National Election Commission; and (iii) I have tried to 
contact the author numerous times over the last eight months, but apart from an early correspondence about 
an interview, to which he agreed, I was never able to either set up a time for the interview or get the exact 
numbers presented in the figure. 
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A political candidate’s expenses did not only rise because of an increasingly 
sophisticated campaign process but also 
because they needed to outspend their 
competitors from their own political 
parties (Walecki, 2007, p. 125, 2007, 
p. 124). While the Polish electoral 
system is party-centered, it nevertheless 
maintains a strong focus on candidates 
as well through the use of personal 
votes. Candidates within the same 
party, thus, will attempt to outspend 
each other to gain a seat in the Sejm or 
Senate (Walecki, 2007, p. 126). 
Observation 6: Until 1997, Poland’s party finance system forbade direct public 
funding. Parties were therefore reliant on membership fees, campaign contributions, and 
what they could earn from selling their assets (Jacuński, 2012, pp. 43–63). As in other 
CEE countries, the income from membership fees was almost negligent, and so most 
parties focused on acquiring contributions from private citizens and economic actors. In 
1997, with the entry into force of the new Law on Political Parties of 1997, a major 
change in how parties fund themselves took place. Parties now received the majority of 
their income from direct and indirect public funds (Szczerbiak, 2001, p. 221). 
Observation 7: Poland passed its first policies to liberalize and privatize parts of 
its economy already in the late 1980s. These regulations largely focused on providing a 
legal basis for transforming SOE into private entities as well as transferring the SOE's 
assets (Błaszczyk & Dabrowski, 1993, 24, 83). In 1989, already 1.300 new state-owned 
Figure 4.1: The Cost of Parliamentary Elections in 
Poland, 1991-2001 (in USD) 
Note: Poland introduced an election expenditure 
ceiling of PLN 29 million in 2001 
Source: figure from Walecki (2003, 72)  
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enterprises were established, which almost doubled the number of firms under 
government control (Tarkowski, 1991, pp. 6–7).70 Ultimately, despite Poland’s intention 
to rapidly privatize its SOE, the privatization of its state assets had been rather slowly 
implemented (Schoenman, 2014; Zijlstra, 1997, p. 12). 
Observation 8: Another feature of the early economic reforms was making it 
simpler for individuals to establish new firms (Błaszczyk & Dabrowski, 1993, 24, 83). As 
a result, within six months the number of private firms increased from 572.000 to 
700.000, or almost 25 percent in 1989 alone (Tarkowski, 1991, pp. 6–7). In total, the 
private sector share of GDP has risen steadily, from only 28 percent in 1989 to 58 
percent in 1994 (Borish & Noel, 1996, p. 100). At that time, Poland had around 4.6 
million micro-enterprises and 22,000 private firms that employed between 21 to 500 
individuals. In addition, several hundred firms with foreign investments and around 
5,000 SOE also operated in the private sector (Borish & Noel, 1996, p. 104). Scholars 
have attributed this explosion of firms in the private sector to the early regulatory 
reforms still in the eighties, a liberal foreign trade regime, low taxes for private 
investments, and the survival of private property during communism (largely in the 
agricultural sector that has never been fully collectivized) (Błaszczyk & Dabrowski, 1993, 
pp. 9–11). 
Observation 9: In 1991, Poland went through a deep recession and ended up 
having to devalue the Zloty several times. As the recession continued, the country 
continued with its currency devaluation in the early months of 1992—all to keep its 
economy competitive in the world market (Borish & Noel, 1996, pp. 151–152).  
                                                        
70 These state-owned companies were called nomenklatura companies, already pointing to their hidden 
function (Błaszczyk and Dabrowski, 1993, p. 31). 
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Observation 10: Despite its market size, Poland was not a leader in attracting 
foreign investments. By 1994, it has only attracted a cumulative FDI of USD 1.8 bln, 
which is less than half what Hungary attracted in the same time (Lipton & Sachs, 1990, 
p. 301). Most FDI is concentrated in small-scale investments averaging a little bit less 
than USD 50,000. The larger-scaled FDIs focused on the automotive industry, food 
processing sector, telecommunications and engineering (Borish & Noel, 1996, p. 109). 
Despite the small absolute amounts of foreign investments into Poland, those that came 
in hurt Polish workers and firms, as they were not competitive, lacking the requisite 
intellectual and financial capital (Dunn, 2004).71 
Observation 11: Poland divided its state bank into 9 separate entities to simplify 
the subsequent privatization in the sector, which it accomplished in 1993, when it 
privatized its first bank successfully (Borish & Noel, 1996, p. 150,  154). The total number 
of banks increased to 90 in 1992 and 73 in 1995. Despite these early successes in the 
banking sector, the small and medium-sized private enterprises that mushroomed had 
major difficulties receiving credits and bank loans (Borish & Noel, 1996, p. 105). The 
unwillingness to extend credit to private enterprises decreased even with a raise in GPD 
in the early nineties. As calculations by the World Bank show, credit to private 
enterprises constituted 29.3 percent as a share of total credit in 1990 but had declined to 
26.2 percent by 1994. In addition to a lack of supply of credit, enterprises, especially 
micro-enterprises, also faced lending rates between 33 to 57 percent at that time (Borish 
& Noel, 1996, p. 105).  
                                                        
71 This assessment differs from the assessment of two leading economic advisers, who suggested in 1992, 
that Poland’s industry is highly competitive and there was little risk of monopolies developing because of 
extensive international competition (Lipton and Sachs, 1990, p. 301). 
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Observation 12: During the early nineties, the first signs of strong interactions 
between the political and economic sector became visible. Interlocking directorates 
quickly developed, or more often a public official would appoint themselves as director of 
a newly privatized company (PL 002, 2017, Jun 27). As scholars found, these tight 
connections between economic and political actors continued work well into the first 
decade of the new century (McMenamin, 2004, pp. 657–676; Schoenman, 2014). One 
common method evolved from the need to place state officials on the board of directors 
of companies that were either partially or fully under the control of state (Schoenman, 
2005, pp. 40–75). Appointments to the board of directors were also a common path to 
create interlocking directorates—with firms appointing senior managers or owners to 
each other’s board of directors, ensuring their cooperation and create alliances among 
firms (Schoenman, 2014, pp. 111–113).  
Observation 13: While the early economic reforms encouraged rapid 
liberalization and privatization, they came at a high cost. Several areas, such as conflict-
of-interests situation, remained unregulated, which created legal loopholes that 
economic and political actors exploited for their personal benefit (Holmes, 2006, 
pp. 192–193; Tarkowski, 1991, pp. 4–5)—a sentiment that Polish scholars and 
entrepreneurs echo (PL 001, 2017, Jun 19.; PL 002, 2017, Jun 27). As a result, corruption 
related to privatization exploded. But other areas did not remain untouched as 
accusations of corruption levied against leading politicians abounded. 
Observation 14: Leading scholars of corruption in Poland agree that with the 
transition, a rise in corruption incidents had taken place (Tarkowski, 1991). These 
scholars identified the loss of power the communist regime experienced, as the initiator 
for this increase as the regime was unable to avert corruption incidents at this stage 
(Pleines, 2005, p. 10). Between 1992 and 1998, for instance, the number of reported 
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bribe-offenses increased by 54 percent, while the number of power abuses by public 
officials increased by 65 percent (Pleines, 2005, p. 9). The largest increase, however, 
took place within the police, were the numbers of reported police corruption rose by 300 
percent. This explosion in corruption among those that were supposed to uphold the 
laws, prompted the EU as well as national agencies to warn successive Polish 
Governments multiple times about the high degree of corruption in the police (Fuszara 
et al., 2002, pp. 47–48). 
Inference: Observation 1 points towards a stabilization of the party system in 
Poland, where only the most successful parties survive. However, the next few 
observations fully destroy any hope of party institutionalization in the Polish party 
system—competition was excessive within political parties (observation 5) and across 
parties (observations 2 and 3). Competition also swapped into the legislative area—with 
an increasingly chaotic legislative output (observation 4) as parties rarely received 
enough votes to pass a new law, they settle for making amendments to existing laws and 
so bypassing the need for a majority decision. Political actors also faced a tough financial 
situation (observations 5 and 6). Economic actors faced similar uncertain times. Across 
sectors, they encountered strong competition from (former) SOE (observation 7), newly 
emerging firms (observation 8), and foreign firms (observation 10). What made matters 
worse, firms had to deal with a devaluation of the zloty (observation 9) and difficulties 
obtaining credits and bank loans for any investments (observation 11).  
The situation provides both sides with a strong motivation to seek out each other. 
Observation 12 corroborates this conclusion, describing how rapidly state-business 
relationships formed. Economic actors gained access to political actors, potentially 
hoping to receive an early warning about changing legislation. Political actors, in 
comparison, gained access to another potential income source as campaign expenses 
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increased exponentially (observation 5). Not all of their interactions took place through 
such interlocking directorates. A large part also in unregulated and covert channels 
(observation 13). Furthermore, it appeared that corruption incidents increased at all 
levels and business sectors (observation 14). In light of the evidence presented, I 
conclude that there is strong and direct evidence for the proposition that the emergence 
of political and economic competition encouraged actors to engage in corruption. 
Proposition 2. 
The second proposition of causal claim 1 probes how the emergence of 
competition has affected the ability of existing oversight agencies to deter corruption. 
The evidence portrays a rather bleak picture, where control mechanisms such as law 
enforcement, prosecution, the judiciary, and the state audit office are ill-equipped to 
deter corruption. 
Observation 1: In an assessment by the World Bank of the first few years of the 
transition, the police has been identified as lacking the necessary skills and resources to 
conduct criminal investigations (Borish & Noel, 1996, p. 120). The assessment has not 
changed over the years. GRECO’s peer-evaluation, for example, stressed that law 
enforcement authorities lack the specialized skill-set to deal with corruption cases 
(GRECO, 2001, p. 7), especially as it did not develop a specialized anti-corruption unit 
until 2006. In addition, there are high levels of corruption among the police itself 
(Holmes, 2006). Based on official police statistics, the number of criminal cases initiated 
against police officers has risen from 80 in 1998 to 110 in 2001; similarly, the number of 
officers under investigation increased from 102 to 157 during the same time (Fuszara et 
al., 2002, p. 438). 
Observation 2: Scholars and anti-corruption experts have stressed the formal 
and informal subjugation of the public prosecution services to the government. From the 
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beginning, Poland had combined the position of Prosecutor General with that of the 
Minister of Justice and instituted a tight hierarchical structure (Polak & Nelken, 2010, 
pp. 219–253). The institutional design has also been heavily criticized by several anti-
corruption experts as enabling the politicization of the prosecution (Fuszara et al., 2002; 
GRECO, 2001; Kobylińska, Makowski, & Solon-Lipiński, 2012, pp. 98–102). Interviews 
with prosecutors have also exposed the strong informal pressure exercised on their 
investigations (Polak & Nelken, 2010). Apart from such pressure from above, a lack of 
appropriate training in how to handle corruption cases further limits the prosecution’s 
capacity to deal with corruption cases (Borish & Noel, 1996, p. 120; GRECO, 2001, 
pp. 21–22; Kobylińska, Makowski, & Solon-Lipiński, 2012, pp. 98–102). 
Observation 3: Evaluations of the judiciary’s ability to deal with corruption cases 
have been negative at the turn of the century—mostly due to the lack of relevant legal 
training (Fuszara et al., 2002, pp. 427–428; GRECO, 2001, pp. 21–22). In 2009, 42 
percent of respondents in a large-scale public survey viewed the judiciary as corrupt 
(European Commission, Directorate-General for Home Affairs, 2012). An assessment 
that the U.S. Ambassador to Poland, Victor Ashe, shared in his leaked memo to the US 
State department. He, however, suggests that what the public considers as corruption in 
the judiciary, can also be attributed to a lack of funding, staff, and experienced judges 
(Ashe, 2009). 
Observation 4: A final institution that has been a left-over of the communist 
regime is the Supreme Audit Office NIK. The agency has continuously received praise by 
anti-corruption experts for its work in revealing irregularities and corruption in state 
institutions (Fuszara et al., 2002, p. 410, 2002, pp. 411–412; GRECO, 2001; Kobylińska, 
Makowski, & Solon-Lipiński, 2012, p. 16). Its auditors work independently in their 
assessment of the state entities’ accounts, and the agency’s reports are published 
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regularly on its website since 1998. These reports highlight instances of irregularities or 
other wrongdoings that their audits revealed. The agency is also formally required to 
forward any suspicions of criminal wrongdoings to the prosecution. While its president 
is appointed by the Sejm, the office’s tenure is longer than that of the parliament, 
resulting in the President of NIK having been appointed by the former government and 
so having even few informal ties to the current government (Fuszara et al., 2002, p. 410). 
Inference: The first two state agency’s that would deal with potential corruption 
cases—the police and the prosecution—have neither the skill-set nor the incentives to 
investigate such cases properly (observations 1 and 2). The police itself has been 
repeatedly accused of corruption among their own ranks, which their own statistics 
corroborate (observation 1). And the risk of political pressure on the prosecution 
(observation 2) indicates that especially in major corruption cases, these agencies are not 
a major deterrent. Even the judiciary has been fighting with corruption, in addition to 
dealing with a significant lack of resources for handling their caseloads (observation 3). 
The only state agency that has received high praise in its handling of corruption has been 
NIK (observation 4). But despite its ability to uncover potential corruption cases, it is not 
enough to deter corruption. The results of the agency’s reports need to be followed by the 
prosecutions (observation 4), which leads back to the conclusion that the existing 
oversight agencies that were in place already before the transition are not able to deter 
corruption in any meaningful way.  
Two caveats, however, need to be mentioned. First, the simultaneous position of 
Prosecutor General and Minister of Justice is not unique to Poland. The majority of 
common-law countries have combined the position of Attorney-General and Ministry of 
the Interior or its equivalent. But rarely has the Prosecutor General such extensive 
formal and informal powers to direct the investigations of their subordinates. What is 
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worse, it undermines the faith of the public in due process. The second caveat relates to 
this lack of faith. As the dispatch of then U.S. Ambassador points outs, what the general 
public views as corruption, might only be the result of lack of adequate resources 
(observation 3). But while the origins of this inefficiency can be disputed, the outcome 
remains the same—the existing agencies were not able to effectively deter corruption. I, 
therefore, conclude that there is at least a moderate and direct evidence supporting the 
second proposition of causal claim 1. 
Proposition 3. 
Moving now to the third proposition of causal claim 1, I concentrate on 
examining the ability of competition, specifically the emergence of political and 
economic competition, to establish deterrents for corrupt actors. The following 
observations describe the political, economic, and social conditions that limited the 
chances for competitive processes to create adequate constraints. I find strong and 
direct evidence to support the last proposition of causal claim 1. 
Observation 1: The first two decades after the transition, Poland’s parties had 
been weakly institutionalized (Nalepa, 2016, pp. 353–372). During the round table 
discussion, both sides wanted to ensure that the capture of either the government or the 
parliament would be difficult to achieve. They designed the system therefore with a focus 
on creating an individualized legislature, which, in turn made it easy for 
parliamentarians to switch party-affiliations even during a parliamentary term (Millard, 
2009; Shabad & Slomczynski, 2004, pp. 151–176) and their capacity to block or amend 
laws (Millard, 2009; Szczerbiak, 2001).  
Observation 2: In contrast to Western governments, the core executive has not 
only been “constrained by presidential veto powers and parliamentary activism” (Zubek, 
2011, pp. 911–932) but it also had been subjected to the demands of its coalition 
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partners, whose support was ambiguous. Scholars agree that throughout the first two 
decades, “coalitions proved quarrelsome and unstable” (Millard, 2009, p. 793; Zubek, 
2011, pp. 172–192). 
Observation 3: Poland’s political financing system can be divided into two 
phases. In the first seven years, party financing was largely unregulated and influenced 
by a laissez-fare mindset (Walecki, 2007, p. 133). The few provisions about party 
financing in the Act on Political Parties of 1990 concentrated on prohibiting parties from 
accepting foreign donations. The act also did not introduce public subsidies, expected 
parties to finance themselves from membership fees, income from assets, donations, and 
bank loans (Jacuński, 2012, p. 52; Szczerbiak, 2001, p. 221). In 1997, Poland introduced 
the Act on Political Parties of 1997 and so triggered the second phase began. The 
country’s political financing system became now increasingly regulated and resembled 
that of Western European Countries. It introduced generous direct public subsidies 
while tightening restrictions on acceptable income sources (Fuszara et al., 2002, p. 38; 
GRECO, 2008, p. 3; Walecki, 2007, p. 123).  
Despite these restrictions, several scandals surrounding illicit party financing 
occurred. The public outcry triggered further restrictions on acceptable income sources 
to safeguard political parties from becoming the instrument of special-interest groups 
donations (Casal Bértoa & Walecki, 2012). To ensure transparency and the independence 
of political parties, the Act on Parliamentary Elections of 2001,72 which required parties 
to make their financial statements publicly available and introduced sanctions for parties 
that did not submit their statements annually to the National Electoral Commission 
(GRECO, 2003). Last, the act disallowed campaign contributions from legal entities, 
                                                        
72 Parliamentary Election Act of, 2001. 
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such as firms and business associations, as well as anonymous donations (Casal Bértoa & 
Walecki, 2012, p. 11; GRECO, 2001). 
Observation 4: Shortly before Poland’s EU Accession, GRECO’s anti-corruption 
experts positively evaluated the efforts of the civil society, including academics and 
media, to pressure the government to be more pro-active in its anti-corruption approach 
(GRECO, 2001, p. 19). By the end of the decade, civil society, however, had largely turned 
away from the issue. One explanation, provided by a lecturer at the University of 
Warsaw, suggest that corruption has become a too politicized topic and studying it 
constitutes ‘career suicide’ (PL 001, 2017, Jun 19).73 
Observation 5: At the end of the nineties, Poland had passed several legislations 
that established the basis for its anti-corruption framework (Fuszara et al., 2002, p. 406, 
2002, p. 405). But doubts remained about the intentions behind many of these 
initiatives (GRECO, 2003, pp. 13–14). For instance, when the ruling AWS introduced a 
proposal to establish an anti-corruption agency, its coalition partner as well as the then-
opposition parties of the SLD and PSL rejected the proposal. When it came time for the 
Parliamentary Elections in 2001, the SLD however campaigned on an anti-corruption 
platform (Fuszara et al., 2002, p. 406, 2002, p. 405). It turned out that the prominence 
of corruption on the political agenda ended up being the reason for the lack of effective 
anti-corruption measures. The intense political competition between parties meant that 
no party’s anti-corruption initiative managed to receive cross-party consensus (Fuszara 
et al., 2002, p. 406). 
Observation 6: Eventually, Poland established an anti-corruption agency. PiS 
founded the Central Bureau for Anti-Corruption after the party’s electoral win in 2005 
                                                        
73 Which might explain why he only holds a non-tenured position at the University. 
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(Associated Press International, July 24, 2006).74 The Central Anti-Corruption Bureau is 
Poland’s main agency in fighting corruption. It has extensive intelligence and law 
enforcement authority to control privatizations and public procurement proceedings, 
and asset declarations and can initiate administrative as well as criminal proceedings 
(European Commission [EC], Migration and Home Affairs, 2014b, p. 5). The agency has 
been contested from the beginning, especially the institutional design that fortify its lack 
of impartiality (EC, 2014b). The prime minister appoints the head of the agency and also 
supervises its work. The agency also reports annually to the Sejm on its activities. The 
head of the agency serves a four-year term during which removal is only possible after 
the prime minister conducted a “non-binding consultation with the President, Special 
Services Committee and Parliamentary Committee for Special Services” (EC, 2014b, 
p. 5). The European Commission, in their 2014 report on the anti-corruption measures 
in each member states, explicitly warned of the risk of the agency becoming a political 
tool (EC, 2014b, p. 5). The report also noted that the design of the CBA concentrates the 
power in the hands of the agency’s head and combined with its highly hierarchical setup, 
opens the agency to the risk of the head of the agency misusing their powers for political 
reasons (EC, 2014b, p. 5). 
Observation 7: A representative of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce noted that 
when foreign firms encounter corruption, they generally turn to the Chamber of 
Commerce or their embassies (PL 002, 2017, Jun 27). These organizations would then 
try to work on the firms’ behalf to resolve the issues, most often by issuing a reprimand. 
Observation 8: Domestic firm, when confronted with corruption and intent to 
report such behavior can either turn to the general police or the public procurement 
                                                        
74 Act on the Central Bureau of Anti-Corruption of 2006.  
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authority (Urząd Zamówień Publicznych, UZP), if the corruption happened during the 
public procurement process. The UZP had been established in 1995 and tasked with 
publishing the Public Procurement Bulletin, auditing the public procurement 
proceedings in the various state entities, and coordinating appeal proceedings. Poland’s 
highly decentralized public procurement system means that the UZP’s ability to audit 
public procurement projects have been limited. In 2002, for instance, the UZP had only 
been able to examine only 1.8 percent of tenders announced in the public procurement 
bulletin (GRECO, 2001, p. 22). 
Inference: During the first two decades after the transition, intense political 
competition has prevented successive governments from introducing effective anti-
corruption mechanisms. The design of the political system required that political parties 
were internally cohesive enough to ensure that their parliamentarians support their 
agenda. However, such party cohesion had been lacking for most of the time 
(observation 1). Moreover, larger initiatives called for the support of all governing parties 
(observation 2) if not even inter-party consensus with opposition parties, which was even 
harder to obtain (observation 5). Under such condition, even if any political party 
wanted to initiate reforms that would have constrained their own behavior and that of its 
opponents, it needed to overcome internal fragmentation and foster cross-party 
consensus. Either one was already difficult to achieve, achieving both seems almost 
impossible. Extensive political competition, I therefore conclude, did little to constrain 
corruption but made it actually harder to introduce any anti-corruption mechanisms.  
Contrary to popular perception about civil society pushing for anti-corruption 
reforms from below, I find that civil society’s influence had been inconsistent over time. 
While it has been active in the early years of the new century, by the end of the decade, 
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its interests have largely disappeared (observation 4).75 Finally, economic competition 
also played only a negligible role in deterring corruption. Any economic actor, whether 
foreign or domestic, willing to report suspicions of corruption to the authorities, faced 
the problem of where to report. There were only a few viable options available to report 
corruption in the nineties, all with their own share of issues (observations 6,7 and 8). 
The evidence presents me with strong and direct support for my third proposition. In 
other words, I find that neither the political nor the economic and social conditions were 
helpful in constraining corruption and have likely even encouraged actors to participate. 
Overall, the analysis of the three propositions illustrate well how the emergence 
of competition in politics and the economy transformed the actors’ opportunity 
structures and thus encouraged them to engage in corruption. I have found traces of the 
ideal evidence laid out in chapter 2 for all three propositions. The first proposition found 
strong and direct evidence that political actors developed an interest to engage in 
corruption and would find a willing partner for it on the economic side. The second and 
third proposition investigated the ability of constraints to deter these actors from 
engaging in corruption. The evidence for both propositions demonstrates how 
competition in politics and the economy reduced the chances that the existing oversight 
agencies or any potentially new control mechanisms would be able to deter these actors. 
I find that existing oversight agencies had only limited resources available, while new 
deterrents were difficult to establish as excessive political competition would kill any 
anti-corruption initiative proposed by another political actor. The evidence for the 
second proposition is, however, only moderate and direct, as a few caveats to my 
                                                        
75 I suspect that I had difficulties obtaining interviews for largely the same reasons that lead civil society 
moving away from corruption. 
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interpretation remain. The evidence for the third proposition is again strong and direct. 
As any argument is only as strong as its weakest link, I conclude that the presented 
evidence provides only moderate but direct support for causal claim 1.  
Causal Claim 2: Entering into a corrupt state-business relationship. 
Causal claim 2 focuses on the constellation of incentives and constraints that 
political and economic actors face and argues that the specific constellation of powerful 
incentives and weak constraints encourages the actors to enter into corrupt state-
business relationships. To test the claim, I derived three propositions: (a) the actors have 
mutually compatible interests to enter into a corrupt state-business relationship, (b) at 
least one of the actors in the relationship earns substantially from it, and (c) control 
mechanisms are ineffective deterrents for the actors.  
In this section, I examine how well the three corruption cases that have occurred 
in the later half of the period investigated—Rywingate, Afera Hazardowa, and 
Infoafera—support these three propositions. In an ideal case, I should encounter 
evidence in each of the three corruption cases that causal claim 2 occurred as theorized. 
As laid out in chapter 3, I expect to find supportive evidence in each case for each of the 
three propositions in a particular form. For the first proposition, for instance, I, ideally, 
encounter records and other accounts about the political and economic actors having 
mutually compatible interests to entered into a corrupt relationship. For the second 
proposition, I hope to find accounts that highlight the significant benefits that at least 
one side in the exchange gets. And for the third proposition, I ought to find that there 
existed only a few attempts to constrain actors, either because only a few deterrents had 
been in place or because those control mechanisms that are in place are not effective. 
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 Rywingate 
The Rywingate corruption case requires special attention as it represents a failed 
attempt to enter into a corrupt state-business relation. As the failure was the result of 
idiosyncratic factors, and not effective institutional deterrents, the case still allows me to 
test the second causal claim. The analysis, however, relies in some instances on ‘what-if’ 
scenarios that will be clearly marked as such. The first proposition that I will test on the 
Rywingate corruption case states that actors developed mutually compatible interests 
that encouraged them to form corrupt state-business relations.  
Observation 1: In fall 2001, Polsat’s owner Solorz-Żak announced that Agora was 
a potential investor into his TV-station Polsat (Siemieniec & Makarczyk, November 7, 
2001). Polsat was at that time the largest nationwide private TV-station, with an 
audience share of 16.2 percent in 2004. The next closest nation-wide private TV-station 
was TV Wisla with 14 percent (EC, n.d., p. 71). Polsat’s audience share remained around 
15 percent throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century (Lara, February 2, 
2018). 
Observation 2: The two TV channels with the largest audience share belong both 
to TVP, a state-owned broadcasting company. In 2004, for instance, they had a 
combined audience share of 45 percent, and over 55 percent if one adds the regional 
third channel of TVP to it (EC, n.d., p. 71). 
 Observation 3: Agora is the only large Polish publisher in the press market 
(Lara, February 2, 2018; Peruško & Popoviç, 2008, pp. 166–190). Its flagship daily 
newspaper Gazeta Wyborza has been the leading national newspaper throughout the 
1990s (Cohen, November 7, 1999; Lara, February 2, 2018). In 2004, for instance, Gazeta 
Wyborza had a daily circulation of 171.000, second place after Fakt, another daily owned 
by the German Alex Springer publisher, with a circulation of 241.000 newspapers (EC, 
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n.d., p. 71). Even in 2009, Fakt maintained only a small lead with a market share of 14.79 
percent to Gazeta Wyborcza’s 14.35 percent (Lara, February 2, 2018). 
Observation 4: In 2004, the top three publishing companies were the German 
Alex Springer Press, Norway’s Orkla group, and Agora (EC, n.d., p. 71). In 2009, Agora’s 
market share was only 18.3 percent, the remaining 80 percent are shared between 
several large foreign owners (Lara, February 2, 2018). 
Observation 5: The main revenues for companies in the broadcasting market are 
advertisement revenues (Peruško & Popoviç, 2008). A similar dependence on 
advertisement revenues due to pressure from intensive competition also exists in the 
press market (Sparks, 2008, pp. 44–72). 
Observation 6: At the parliamentary elections in September 2001, the SLD-UP 
electoral bloc won 41.04 percent of votes (results of the election presented in table 4.9). 
The second placed PO and third placed Samoobrona only managed to get 12.68 and 
10.28 percent of the votes. The SLD-UP formed a coalition government with the PSL, 
who won 8.98 percent of the votes. The SLD-UP-PSL government thus achieved a 
majority of 50.02 percent and 258 out of 460 seats in the Sejm. It gained a substantially 
larger majority in the Senate, where it gained 75 out of 100 seats, with 4 additional seats 
through its coalition with the PSL (Millard, 2003, pp. 69–86).  
Table 4.9: Results of 2001 Sejm Elections 
Party  Votes
Percent of 
Votes 
Seats 
Democratic Left Alliance – Labor 
Union (SLD-UP) 
5,342,519 46.5 216 
Civic Platform (PO) 1,651,099 12.7 65 
Self-Defence of the Republic of 
Poland (Samoobrona) 
1,327,624 10.2 53 
Law and Justice (PiS) 1,236,787 9.5 44 
Polish People's Party (PSL) 1,168,659 8.9 42 
League of Polish Families 1,025,148 7.9 38 
Source: Piasecki and Michalak (2016). 
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Observation 7: The 2001 election featured three new contenders: the PO, 
founded by former AWS and UW members, the Law and Justice party (PiS), and the 
League of Polish Families. All of which had only been established a few months before 
the elections (Millard, 2003, p. 72; Szczerbiak, 2003, pp. 729–746). Meanwhile, the 
incumbent AWS was in such a disarray that it failed to gain representation in the Sejm at 
all (Millard, 2003, p. 71). As a result, the PSL and the SLD had been the only two parties 
that have managed to win enough votes in each election to sit in the Sejm since 1993. 
Observation 8: In the 2002 local elections, the SLD-UP did not manage to 
maintain their lead from the national elections (Jasiewicz, 2008). While it still secured 
first place, it had only received 24.7 percent of the total votes, in contrast to 31.83 
percent of the total votes in the previous local elections, when it came second place after 
the AWS with 33.32 percent. 
Observation 9: The SLD’s expenses for the 2001 parliamentary elections met the 
PLN 29 million spending ceiling established in a major revision of the Political Parties 
Act of 1997.76 The party’s expenses have risen exponentially since 1991.  
Inference: While Polsat has been one of the major players in the broadcasting 
market it was not the largest as the public broadcasting station TVP still reaches over 50 
percent of Poles (observations 1 and 2). And while Agora similarly has not been the top 
player in the press market, the leaders are two foreign companies, it still controlled 
almost 20 percent of the market (observation 3 and 4). Polsat and Agora thus faced 
tough competition from national and international media firms. The entire media sector 
has been heavily reliant on advertisement revenue (observation 5), which corroborates 
                                                        
76 No exact figures were available online as the National Election Commission has not yet made the political 
parties annual expense reports from the previous decade available online. 
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the conclusion about Agora facing intense competition. Combining these observations 
suggest that Agora had strong financial interests in establishing reliable ties with a 
political actor. On the political side, a few candidates showed potential (observation 7). 
The win of the SLD in the 2001 parliamentary elections (observations 6 and 7) indicated 
that the party continued to be a major political force. But as observation 7 and 8 
highlight, the public appeared to have voted for the SLD more because of a lack of viable 
alternative options than because they believed in the party’s vision. This suggests that 
the SLD had only a narrow lead and was facing strong competition from other, newly 
emerging, political actors. When adding observation 9 and observation 5 of the first 
proposition in claim 1, both pointing to the exponential increase in the SLD’s expenses 
over the years, I conclude that the SLD had a large financial interest in securing an 
economically strong partner in the media sector.  
While these observations do not a provide smoking-gun evidence for the 
proposition, neither do they support alternative interpretation. Faced with fierce 
competition, actors will strive to secure their position in a market through various 
means—either by expanding to other markets, or by establishing alliances with partners 
that are also confronted with tough competition in their respective domains. And given 
their respective resources in their domains, Agora and the SLD were the most likely 
partners for establishing a corrupt state-business relation. I, therefore, infer that there 
exist strong and direct evidence to support the first proposition about the existence of 
mutually compatible interests of economic and political actors to enter into a corrupt 
state-business relationship. 
Causal claim 2, the second step in the causal mechanism, concentrates on 
political and economic actors establishing a corrupt state-business relationship. To test 
it, the first proposition above focused on the mutually compatible interests to enter into 
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such relationship on both sides. The second proposition demands that to validate the 
causal claim, the corrupt exchange between the actors has to have benefited at least one 
side. So, while the first proposition requires that both sides have an interest to enter into 
a corrupt relationship, the second proposition requires that both sides act on this 
interest and enter into a relationship.  
As I have noted above, in the Rywingate case the actors ultimately did not enter 
into a corrupt state-business relationship. As the reason for this are idiosyncratic factors 
related to Agora and its leadership, and not effective control mechanisms, the case does 
not invalidate my theory. To test the proposition, despite its outcome, I will treat the 
following analysis of the second proposition as a ‘what-if’ case.77 
Observation 1: If Agora had expanded diagonally into the broadcasting market by 
purchasing Polsat, it would have established itself as Poland’s largest domestic media 
company. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Agora was the largest domestic 
publisher in Poland’s press market, ranked third behind two foreign publishers (Lara, 
February 2, 2018). At the same time, Polsat had the largest audience share among 
private broadcasters (EC, n.d., p. 71). 
Observation 2: The SLD-UP faced a disintegrating AWS at the 2001 
parliamentary elections and has been considered the dominant party in the elections. 
And while they won the election (see table 4.9 in proposition 1), they did not achieve a 
majority and so formed a coalition government with the fifth-ranked PSL. In the 
subsequent years, the party system soon devolved into an unstable system with intense 
                                                        
77 While the evidence in this case does not consist of actual observations and instead are suppositions, for 
the sake of consistency I will continue using the term observation to list the individual data points. 
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electoral competition (Piasecki & Michalak, 2016, pp. 321–327; Stojarová, Šedo, 
Kopecek, & Chytilek, 2007, p. 8). 
Observation 3: The public broadcasting sector has been under strong political 
influence since the transition. And the degree of its politicization got larger as political 
competition intensified over the years (Fuszara et al., 2002, p. 449; Sparks, 2008, 
pp. 52–54). 
Observation 4: If the SLD would have managed to form an alliance with Agora, it 
would have had received a major financial contribution of around USD 17.5 million 
(Lepszy Michnik niż Murdoch, December 27, 2002; Włosy stają dęba, December 27, 
2002; Smoleński, December 27, 2002, p. 3). In their 2003 annual report to the national 
election commission, the party’s election committee reported expenses of almost PLN 29 
million, coming close to reaching the expense ceiling set for the elections (Austin & 
Tjernström, 2003, p. 72).  
Observation 5: If the SLD would have managed to form an alliance with Agora, 
they also would have won indirect access to the largest Polish media company. The 
alternatives in the media market either did not have the same reach as Agora would have 
had if they had purchased Polsat or they were foreign owned corporations. Neither one 
would have been suitable partners for the SLD. 
Observation 6: Poland grants each party, proportionally to votes received at the 
last parliamentary elections, media access. While each party is guaranteed a certain 
amount of media time, the body responsible for the allocation of time slots is KRRiT. 
Moreover, media access is only guaranteed to public TV and radio stations (Szczerbiak, 
2001, pp. 229–240). 
Inferences: Observations 1, 4, 5, and 6 identify the major benefits that both sides 
would have gained in the exchange. In addition, the media’s dependency on 
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advertisement revenues (see observation 5 in the previous proposition) would have given 
Agora another reason to enter into an alliance with the SLD. By supporting the SLD it 
would have increased its chances of gaining lucrative state advertisement contracts. 
Considering the environment in which the actors operated (observations 2 and 3), it is 
plausible to assume that both sides would have benefited significantly from establishing 
a corrupt state-business relationship.  
Even though the inference is a speculation as I had to base it on a likely ‘what-if’ 
scenario, it finds support in existing research on the ties between political actors and 
media firms. Examining the globalization of the media market in the CEE region, Stetka 
(2012) finds that "mainstream media organizations are increasingly facing the risk of 
getting woven into the local political-economic networks and power structures" (Stetka, 
2012, p. 450). She concludes that the heated competition for revenues and the slow 
takeover of media outlets by local owners, reduces the media’s journalistic 
independence. Örnebring (2012) goes even further and suggests that across the CEE 
countries, the media slowly evolved into a clientelistic resource for the various elite 
networks. These findings echo previous works on corruption that emphasize the 
importance of media access for actors as a political tool (see, for instance, Della Porta 
& Vannucci, 1999, pp. 61–62) and research specifically on Poland (Gallina, 2008; 
Schoenman, 2014). 
The evidence for the second proposition in causal claim 2 of Rywingate has only 
moderate accuracy as I needed to substantiate it with secondary research. In addition, to 
properly assess the proposition, I had to theorizing about the most likely ‘what-if’ 
scenario that provides only indirect evidence. Combined, I find that events in Rywingate 
provide moderate and indirect evidence for the second proposition of causal claim 2. 
  148 
The third proposition concentrates on the inability of existing control 
mechanisms to counter the corrupt state-business relationship. In the Rywingate case, I 
uncover that there were few control mechanisms in place that could have prevented the 
corrupt exchange. And as previously mentioned, while the corrupt relationship 
ultimately did not emerge, the reasons for it were not strong oversight agencies or 
mechanisms but idiosyncratic factors. 
Observation 1: The Parliamentary Election Law of 2001 bans legal entities, such 
as corporations, from donating to political actors.78 
Observation 2: The top public prosecutor, that is, the Prosecutor General, is 
simultaneously also the Minister of Justice and thus a politically appointed office holder. 
In 2002, the Minister of Justice and Prosecutor General was Grzegorz Kurczuk, a 
member of the SLDSee relevant observation in proposition 2 of causal claim 1. 
Observation 3: Interviews with several current and former prosecutors 
emphasized that prosecutors are highly attuned to the moods of their political masters. 
And while prosecution experienced at least informal independence from politics in the 
nineties, by 1997 political pressure slowly crept back into their professional work (Polak 
& Nelken, 2010).79  
Observation 4: Before news about the failed corruption attempt exploded, the 
public paid little attention to such corruption as they viewed it as a part of living in a 
post-communist democracy. At that time, political actors were considered to be above 
the law (PL 001, 2017, Jun 19). The investigations by an international expert team 
                                                        
78 See relevant observations in Causal Claim 1. 
79 More on this in proposition 2 in causal claim 1. 
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echoed these concerns when they advised the Polish government to raise public 
awareness of the dangers of corruption (GRECO, 2001, p. 20). 
Observation 5: A prime minister has formally full authority to appoint the 
ministers and state secretaries. Several sources, however, note that these positions are 
highly sought after by party members, which often leads to intra-party competition 
among potential candidates (Jasiewicz, 2008; Raciborski, 2007, pp. 17–40).  
Observation 6: The prosecution has charged the vice-minister of culture 
Aleksandra Jakubowska, the senior legal advisor in her ministry, as well as the director 
and deputy director of KRRiT’s legal department. All four were eventually found guilty 
on charges of falsifying documents, as they orchestrated the removal of the phrase “and 
magazines” from the bill after the Council of Ministers had already approved the 
gambling bill (Zarzuty za aferę "lub czasopisma", September 29, 2004; Wróblewski, 
December 21, 2007; Wróblewski, June 26, 2012, p. 8). 
Observation 7: Table 4.5 presents the nine individuals and their party affiliations 
that sat on the KRRiT at the time of events. The head of KRRiT from July 1999 to March 
2003 was Juliusz Braun, a member of the UD/ UW. His deputy at that time was Jan Sęk, 
a member of the PSL. Secretary to the Council was Włodzimierz Czarzasty (SLD), who 
served in this position from March 2000 to August 2004. Out of the remaining six 
KRRiT members, three more belonged to the SLD and two to the PSL. This meant that 
two-thirds of the council members had party affiliations with the ruling government.  
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Table 4.5: Members of KRRiT in 2001 
Name Tenure 
Party 
Affiliation* 
Position 
(in 2001) 
Appointed by 
Marek Jurek 
May 1995 – May 
2001 
PR/ PiS  
President of 
Republic 
Waldemar 
Dubaniowski 
September 1998 – 
April 2003 
Independent/ 
SLD 
 
President of 
Republic 
Włodzimierz 
Czarzasty 
May 1999 – January 
2005 
SLD Secretary 
President of 
Republic 
Danuta Waniek 
May 2001 – 
December 2005 
SLD  
President of 
Republic 
Adam Halber 
April 1997 – July 
2003 
SLD  Sejm 
Juliusz Braun 
April 1999 – May 
2005 
UD/UW Chairperson Sejm 
Jarosław Sellin 
April 1999 – May 
2005 
PK/PiS  Sejm 
Aleksander 
Łuczak 
April 2001 – 
December 2005 
PSL  Sejm 
Jan Sęk 
April 1997 – May 
2003 
PSL 
Deputy 
Chairperson 
Senate 
Lech Jaworski 
April 2001 – 
December 2005 
AWS/PO  Senate 
Witold Graboś 
April 1995 – April 
2001 
SLD  Senate 
Michał Strąk 
April 1995 – April 
2001 
PSL  Sejm 
Source: KRRiT (2018). 
Observation 8: Czarzasty was able to manipulate the first draft of the new bill 
already at the KRRiT. His continued criticism of any proposals by the legal expert meant 
that the expert eventually resigned from his position. While Braun assigned Czarzasty a 
fellow KRRiT member as partner, when the former asked to draft the bill himself, the 
partner also eventually despaired. This allowed Czarzasty to create a first draft of the bill 
in his liking. While not all KRRiT members agree with Czarzasty’s draft, due to an absent 
member at the voting and a legal loophole, was the bill accepted by the council and 
forwarded to the Government for their input (tan, October 8, 2008). 
Inference: The probably reason for why Rywin intended to channel the money 
through his firm was the total ban of campaign contributions by legal entities 
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(observation 1). Other control mechanisms that had failed along the way were the 
relevant authorities, especially the prosecution, and the public. The prosecution likely 
paid little attention to the signs as they are subjugated to the Minister of Justice. Because 
of the formal and informal control over the prosecution, the political actors unlikely 
viewed the prosecution as a major deterrent (observations 2 and 3). The conjecture finds 
further support when considering that the public tended to be resigned to corruption by 
political actors and paid little attention to it (observation 4). The political actors also did 
not face a lot of party internal deterrents to their corrupt activities. First, despite 
vehement critique from some of his KRRiT peers, Czarzasty managed to get his version 
of the new media bill accepted by the council (observation 8). It probably helped that 
two-thirds of the KRRiT members were affiliated with the government, four even had 
affiliations with the SLD (observation 7).  
Another potential oversight mechanisms that could have deterred the actors was 
PM Miller. But even though Miller was the head of the government and also head of the 
SLD at that time, his formal and informal authority over the other individuals was 
limited. In fact, he needed to balance the varying interests within the party and across 
the coalition (observation 5). The political actor also managed to circumvent the council 
of minister’s decision on the media bill by making changes after it the bill had already 
been approved by the government (observation 6). This further corroborates the 
proposition as it meant that the actors’ reach even extended beyond the confines of the 
KRRiT, which presented the first draft of the bill, into the government. In sum, I find 
moderate and direct evidence that supports the third proposition of causal claim 2. 
Multiple formal and informal control mechanisms failed constraining the corrupt actors. 
Overall, investigating the conditions under which Rywingate took place and 
tracing the steps undertaken by the political and actors has provided a first assessment 
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of causal claim 2. The claim suggests that the constellation of powerful incentives and 
weak constraints encouraged political and economic actors to form corrupt state-
business relationships. Its first proposition expects to find evidence that the actors have 
mutually compatible interests to enter into a state-business relationship. In the case of 
Rywingate, I found strong and direct evidence for such mutually compatible interests. 
But not all individuals base their decisions on a cost-benefit analysis alone, and the 
attempt of establishing such a corrupt relationship was soundly rejected by Agora. I, 
therefore, had to resort assuming the likely benefits the political and economic actors 
would have derived, had they entered into a corrupt relationship. Because of the guess-
work involved, I assessed the support for the second proposition only as moderate and 
indirect. The final proposition, discussed above, highlighted the failure of control 
mechanisms to deter the corrupt actors. The evidence for the proposition was moderate 
and direct. Rywingate, therefore, provides only moderate and indirect support for causal 
claim 2. 
Afera Hazardowa. 
The main episodes of Afera Hazardowa took place at the intersection of the 
gambling sector and the legislative process between 2008 and 2009. In the case 
lobbyists from the gambling industry used their political connections to influence the 
drafting of a new gambling bill, in particular thwarting any legislative efforts to introduce 
an additional tax on the proceeds of slot machines. 
The first proposition of causal claim 2 states that the political and economic 
actors have mutually compatible interests that encouraged them to enter into a corrupt 
state-business relationship. Observations 1 to 5 reveal the various ties between these 
actors, while observation 6 highlights first, Sobiesiak’s willingness to engage in 
corruption, and second, Chlebowski’s and Drzewiecki’s likely involvement in at least 
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some of these cases. Based on the here presented evidence, I find strong and indirect 
support for the first proposition of causal claim 2. 
Observation 1: In their testimonies in front of the parliamentary inquiry 
committee Sobiesiak and Chlebowski, Head of the PO’s Parliamentary Klub and Chair of 
the Public Finance Committee, both admitted that they have been friends since the 
nineties, including spending holiday’s together (Afera hazardowa. O co chodzi?, October 
1, 2009; Czuchnowski & agko, February 11, 2010). The tape recordings of several 
telephone conversations by the CBA also highlight the actors long-standing personal 
friendship and Chlebowski’s willingness to talk to Drzewiecki and Schetyna on 
Sobiesiak’s behalf. Further investigations by the media revealed that Chlebowski had 
made an appointment with Schetyna at the end of September (Walczę Rysiu, załatwimy, 
October 1, 2009; Wprost, October 7, 2009). 
Observation 2: Sobiesiak had strong personal ties to then Minister of Sports, 
Mirosław Drzewiecki and their acquaintance goes back between 10 to 20 years—their 
accounts about the exact duration differ.80 Both own residencies in Florida but 
apparently, they could not remember if they have met there in November or December 
after the scandal broke. Sobiesiak first testified in front of the committee that he met 
with Drzewiecki in Florida but later rescinded his testimony—claiming he and his family 
only met with Drzewiecki’s wife (Sobiesiak zmienił zeznania na korzyść Drzewieckiego, 
April 25, 2010; Kacprzak, Kałucki, Haszczyński, Szczepaniak, & Nisztor, February 2, 
2010; Stenogramy, August 9, 2011). 
                                                        
80 Sobiesiak and Drzewiecki have contradicted each other in their various testimonies to the parliamentary 
inquiry committee and the Prosecution office Informacyjna Agencja Radiowa [IAR] (2010). They also 
contradicted each other on whether they have meet each other after the entire scandal became public. 
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Observation 3: Ryszard Sobiesiak had been a professional football player 
throughout the eighties, were he spent most of his time playing for various football clubs 
in Austria.  
Observation 4: Sobiesiak and his family have been operating in the Polish 
gambling industry since the early 1990s. Sobiesiak established his first casino with help 
of Novomatic—the Austrian gambling company and distributor of slot machines 
(Kacprzak et al., February 2, 2010). He or his family fully or partially own several 
companies in the gambling industry: Casino Polonia, which owns seven casinos across 
Poland, Golden Play, and Golden Play Bis. In addition, the family is also active in the 
sports and real estate sectors through Winterpol, the company for which Sobiesiak 
apparently already bribed judges and had Chlebowski help him win the necessary 
permits and licenses to construct a ski lift on protected land, including arranging for a 
rezoning of the land (Kałucki, Haszczyński, & Szczepaniak, January 14, 2010). 
Observation 5: The Gambling Act of 1992, and its amendment of 2003, treated 
slot machine games as a separate category from other games of chance and mutual bets 
(1992; Law on Gambling and Slotmachines of, 2001). Slot machine games are divided 
into games with regular and low-pay machines. The former can only stand in game 
arcades or casinos and the operator requires a license. Low-pay machines, however, can 
be placed on any commercial and service premises, with a maximum of three machines 
in a room. The difference between regular and low-pay machines lies in a technicality—
low-paying slot machines have been programmed to allow a maximum payout of EUR 15 
per game with a betting limit of EUR 0.07 (Pytlakowski, October 13, 2009). Of course, 
players have no restrictions on how long they want to play. 
Observation 6: The contested provision in the gambling bill would have 
introduced additional payments to all slot machines owners or operators (Pytlakowski, 
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October 13, 2009). Just like any other entrepreneur, these economic actors would have 
transferred the additional taxes to their clients. Experts from the Gdańsk Institute for 
Market Economics predict that after the introduction of these additional taxes, the 
number of players would drop, and the revenues of the industry and, consequently, the 
state budget would decrease dramatically. Their estimates show that income from games 
and income tax in the low-pay segment would decrease in 2010-2014 by PLN 1.7 billion, 
and for the entire industry by over PLN 2.3 billion (Polskie kasyna przeciw 10% dopłacie, 
October 21, 2008). 
Observation 7: At the end of June 2009, the head of Drzewiecki’s cabinet Marcin 
Rosół, sent one of several emails to the Deputy Minister of Finance, recommending 
Magdalena Sobiesiak, the daughter of Ryszard Sobiesiak for a position at the state-
owned gambling firm Totalizatora Sportowny (Pytlakowski, October 13, 2009; 
Leszkiewicz: rekomendacja Magdaleny Sobiesiak była niestandardowa, August 9, 2011; 
Rosół, August 9, 2011). On July 15, she resigns from her position as Vicepresident of the 
family’s gambling company Casino Polonia. And at the end of August, she meets with 
Marcin Rosół to discuss her qualifications for a position at the board of Totalizatora. But 
just a day after their meeting she rescinds her application. Statements by several 
individuals familiar with the family and the affair, suggest that the entire application and 
later withdrawal had been orchestrated by her father. While he first wanted to have a 
family member at Totalizatora to split the lottery market between Totalizatora and 
Sobiesiak’s firm, he later changed his opinion, believing that the board was full of ‘KGB, 
CBA’ (Kacprzak et al., February 2, 2010; Knysz, October 8, 2009; PAP, January 14, 2010; 
Zawadka, Kałucki, & Stróżyk, October 2, 2009). 
Observation 8: While Sobiesiak’s firms have been investigated on several 
occasions for possible corruption, money laundering, and tax evasion, two are particular 
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relevant for now. First, Sobiesiak’s attempts to block unfavorable provisions in the new 
gambling bill were first discovered when the CBA recorded his conversations in 
connection to their investigation into wide-spread corruption among local politicians in 
Lower Silesia (Kacprzak et al., February 2, 2010; Kałucki, Haszczyński, & Szczepaniak, 
January 1, 2010). In October 2009, the Krakow Regional Prosecution even begins their 
investigation into possible bribe payments by Ryszard Sobiesiak to members of the Civil 
Chamber of the Supreme Court to secure a favorable sentence for one of Sobiesiak’s 
firms involved in the corruption in Lower Silesia (Zieliński, May 9, 2012).  
The second instance of corruption relates to the construction of a ski lift in 
Zieleniec in the early 2000s. Sobiesiak received a 10-month suspended sentence with a 
two year probation, payment of PLN 2.000 for bribing an a local official (Knysz, October 
8, 2009). In addition, he had to divest official of his interests in the gambling sector, 
which he did by handing over his controlling shares in several companies to his three 
children (Kacprzak et al., February 2, 2010). When the former head of the CBA testified 
to the committee, he also referenced several times Sobiesiak’s willingness to engage in 
corruption. Two other names, however, also appear in this case. Several media reports 
highlight Chlebowski’s and Drzewiecki’s pressure on local politicians and state officials 
to grant Sobiesiak’s firm the necessary permits and licenses, without doing the required 
due diligence (Kto dał gazecie "kwity" o Sobiesiaku, June 7, 2010). 
Inference: Observations 1 and 2 reveal the strong personal and professional ties 
that exist between Sobiesiak and the Head of the PO’s Parliamentary Klub and chair of 
the Public Finance Committee Zbigniew Chlebowski and the Minister of Sports Mirosław 
Drzewiecki. While they do not provide direct information about the interests of 
Chlebowski and Drzewiecki, this is also not to be expected in the case of legal corruption. 
As mentioned before and clarified in chapter 2, one of the characteristics of legal 
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corruption is how the benefits are rarely overt and direct, especially benefits for the 
political actors.  
My argument is based on the assumption that political actors are driven by vote-
maximization. Taking this assumptions as the motivation for individuals such as 
Chlebowski and Drzewiecki, I can infer that they are motivated by career advancement. 
Based on this underlying assumption about career-advancement, I can make two 
plausible conjectures about their interest in working with Sobiesiak. First, their 
cooperation had likely reputational benefits for both political actors as they were friends 
with a former football player who later became a successful entrepreneur (observations 3 
and 4). Second, there might have been the option, if either political actor ever retired 
from politics, for a position at one of Sobiesiak’s firms. 
The interests of Sobiesiak are much clearer. He and his family had strong 
business interests in the gambling sector. And regardless of the specific size of his 
business interests, Sobiesiak and his family had enough of a financial stake in the 
gambling market that any changes in the Gambling Act would affect their fortunes 
(observation 4). According to the statement of a research institute, would have been hurt 
had the additional tax on slot machines been introduced (observations 5 and 6). 
Sobiesiak also apparently attempted to situate a close family member in the state-owned 
lottery company, with the intention of dividing up the lottery sector (observation 7).81 
The last observation exposes Sobiesiak’s willingness to engage in corruption if it benefits 
                                                        
81 While it is possible that Sobiesiak’s daughter planned the move alone, her testimony in front of the 
parliamentary committee does not suggest that. However, she also did not outright say that she acted on 
behalf of her father. But then, she did not have too - as vice-president she would have been aware of the 
situation and the benefits for the family’s business if they could divide the market up between their gambling 
firms and the SOE. 
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his businesses (observation 8). Together, observations 5 to 8 portray Sobiesiak as an 
economic actor, who is driven by profit maximization.82 
Hence, I find strong evidence that the actors had mutually compatible interests in 
working together, I also find indirect evidence of them being willing to ‘bend the rules’ in 
their favor.83 Especially observation 8 explicitly points towards Sobiesiak’s willingness to 
engage in corruption, including the likely involvement of Chlebowski and Drzewiecki in 
at least some of Sobiesiak’s dealings. As such, these observations provide strong and 
indirect evidence that the political and economic actors had mutually compatible 
interests to entered in a corrupt state-business relation. 
The following observations provide strong direct evidence for the second 
proposition—at least one side benefited significantly in the corrupt exchange. As the 
exposure of the case lead to Prime Minister Tusk pushing for a far tighter regulation of 
the gambling market than the first draft of the new gambling bill intended, I will again 
resort to considering the ‘what-if’ scenario—What if Sobiesiak’s and Kosek’s lobbying 
efforts had remained unknown? 
Observation 1: Sobiesiak had already previously used his ties to politicians to ‘get 
things done’. In one of the better-known cases, Sobiesiak’s company Winterpol 
constructed a ski lift and a Winter resort on state protected land in 2008. To obtain the 
necessary licenses and permits, including rezoning parts of the land, Sobiesiak got 
                                                        
82 Sobiesiak’s behavior thus supports the underlying assumptions made about this group of actors in chapter 
2. 
83 I evaluate the evidence only as indirect, as I had to that make several explicit assumptions about the 
political actors’ interests. 
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Chlebowksi to help him (Kacprzak, Nisztor, & Kubiak, October 8, 2009; Kałucki et al., 
January 14, 2010).84 
Observation 2: Sobiesiak and Jan Kosek, the second lobbyists investigated in the 
affair, have both made significant donations to the PO’s Electoral Fund, among others to 
help a Sejm candidate who was considered as a right-hand man of Schetyna, in 2005 and 
2006 (Kacprzak et al., February 2, 2010; Knysz, October 8, 2009). Kosek also admitted 
that he knew Chlebowski personally, having met him on several occasions throughout 
the years (Knysz, October 8, 2009; Manys, March 13, 2010). Sobiesiak and Kosek have 
also known each other for several years, even owning at least one gambling company 
together (Knysz, October 8, 2009). 
Observation 3: A Regional District Prosecution Office also investigated Jan 
Kosek for corruption connected to establishing a casino in Przemyśl, a city in the south-
east of Poland. The District Prosecutor's Office examined to what extend Kosek, another 
gambling operator, and politicians of the PO, especially Zbigniew Chleboski, influenced 
the decision of the city councilors. While previously against a casino in their city, on 
September 3, 2009 they voted to open the first casino in the city with slot machines 
(Kacprzak et al., October 8, 2009; Matusz, March 13, 2010). While the prosecution was 
eventually stopped because of lack of evidence, Przemyśl does feature now a casino. 
Observation 4: In the mid to late 2000s, Sobiesiak and Kosek focused on 
establishing new casinos, where a majority of the slot-machines are located, in the 
smaller towns and cities in Poland. When interviewed by journalists, a city council 
member from Zabrze noted that they have voted on establishing a Casino in Zabrze now 
                                                        
84 The Wroclaw District Prosecutor’s Office charges several State Forestry officials with failure to fulfill their 
duties in March 2010. In October, the NIK also reported on the fraudulent activities by several State Forestry 
officials (Pitera, 2010; Kacprzak, Kałucki, Haszczyński, and Szczepaniak, March 4, 2010; "NIK zawiadamia 
prokuraturę ws. wyciągu Sobiesiaka," October 5, 2010). 
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for several times, until they came to a favorable decision for Sobiesiak. A hitherto 
unprecedented event in the town. The council member blames the lobbying efforts by the 
national PO politicians on these developments (Kacprzak et al., October 8, 2009).85 
Observation 5: Drzewiecki admitted in his statement to the parliamentary 
inquiry committee that he had occasionally received small tokens from Sobiesiak over 
the years, such as golf clubs or similar items (Stenogramy, August 9, 2011). Chlebowski 
revealed that he spent the 2008 New Year at Sobiesiak’s Winter Resort in Zielience—the 
same resort he has been accused to help get built on protected land. Chlebowksi stressed 
that he paid for the stay was not financed by Sobiesiak (IAR, 2010; Wprost, October 7, 
2009). 
Inference: Observations 1 and 3 illustrate two explicit examples of the economic 
actors have used their political connections to Chlebowksi and other PO politicians for 
their own benefit on previous occasions. Observation 2 highlights how strongly the two 
economic actors are connected to each other. And combined with observation 3, they 
both corroborate the general trend of Sobiesiak and Kosek’s gambling companies 
expanding into smaller towns and cities (observation 4). If the provision about 
additional taxes on slot-machines would have passed, Sobiesiak and Kosek’s existing and 
future investments would have suffered a major hit (see observations 5 and 6 in the 
previous proposition).  
Establishing the benefits for the political actors is far harder, which is not 
surprising given the type of corruption the case exemplifies. Legal corruption is 
characterized by how exchanges tend to be subtle and outright bribery rarely happens. 
Any monetary transactions are more likely to benefit the entire political party or the 
                                                        
85 The town in the south-west of Poland is remarkable only because it so unremarkable. 
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campaigns of an individual politicians, and not their own personal pursue. Instead, most 
of these benefits for the political actors likely come more in the form of status and 
prestige increase. With this in mind, observation 5 is in line with my expectations. 
Neither prosecution nor the media have discovered any direct financial transaction 
between Sobiesiak and the PO politicians (apart from an early campaign contribution to 
the PO’s local electoral fund described observation 2). The obvious benefits that the 
political actors received have been minor given their help (observation 5). But they 
nevertheless continued to associate with Sobiesiak, even in their spare time, despite him 
having been previously convicted of corruption and continuing to be under investigation. 
These long-term friendships therefore reveal that they have at least benefited on a 
personal level from the relationship. 
Measurement accuracy of these observations is relatively high, as the sources 
were cross-checked where possible and in general have a high reputation for qualitative 
journalism. Overall, the evidence for the second proposition of causal claim 2 is direct. 
While I again have to consider partially a what-if scenario (i.e. what if the specific 
provision had been passed) as the lobbying efforts by Sobiesiak and Kosek had been 
discovered before they have been fruitful, and the benefits for the political actors have 
been discrete and difficult to trace, it is hard to identify alternative explanation for the 
combination of observations, especially observations 1, 2, and 5.86 I therefore conclude 
that there is strong and direct evidence that both sides in the corrupt exchange have 
benefited. 
I now turn to the last proposition of causal claim 2. As a reminder, causal claim 2 
focuses on the establishment of a corrupt state-business relationship between the 
                                                        
86 I also only suggest that at least one side benefits from it. 
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political and economic actors. The previous two propositions established that the 
political and economic actors in Afera Hazardowa have mutually compatible interests to 
engage in a corrupt exchange (proposition 1), and that they benefit significantly once 
they enter into the corrupt relationship (proposition 2).  
The final aspect that I will investigate is the ability of control mechanisms to 
deter the corrupt relationship between these actors (proposition 3). Specifically, I 
examine the ineffectiveness of oversight institutions with a particular focus on how 
political and economic competition has undermined the effectiveness of these control 
mechanisms or at least limited the effectiveness of those mechanisms that still worked. 
The CBA is a prime example of the former, while the role of the media shows that a few 
functioning control mechanisms are not enough to effectively deter the formation of a 
corrupt relationship between actors. 
In the present case, the CBA uncovered the covert lobbying efforts by Sobiesiak 
and Kosek, which could be interpreted as a challenge to my argument. However, I argue 
that the work of the CBA had not been enough of a deterrent for the corrupt actors, 
visible in how Sobiesiak exploited his relationship with the political actors on multiple 
occasions. On basis of the here presented observations from the case of Afera 
Hazardowa, I therefore conclude that there exists strong and direct evidence in support 
of the third proposition. 
Observation 1: The head of Poland’s first anti-corruption agency, the CBA, was 
Mariusz Kamiński ("Anti-corruption office starts work in Poland," 2006). Kamiński had 
been a PiS parliamentarian for two terms who, upon his appointment as Head of the 
CBA, resigned his party membership. He reactivated it again after his dismissal by PM 
Tusk in 2009 (EC, 2014b, p. 5). By 2011, Kamiński became Chair of the Special Services 
Committee, i.e. national security coordinator. 
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Observation 2: On September 9, 2009, a regional district prosecutor charged 
Kamiński with abuse of power for his agency’s investigation of another major corruption 
case in 2007 (Piasecki & Michalak, 2016, p. 355; Wprost, October 7, 2009).87 The 
prosecution suspected Kamiński had abused his powers as head of the CBA during the 
investigation. In March 2015, a court sentenced him to three years in prison and a ten-
year ban from holding any public office (Casey, March 31, 2015). He was pardoned by 
then-President Duda, another PiS member, just a few months later (Poland: Ex-Chief of 
Anti-Graft Agency Is Pardoned in Abuse-of-Power Case, November 18, 2015). The 
Supreme Court recently ruled that the pardon had been premature, as Kamiński had 
been still appealing his sentence (Polish News Bulletin, June 8, 2017, p. 26). 
Observation 3: In October 2009, after the case about covert lobbying by Sobiesiak 
and Kosek became public, PM Tusk consulted with the President and the relevant 
committees to initiate Kamiński’s removal as Head of the CBA. PM Tusk dismissed 
Kamiński from his position as head of the CBA on October 14, 2009 (Krawczyk, Flint, 
PAP, & tvn24.pl, October 13, 2009).88  
Observation 4: Sobiesiak’s relationship with the Minister of Interior Grzegorz 
Schetyna can be traced back to at least 2003, when they were both shareholders in two 
sports club in Silesia. When Sobiesiak’s football club encountered some financial 
difficulties, it asked the region’s basketball club for help—one of its shareholders was 
                                                        
87 The case, known as Afera Gruntowa, revolves around the rezoning of state land by two businessmen, who 
the CBA wanted to catch in a sting operation. In the course of the CBA’s investigation, it ended up accusing 
then-deputy minister and minister of agriculture Andrzej Lepper of having been involved. Lepper was the 
Chair of Samoobrona, a coalition partner of PiS at that time (Piasecki and Michalak, 2016, p. 355; Wprost, 
October 7, 2009; Piasecki and Michalak, 2016, p. 355). 
88 When the Sejm questioned Tusk about it, he stated that the CBA had been abused as a political tool by the 
PiS through Kamiński, who is also facing charges of abusing his powers in connection to afera gruntowa. 
Kamiński, in turn, claims his dismissal was an act of revenge as he revealed the connections between 
Sobiesiak and senior members of the PO (Krawczyk et al., October 13, 2009; "Kamiński stanął przed komisją 
hazardową," August, 9, 2011). 
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Schetyna. According to Schetyna’s testimony to the commission, they business 
relationship ended in 2005 (Knysz, October 8, 2009; PAP, January 14, 2010; Polskie 
Radio). In his testimony Schetyna admitted that he continued meeting with Sobiesiak 
throughout the years, generally at some sport events as it was their shared passion. He 
claimed that his last meeting with Sobiesiak was in May 2009, but later remembered 
that he met Sobiesiak twice more—at the end of September 2009 (Szułdrzyński, 
February 4, 2010). Rzeczpospolita, a national Polish newspaper, would reveal the entire 
affair just a few days later on October 1, 2009. 
Observation 5: PM Tusk dismissed the Minister of Justice and Prosecutor 
General Andrzej Czuma for his involvement in the corruption case. Czuma was also one 
of the few individuals that PM Tusk openly admonished for his “unethical behavior” 
(Polskie Radio, February 10, 2010).89 
Observation 6: After more then two years, Poland’s first lobbying law came into 
effect in 2006.90 The law lays out what it considers to be lobbying91, who professional 
lobbyists92 are and that such professional lobbyists must register their interactions with a 
public authority in a publicly-accessible registry, which the Ministry of Interior and 
Administration administers (OECD, 2009a, pp. 148–150). In addition, the law stipulates 
that the individual ministries introduce internal regulations on the proper conduct with 
                                                        
89 I could not yet identify clearly what part Czuma played in the case as the sources glossed over his 
involvement. 
90 The Law on Lobbying of 2005 was signed into law in August 2005, but its date of entry into force was 
March 2006. 
91 Article 2 Par 1 defines lobbying as “any legal action designed to influence the legislative or regulatory 
actions of a Public Authority” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2007, 
June 1, p. 3). 
92 Professional lobbyists are any individuals or entities that lobby on behalf of a third party in exchange for 
money (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2009a, p. 148). 
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lobbyists, including registering each contact with a lobbyist (GRECO, 2012, p. 12; OECD, 
2009a, pp. 158–160). 
Observation 7: A representative of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Poland, 
academics, as well as national and international experts agree unequivocally that the 
existing regulations about lobbying are ineffective (EC, 2014b, p. 4; GRECO, 2012, p. 12; 
Kwiatkowski, 2016; Olejnik, 2011; PL 001, 2017, Jun 19.; PL 002, 2017, Jun 27). For one, 
only a few lobbyists have been registered, and even a fewer of those are reported as 
actively lobbying (Olejnik, 2011), suggesting that most of the influence-seeking is 
conducted covertly through personal connections (GRECO, 2012, p. 12). 
Observation 8: In addition to the parliamentary inquiry committee in the Sejm, 
PM Tusk also ordered an investigation into the drafting of the gambling bill, in particular 
all contacts between public officials and economic actors. He tasked his State Secretary 
of State Julia Pitera, the former President of the Board of Directors of the Polish chapter 
of Transparency International, with the investigation. In her final report, Pitera 
identifies several wrongdoings that took place during the drafting of the bill. Among 
others, she clearly notes that representatives by the Ministry of Sports, Ministry of 
Economy and Ministry of Finance failed to publish their contacts with lobbyists from the 
gambling industry (Pitera, 2010, pp. 85–89). 
Observation 9: Polish legal experts identify several critical actors in the law-
making process93 in the executive and in the legislative, who have a substantial impact on 
                                                        
93 A bill can be introduced to the Sejm in several ways - most commonly either by the government, 15 MPs, 
or a Sejm committee. If done through the government, it will have passed an interministerial coordination 
process that also includes consultation with non-executive actors. Once a bill has been submitted to the 
Marshal of the Sejm, i.e. the Speaker of the Sejm, it again goes through a consultation and coordination 
process involving non-legislative actors and several (sub)committees. Most bills require only a simple 
majority to pass and be sent off to the Senate and then the President of the Republic, who would sign a bill 
into law (Goetz and Zubek, 2005). 
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the drafting of a bill. For instance, in an examination of the legislative process in the 
early 2000s, Goetz and Zubek (2005) find that in the executive individual ministers have 
extensive leeway in shaping a bill. And while a bill, before being passed on to the Sejm, 
undergoes interministerial consultation, these rarely impact the substantive matter of a 
bill. Once a bill has been submitted to the Sejm, it is largely out of reach of the 
government (Zubek, 2008, pp. 147–161). The main players are now the various 
committees and subcommittees, especially their chairs, and the the chairs of the 
Parliamentary Clubs, who can introduce amendments to any bill (Goetz & Zubek, 2005; 
Zubek, 2008). The last veto-player in the Sejm is the Marshal, who has several tools at its 
disposal to manipulate what bills get passed in what form (Nalepa, 2016, pp. 357–358; 
Zubek, 2008). 
Observation 10: While PM Tusk had been a founder of the PO, his authority over 
the behavior of fellow party members is limited. For one, the internal organization of the 
PO has few internal control mechanisms in place that would allow its party leader, in this 
case PM Tusk, to influence other party members (Hartliński, 2014, p. 1165). Second, the 
design of the law-making process empowers individual ministers and members of 
parliaments at the expense of government and party cohesion (Millard, 2008; Nalepa, 
2016; Zubek, 2011). Third, even before PO members receive a position in the government 
or in the parliament, they already face intensive intra-party competition. Several studies 
have stressed the high levels of intra-party competition that takes place, whether it is for 
ministerial positions (Raciborski, 2007), campaign contributions (Walecki, 2007), or a 
place on the party’s list through personal votes (Nalepa, 2016, p. 359)  
Observation 11: There are no indications that PiS, the PO’s main political rival, 
had been aware of the covert lobbying efforts by the gambling industry, or, if they knew 
about it, that they considered it a criminal act and thus useful for public condemnation. 
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Observation 12: Several national media outlets picked up on the corruption case 
and continued to report on the events extensively. Rzeszpospolita and a few other 
newspapers also started their own investigations into the covert lobbying activities by the 
gambling industry.  
Inference: The first few observations illustrate how the main oversight agency 
failed to deter Sobiesiak’s and Kosek’s covert lobbying attempts. In causal claim 1, I 
discovered how the institutional design of the CBA predisposed it to be politicized. 
Observation 1 now reveals that such a politicization indeed took place. Observations 2 
and 3 further solidify the idea that the CBA has been acting with a political bias at that 
time.94 But also, the other law enforcement authorities and prosecution services showed 
signs of having been compromised. For one, Sobesiak had a friendly relationship with 
the Minister of MSWiA, the head of Poland’s law enforcement agencies (observation 4). 
And there are some indications that also the Minister of Justice and Prosecution General 
had been implicated (observation 5). While neither observation provides clear evidence 
of the actors’ involvement, they cast doubt on the impartiality of either minister. 
Another control mechanism that had failed to deter the corrupt actors was the 
lobbying legislation (observation 6). Observation 7 presents the initial negative 
evaluations of the legislation, while observation 8 reveals how the political actors had 
violated the regulations. Together, the observations corroborate the preliminary 
conclusion that existing control mechanisms failed in deterring Sobiesiak and Co from 
engaging in a corrupt exchange. 
                                                        
94 While the relationship between a government and its anti-corruption agency is often adversarial and 
might even end in the removal of the agency’s head - it is rare to see such a blatant political bias as with 
Mariusz Kamiński’s allegiance to PiS, visible in the early CBA investigations and Kamiński’s post-CBA career 
choices. 
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Observation 9 is especially relevant for the third proposition and comes closest to 
the ideal evidence of finding a ‘smoking gun’. All of the identified major political actors 
with whom Sobiesiak and Kosek have been in contact occupied key-positions in the law-
making process. In the executive, Sobiesiak had close ties to Mirosław Drzewiecki, then-
Minister of Sports, and Grzegorz Schetyna, then-Minister of Interior and Administration. 
In the legislature, Sobiesiak and Kosek’s main contact was Zbigniew Chlebowski, who 
occupied two of the critical positions in the Sejm—he was Chair of the PO’s 
Parliamentary Club as well as Chair of the Committee of Public Finance. And these 
political actors were hardly deterred from becoming involved with Sobiesiak, despite his 
prior convictions.95 The actors also had little to fear from within the PO. As observations 
10 shows, a combination of institutional features, both external and within the PO, 
limited PM Tusk’s ability to form a unified party with him at the center and so supervise 
the activities of other party members, and, if necessary, discipline them.96 
Other oversight agencies or control mechanisms that failed to deter Sobiesiak and 
his political associates from engaging in a corrupt exchange were the political opposition 
parties (observation 11), and investigative media (observation 12). The lack of actions by 
the opposition prior to the scandal becoming public could be attributed to a variety of 
                                                        
95 One of the few key-positions in the legislative process that had not been involved in the corruption scheme 
was Bronisław Komorowski (PO), the Marshal of the Sejm at the time of the events. There have been no 
signs that the political actors attempted to introduce him to their idea of the gambling bill. 
96 The change in position of Grzegorz Schetyna from Minister of Interior to Chair of the Parliamentary Club 
and later Marshal of the Sejm can be interpreted as a lack of full control by Tusk within the party. Tusk could 
not remove Schetyna entirely and so needed to place Schetyna in an equally prestigious position. An 
anecdote supports the interpretation: in 2014, Tusk became President of the European Council and the new 
PM Ewa Kopacz had to deal with Schetyna. She appointed him as new Minister of Foreign Affairs, a position 
for which he was not qualified. When a journalist asked one of Kopacz’ advisers about this unexpected 
placement, they responded: ‘Well, we obviously could not give him the Ministry of Interior, we are not 
suicidal. And we also could not give him the Ministry of Infrastructure and Development - this is where the 
money is. So, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs it is.’ ‘But doesn’t that allow him to build strong connections 
abroad?’ ‘Yes, if he would speak English’ (Majewski and Burzyńska, September 22, 2014; Dialog has been 
translated and slightly paraphrased for brevity by author). 
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reasons—they might not have known about it, took part in a similar exchange with other 
players and thus considered it as ‘normal’, or they wanted to wait for an appropriate time 
when they would publish it. Whatever their motivations were, Sobiesiak and Co 
apparently were not deterred. Also, the media played a minor role for the majority of the 
case—they only became active after one of them had published a transcript of recordings. 
But while this triggered future investigations, none of the media outlets had uncovered 
the corrupt exchange—the CBA did. 
The observations are largely based on highly reliable sources, such as 
investigative reports, official documents, and scholarly works. The evidence also 
addresses the question about the (in)effectiveness of the oversight mechanisms in 
deterring the corrupt actors from engaging in a corrupt exchange.97 Identifying plausible 
alternative explanations for the presented observations is difficult due to their 
overwhelming number. For instance, while Schetyna had personal connections to 
Sobiesiak, one cannot automatically deduce that the national police would have been 
compromised. But when considering this item in the larger context of a politicized CBA, 
a compromised Prosecutor General, and the active involvement of several senior PO 
politicians that occupied key positions in the legislative process, the number of 
alternative explanations decrease drastically. I, therefore, conclude that there is strong 
and direct evidence in favor of the third proposition of causal claim 2. In the case of 
Afera Hazardowa, existing oversight agencies and other potential control mechanisms 
did not manage to deter the actors from engaging in a corrupt exchange.98 
                                                        
97 I do not suggest that the oversight mechanisms failed to detect the actors from engaging in corruption. My 
point is that the corrupt actors were not deterred by the control mechanisms in place. 
98 While I do not focus my research on why these control mechanisms failed beyond establishing that (a) 
they failed, and (b) how competition affected the failure, the likely reason was the nature of the corrupt 
exchange. The CBA and other oversight entities were concentrating on clearly identifiably acts of corruption 
- such as bribery of a judge for a favorable judgment - while neglecting to look for more subtle forms of 
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Overall, the case of Afera Hazardowa illustrates exceptionally well causal claims 
2, which argues that the constellation of powerful incentives and weak constraints 
transforms the opportunity structure of political and economic actors in such a way that 
they will enter into a corrupt state-business relationship. To test the causal claim, I first 
examined how politically and economic actors, once they discover their mutually 
compatible interests, enter into a corrupt state-business relationship (proposition 1). I 
then moved on to analyze whether at least one side benefited from the corrupt exchange 
(proposition 2). While the benefits from the political actors are difficult to identify as 
they, in line with the conceptualization of legal corruption, rarely take the form of overt 
bribery, the benefits for the economic actor would have been substantial had they 
succeeded in excluding the provision about the additional taxation of slot machines. 
The final proposition in causal claim 2 investigated whether existing control 
mechanisms had deterred the actors from their corrupt exchange. While one can rightly 
argue that the control mechanisms ultimately succeeded in uncovering the corrupt 
relationship, these control mechanisms did not deter the actors from engaging in a 
corrupt state-business relationship. The distinction seems minor, but it stresses that the 
corrupt actors had evaluated the risk of engaging in corruption, given the potential 
benefits they could derive from it, as acceptable. As such, I argue that the actors did not 
view the control mechanisms that were in place as a considerable threat for their corrupt 
relationship. This may be also in part because the actors themselves did not consider 
their actions as corrupt.99 In this corruption case, the collected evidence in support of all 
                                                        
corruption, which are the hallmarks of legal corruption and make it so insidious. The results presented in 
proposition 2 highlight this ability of legal corruption of appearing to be legitimate behavior. The benefits for 
the actors can rarely be outright identified and can come in many non-monetary forms, such as paid 
vacations or a post-political-career-position. In such circumstances, attempting to identify benefits with a 
‘follow-the-money’ approach is largely pointless. 
99 For instance, Chlebowski’s defended his actions in front of the parliamentary inquiry committee as 
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three propositions of causal claim 2 had shown a high degree of measurement accuracy. 
But as I assessed the evidence only as indirect, I conclude that Afera Hazardowa 
provides strong and indirect support for causal claim 2. 
 Infoafera. 
Infoafera is the final corruption case on which I examine how the constellation of 
incentives and opportunity structure has encouraged political and economic actors to 
enter into a corrupt state-business relationship—causal claim 2.100 As a reminder, the 
case centers around the irregularities around the coordination of introducing several 
significant IT-projects that were intended to modernize Poland’s ailing IT-infrastructure 
in the state administration. The main events that I will analyze took place at the MSWiA 
between 2008 and 2010, but on occasion I will draw on earlier events as they become 
relevant. 
The first proposition in the causal claim examines how the mutually compatible 
interests of political and economic actors have encouraged them to enter into a (corrupt) 
state-business relations. The observations provide moderate and circumstantial evidence 
in support of the proposition. 
Observation 1: The prosecution has noted in its indictment of Andrzej Machnacz, 
the former director of the CPI at the MSWiA, that the IT-firms were interested in him 
because he had made a good career in the state administration (Jałoszewski, July 2, 
2015). 
                                                        
‘constituency service’. The subsequent events, however, show that neither PM Tusk nor his peers in the 
committee shared his understanding of ‘constituency service’. 
100 Recall from chapter 2 that the label ‘political actor’ can also include state officials that have significant 
resources at their disposal. 
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Observation 2: At the beginning of 2010, the new Minister of the MSWiA101 
dismissed first Deputy Minister of the MSWiA and responsible for implementing the e-
administration projects, Witold Drożdż. Journalists and industry-insiders voiced their 
surprised as Drożdż was considered highly competent and the driving force behind the 
introduction of e-government projects in Poland. Moreover, because did not consider 
Drożdż to be one of Schetyna’s allies. He, therefore, was not expected to be part of any 
personnel changes (Poznański, February 25, 2010; Zieliński, February 25, 2010). In July, 
the new minister also suddenly dismissed Machnacz as director of the CPI.102 Employees 
and business-insiders were surprised as Machnacz, in cooperation with Drożdż, had 
been considered as highly effective and fast in implementing CPI’s IT-projects, several of 
which he had managed to get funded by the EU (Zieliński, February 25, 2010). 
Observation 3: In October 2007, the European Union approved an Operational 
Programme for Poland for the period 2007 to 2013. The program, titled ‘Innovative 
economy’, had a total budget of EUR 9.71 billion (of which Poland would contribute less 
than EUR 1.5 billion) and aimed to modernize, among others, Poland’s ailing 
information and communication technologies in the state administration (European 
Commission, Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, 2018). 29 IT-related 
projects ended up funded by the EU, out of which five were coordinated by the CPI: 
PESEL 2, OST 112, digital radio system for emergence services, ePUAP, and the internal 
police platform (Czubkowska, March 4, 2014). 
                                                        
101 Prime minister Tusk had dismissed Grzegorz Schetyna from his position as Minister of the MSWiA, that 
is Minister of the Interior, due to the latter's involvement in Afera Hazardowa. Schetyna’s successor was 
Jerzy Miller. 
102 His dismissal was likely the result of suspicious findings in the internal audit of the MSWiA that the new 
Minister had initiated. 
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Observation 4: According to HP’s deferred prosecution agreement (DPA), the IT-
company had failed to uphold its internal anti-corruption policies and controls and 
implement them adequately at its Polish subsidiary (Northern District of California, 
2014, § 11). IBM has a long history of violating, or at least being investigated for 
violating, the FCPA. While US authorities eventually dropped their investigations into 
IBM’s involvement in Infoafera, the company had settled with the authorities over 
alleged violations of the FCPA in several other subsidiaries across the globe between 
1998 and 2009 (Ciszak, October 19, 2017). 
Observation 5: Various journalists as well as US law enforcement reported that 
the charged directors of IBM and HP profited from their relationship with Machnacz 
professionally. For instance, HP’s director led the department of Public Sales. Between 
2006 and 2010, the department had been responsible for around 50 percent of the 
subsidiaries gross revenue (Northern District of California, 2014, § 6). IBM’s director 
also occupied a privileged position within the Polish subsidiary due to profitable 
connection into the CPI (Jałoszewski, July 2, 2015). And in his interview with an 
reporter, the former Vice-president of Netline Group admitted that his status within the 
firm increased dramatically due to his connection to Machnacz (Socha, 2013). 
Inference: Machnacz as well as Drożdż had been considered to be highly 
competent by their colleagues at the MSWiA and by business-insiders (observations 1 
and 2). These evaluations corroborate the impression that both actors were had been 
competent enough for their positions as they had dealt with IT-projects worth billions of 
złoty. While neither observation addresses directly the actors’ interests, they suggest that 
both individuals were not only driven by greed but also prestige or status gains. 
However, it is necessary to note that at least in Machnacz’s case, material interests 
played a major role. Hence, these two observations only provide circumstantial support 
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for the proposition about actors having mutually compatible interests, as the 
observations did not directly address the interests of the actors.  
As to the interests of the economic actors, I find that some of the IT-projects that 
Machnacz coordinated were funded the EU (observations 2 and 3). The earmarking of 
such significant amounts of funding for modernizing Poland’s IT-infrastructure 
(observation 3) likely led to intense competition among IT-companies to win at least 
some of the resulting public procurement contracts, given the assumption about their 
aim as wealth maximization. HP signed a deferred prosecution agreement with US 
authorities regarding the company’s violation of the FCPA (observation 4). And while 
investigations into IBM’s Polish subsidiary were eventually stopped, the company had 
settled previously with authorities regarding alleged violations of the FCPA in multiple 
countries. Their violations had taken place during the same time period (observation 4). 
The behavior of both economic actors, therefore, suggests that the companies were either 
endorsing or at least not actively safeguarding against their employees using corruption 
to win contracts. In combination with observation 3, I, therefore, infer that the economic 
actors were likely to be more concerned about their bottom-line than about upholding 
any legal and ethical requirements. This conclusion is substantiated by observation 5, 
revealing that the three charged individuals from HP, IBM, and the Polish Netline Group 
all profited professionally from their connection with Machnacz (observation 5).  
Observations 3 to 5 provide direct evidence that the firms, and their employees, 
had an interest in forming a corrupt relationship. Observation 3 also illustrates how 
Machnacz exploited his position as head of the CPI, which had acted as a cash-cow to 
him. In addition, the evidence is also strong as the number of observations indicate that 
plausible alternative explanations are hard to find given the available information. 
However, observations 1 and 2 only circumstantially address the interests of the political 
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actors, which also leads to a low degree of uniqueness. As such, these observations 
provide only moderate and indirect evidence. A conservative assessment of the evidence 
presented for the first proposition, therefore, is that there exists only moderate and 
indirect evidence that actors had a shared interest in establishing a corrupt relationship. 
The second proposition of causal claim 2 concentrates on the benefits that the 
actors derive from their corrupt relationship. In this corruption case, I find direct and 
strong evidence that the political and the economic side have benefited substantially 
from their corrupt relationship. 
Observation 1: In July 2016, the Warsaw Regional Court convicted Andrzej 
Machnacz for his part in the corruption case. The prosecution had charged him, among 
others, with accepting over PLN 1.7 million in cash payments as well as another PLN 3.1 
million in gifts from HP’s director (Pasławski, February 16, 2016; Zieliński, December 31, 
2011). This sum corresponds broadly with what US authorities have noted in their DPA 
with HP (Northern District of California, 2014, §§ 1–24).103 Investigations by journalists 
and the CBA revealed that the most notorious gifts that Machnacz had received included 
a paid wedding in Sri Lanka and honeymoons in the Maldives, a Nissan Qashai, the 
furnishing of two apartments, a BMW motorcycle, a home TV theater, and over a dozens 
of laptops, computers, printers, iPads, and other electronics (Jałoszewski, July 2, 2015; 
Northern District of California, 2014, §§ 1–24; Socha, 2013). 
Observation 2: Neither available media reports nor publicly available official 
documents have revealed any financial benefits for the other involved political actors, 
                                                        
103 The sums listed in HP’s DPA total to around USD 616.000, which convert to PLN 1.8 million using the 
average 2011 exchange rate. 
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especially benefits that the either the former deputy director of the CPI or the deputy 
minister Witold Drożdż might have received.  
Observation 3: The convicted vice-president of Netline Group stated in an 
interview with an investigative report that Netline benefited immensely from 
participating in the corrupt exchange. While the firm had been active in the domestic IT-
market since 1997, it had not been able to compete in larger IT-contracts as the firm was 
fairly unknown. In his view, the firm therefore did not only benefit financially from the 
corrupt exchange, but their prestige also profited (Socha, 2013). In 2009, 
Computerworld, a Polish IT-journal that releases an annual Top 200 list, had declared 
Netline Group the company with the largest increase in revenues in the previous year. 
The firm’s revenue increased by more than 440 percent from less than PLN 10,000,000 
to almost PLN 54,000,000 (Jadczak, June 6, 2009).104  
Observation 4: The DPA notes that HP had won at least seven public 
procurement contracts connected to KGP-related IT-projects between 2006 and 2010. 
The total value of these contracts had been estimated to be around USD 60 million 
(Northern District of California, 2014, §§ 1–24). 
Observation 5: In 2008 and 2009, CPI had awarded IBM four contracts related 
to the design the necessary software for PESEL 2. The total value of these contracts is 
estimated to be around PLN 71 billion. The UZP found in their audit that Machnacz had 
rigged the tenders in IBM’s favor. And while the parliament considered rescinding on 
these contracts, the MPs eventually decided that it would be too costly for Poland due to 
the substantial fees it would have to pay to IBM. However, the contract did not include a 
                                                        
104 Incidentally, in 2007, the vice-president had established contact with Machnacz at a business trip to the 
US, organized by an US IT-corporation Socha (2013); (Engelberg and Socha, March 20, 2013. 
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transfer of the source code for the software, which meant that the state from now will 
need to order any updates from IBM (Czubkowska, March 4, 2014). 
Observation 6: The Polish subsidiaries of HP and IBM had been ranked in the 
Top 10 in the market in terms of revenues throughout the first decade of the twenty-first 
century (Jadczak, June 6, 2009; Jadczak & Maciejewski, June 15, 2010). In 2008, IBM 
ranked first in sales to the public administration (Jadczak, June 6, 2009). 
Inference: Observation 1 illustrates in detail how Machnacz had benefited from 
the corrupt exchange. I even go so far to suggest that purchasing any one of the ‘gifts’ 
that he received would have been difficult on his salary as a public official. Nevertheless, 
while other political actors have also been charged, if not convicted, in connection to 
Infoafera, there exist no information on any benefits that these political actors have 
received (observation 2). 
Observations 3 to 5 explicitly point towards the substantial gains that all three 
economic actors have made through their relationship with the CPI. Observation 6 
corroborates the view that HP, but especially IBM, had benefited from the corrupt 
exchange, as the firm were the winner in the category ‘Sales to the Public Administration’ 
in 2008. Substantiating these observations is also observation 5 in the previous 
proposition, where I have outlined the benefits for the individual directors of HP, IBM, 
and Netline.  
In sum, all observations apart from observation 2 present strong and direct 
evidence in support of the second proposition. And even though observation 2 does not 
support the proposition, it also does not weaken in any way.105 
                                                        
105 I will take up the question of what the other political actors received in the corrupt relationship when 
investigation claim 3. 
  178 
The third proposition of causal claim 2 centers around the failure of control 
mechanisms to deter actors from engaging in a corrupt exchange. In the case of 
Infoafera, I find an overwhelming amount of evidence that supports the proposition. 
The following observations are therefore grouped by the kind of oversight that had been 
deactivated—starting with control mechanisms that directly impacted Machnacz with the 
CPI, followed by the failure of his superiors to identify and report any suspicious 
activities. I then move on to observations covering other state agencies that had failed 
uncovering irregularities with the IT-public procurement projects, such as the Agencja 
Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego (ABW), the Internal Security Agency, the public 
procurement agency UZP, and the CBA. The last two observations focus on the lack of 
attention paid by the media as well as the long history of corruption in the IT-sector. 
Observation 1: In 2013, the weekly news magazine published excerpts from a 
secret business report from 2012 on the IT-sector. After Polish authorities have made the 
first arrests, one of the involved international IT-companies commissioned the report to 
assess the situation in the IT-procurement sector. The study relied on several dozen 
interviews with CPI employees and other public officials as well as industry-experts. 
Wprost’s journalists had managed to verify the accounts of two of these interviewees. 
According to the study, Machnacz led the CPI in a highly autocratic manner, going so far 
as to prohibit the use of private phones in the office (Majewski & Bielakowski, 2013). 
Observation 2: Machnacz apparently maintained a large network of personal and 
professional ties to individuals across ministries and in potentially senior positions. The 
uncovered business report cites CPI employees saying that Machnacz would often come 
into the office and present them with particular requirements for a tender. He would 
state that he had gotten these requirements from someone at the MSWiA and that they 
would need to be incorporate in the relevant tenders (Majewski & Bielakowski, 2013). 
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The vice-president of Netline, one of the first who had been arrested in the case, 
emphasized that Machnacz often bragged that he had connections to high-ranking 
officials and he was ‘protected’ (Engelberg & Socha, March 20, 2013). This again echoes 
the experience of CPI employees who noted that any audit or control of the CPI’s tenders 
would always came back positive. They also felt that Machnacz had a ‘special protection 
umbrella over him’ (Majewski & Bielakowski, 2013; Zieliński, May 25, 2013). 
Observation 3: Reports about Machnacz’s relationship with his direct superiors, 
deputy minister Witold Drożdż and Minister Gregorz Schetyna vary. While some suggest 
that he was close with the deputy minister and hardly had any contact with Schetyna or 
his cabinet, other sources claim that Machnacz had been friendly with Schetyna but had 
a barely civil relationship with the deputy minister (Jałoszewski, July 2, 2015; Majewski 
& Bielakowski, 2013; Zieliński, February 25, 2010). Schetyna denied that he knew 
Machnacz, stating that he had met the man only once, when he appointed him as head of 
the newly established CPI (Majewski & Bielakowski, 2013).  
Observation 4: The prosecution charged Machnacz’s direct supervisor, the 
deputy minister Witold Drożdż, for failure of duty as he did not adequately supervise his 
subordinate. The prosecution also charged him with bid-rigging as he allegedly ordered 
Machnacz to ensure that Infovid-Matrix, a Polish IT-firm, would win one of the tenders 
(Infoafera.; Bitner, February 16, 2016; Zieliński, November 25, 2011). 
Observation 5: Before the CPI took control over the IT-project e-posterunek, i.e. 
creating an intranet for the police, a group of programmers within the police had already 
been working on a prototype for two years. Machnacz had been the head of this group of 
police officials. When he transferred to the CPI, he took the codes and material with him 
(NIK, 2013, pp. 16–17; Zieliński, October 31, 2011). At the beginning of 2009, the CPI 
initiated a tender for the project, and one of the invited firms was Netline. Soon 
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afterward, several of the IT-specialists had submitted a statement to the Head of the 
Police in which they accused Machnacz of having provided Netline with the project’s 
original source code so that the firm would win the tender. The Head of the Police, 
Andrzej Matujek, conferred with Minister MSWiA Schetyna and deputy-minister Adam 
Rapacki. Matujek then forwarded the report to another police department for further 
inquiries. In July, Schetyna apparently had changed his opinion and reported the 
suspicious similarities in the source codes to the prosecution. But it was too late, the CPI 
had already awarded the project to Netline a few months before (NIK, 2013, p. 21; 
Pieńkowski, May 29, 2012; Zieliński, October 31, 2011). 
Observation 6: The Criminal Code of Procedure requires that heads of state 
agencies report any suspicion of corruption and other criminal activities to the 
prosecution (GRECO, 2003, pp. 12–13). 
Observation 7: One of the first investigative journalists to report on the 
wrongdoings in the IT-sector, noted that the Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego, the 
internal security agency, had failed extraordinarily in their duty to uncover corruption in 
the sector. He stressed that the signs had been visible for a long time (Pieńkowski, May 
29, 2012). 
Observation 8: While the UZP is Poland’s highest regulatory agency for public 
procurement proceedings (GRECO, 2001, p. 15), public procurement is highly 
decentralized in Poland (European Commission, Directorate-General for Regional and 
Urban Policy, 2016, p. 163). The UZP therefore has to conduct checks on public 
procurement proceedings of around 14,000 contracting authorities that are spread out 
across various state agencies (European Commission, Directorate-General for Regional 
and Urban Policy, 2016, p. 163). 
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Observation 9: When asked about why the CBA did not acted sooner, Zieliński, 
the investigative journalists that first reported on the suspicious activities in the IT-
market, noted that the CBA likely had to first sort out their internal issues (Pieńkowski, 
May 29, 2012).106 
Observation 10: The internal control mechanisms of the three main economic 
actors—Netline Group, IBM, and HP had not been properly implemented or were 
completely lacking. In the case of Netline, for instance, the vice-president stated in an 
interview that he had often paid for Machnacz’s ‘gifts’ out of his own pocket (Socha, 
2013). The prosecution, on the other hand, suspected that IBM provided the firm with 
the necessary cash to pay Machnacz from one of their off-book accounts (Engelberg 
& Socha, March 20, 2013). As to HP, the DPA specifically states that while the US 
company had the necessary regulations in place during the relevant years: 
those policies and controls were not adequate to prevent the conduct described 
herein and were insufficiently implemented at HP Poland. This allowed one or 
more HP Poland employees to circumvent HP Co.'s internal accounting controls 
and falsify its books and records (Northern District of California, 2014, § 11). 
In contrast, investigations into the extent of IBM’s involvement in the case were 
closed due to lack of evidence (Ciszak, October 19, 2017). However, the firm had settled 
in a similar case just a few years prior—then IBM had been investigated for bribing 
foreign officials in South Korea and China (U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia, 2011, pp. 1–11). Moreover, Polish authorities had arrested the director of sales 
at IBM Polska for bribing Machnacz on several occasions (Engelberg & Socha, March 20, 
2013).107 
                                                        
106 Recall that the first Head of the CBA had been dismissed by PM Tusk in the Fall of 2009. In recent years, 
several of the CBA’s early operations had been called into question, which had tarnished the reputation of 
Poland’s anti-corruption agency. 
107 I could not establish whether IBM Polska’s director has already been charged and convicted. It is 
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Observation 11: The largest economic competitors of HP and IBM—such as 
Oracle, AB, Dell, Microsoft, and Asseco—have all either themselves been implicated in 
the case (for instance, Oracle) or they also had been awarded contracts related to CPI’s 
IT-projects (Jałoszewski, July 2, 2015; NIK, 2013).  
Observation 12: The IT-market as well as Poland’s Public Procurement system 
have both been considered as areas with a high risk of corruption (European 
Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, 2014c; Fuszara et al., 2002; Pieńkowski, May 
29, 2012; World Bank, 1999). Moreover, Machnacz’s himself admitted to having already 
accepted favors in exchange for bid-rigging while he still was at the KGP (Jałoszewski, 
July 2, 2015).  
Inference: Observations 1 and 2 reveal how any potential deterrents within the 
CPI had been effectively eliminated. CPI employees observed regularly how Machnacz 
would elude existing oversight mechanisms—neither regular audits nor his superiors 
objected to his activities. While observation 3 indicates that sources are not entirely 
consistent in who Machnacz’s protector was, they emphasize that he must have had 
some higher-level protection (more on this in the causal claim 3). Despite the secrecy 
surrounding his protectors, observation 4 shows how his direct superior, whether friend 
or only professional acquaintance, would have been an unlikely candidate to report 
Machnacz to the authorities.108 In Drożdż, another control mechanisms broke down as a 
constraint. But much larger failure had happened at the level of Minister Schetyna and 
the General Director of the Police, when they neglected to report their suspicions, or at 
                                                        
possible, given the long time that court cases take, that no decision has yet been reached. 
108 In the early reports on the investigations, Drożdż claimed that he never had any suspicions of corruption. 
However, this seems implausible given that the media, and those that interacted with Machnacz in the case, 
have consistently highlighted Machnacz’s pomposity and self-conceit. 
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least the suspicions of their subordinates, to the prosecution (observations 5 and 6). I 
consider it plausible that at least Schetyna had some idea of malfeasance at the CPI, as 
he eventually ended up reporting his doubts about the tender for e-posterunek to the 
prosecution (observation 5). Apart from oversight mechanisms within the MSWiA, the 
three state agencies tasked with detecting such corruption schemes had also overlooked 
the signs (observations 7 to 9).  
When we now look at the constraints that could have come from the economic 
side, we also find several failed control mechanisms. There is for one, the complete 
breakdown of oversight within the three economic actors (observation 10). Neither 
economic competitors, who theoretically might have had some financial incentives to 
report these firms, were likely candidates. They either were themselves implicated in the 
corruption case or they had strong financial interests to avoid creating a negative press 
for their contracting partner, the CPI (observation 11). And even if a competitor would 
have felt ethically obliged to report their suspicions to the police, it is unlikely that they 
expected to see a change in how the system worked. Corruption in the procurement 
system, in particular connected to the largest IT-projects, apparently had deep roots 
(observation 12). 
In sum, there have been several instances were the corrupt actors could have 
been detected earlier, but despite multiple control mechanisms in place, the corrupt 
state-business relationship continued to prosper. I therefore conclude that there exists 
direct evidence of a failure of control mechanisms to deter the actors from engaging in 
the corrupt exchange. 
The reliability of the sources varies. The most doubtful ones are presented in 
observation 1 and 2 as the CPI employees and other individuals cited have reasons to put 
their own spin on events when claiming that Machnacz was friendly with high-ranking 
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officials in several ministries. Without obtaining confirmation from his alleged 
connections, Machnacz’ alone might have just deluded himself about the extent of 
supporters that he had in various places. But any confirmation would be hard to obtain, 
once Machnacz had been arrested and his corrupt activities had come out. By that time 
any associate would attempt to distance themselves from Machnacz as much as possible.  
Given this impasse, I assume that Machnacz had these connections across 
ministries—even if the help these connections provided appears to have been weak as it 
eventually failed to protect him.108 Until new facts arise that contradict this 
assumption,109 I will consider the presented evidence as having a strong overall degree of 
reliability and conclude that there exist strong and direct evidence supporting the third 
proposition of causal claim 2 in the case of Infoafera. 
In conclusion, the developments in the case of Infoafera support causal claim 2, 
which argues that the particular constellation of powerful incentives and weak 
constraints encouraged political and economic actors to establish a corrupt state-
business relationship. Even though the case only provides moderate and circumstantial 
evidence for the first proposition about the mutually compatible interests of the corrupt 
actors, I find strong and direct evidence for the second and third proposition. However, 
as the support for the causal claim can only be as strong as its weakest link, I consider 
causal claim 2 to find only moderate and indirect support in the case of Infoafera. 
                                                        
108 Ideally, there would have been legal documentation that would outline any such connections, or at least 
correspondence indicating a high level of familiarity between the individuals. 
109 Contradictory evidence could be schedules of Machnacz’ alleged associates, in particular whether they 
would have been present at the time Machnacz claimed to have met them. While this might not outright 
contradict Machnacz, it would undermine his claim substantially. Machnacz’s claim of powerful friends 
would also be weakened, if the prosecution would need to establish that Machnacz had obtained the dubious 
tender specifications not through his superiors at the MSWiA. 
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I have tested the three propositions that I have derived from causal claim 2 
against three corruption cases. Each proposition added one of the pieces to the question 
on how the constellation of opportunity structures encouraged political and economic 
actors to form a corrupt state-business relationship. 
Rywingate presented a particular puzzle, as I had to consider a ‘what-if’ scenario. 
The case therefore only provides indirect evidence for causal claim 2 as the 
interpretations are based largely on suppositions, that is, suppose that the movie-
producer had been successful in forming a corrupt exchange with the publisher Agora, 
what would have been the benefits? And what control mechanisms would have been 
ineffective? The evidence presented had largely been assessed as moderate reliable, as I 
had to draw on secondary sources to corroborate some of the inferences. However, the 
case provided a first glimpse at how the specific constellation of powerful incentives and 
weak constraints can encourage actors to enter into a corrupt relationship. In contrast, 
the case of Afera Hazardowa provides strong and direct support for propositions 2 and 
3 about the significant gains made by actors in the relationship and that any existing 
control mechanisms have been ineffective in deterring actors for engaging in their 
corrupt exchange. As the case had been further along until it was uncovered, the actors 
had already time to exchange any benefits and it illustrates the insidious nature of legal 
corruption.  
Legal corruption cases, such as Rywingate and Afera Hazardowa, are difficult to 
discover as the benefits for the political actors are rarely overt. Rather, the gains take the 
form of paid vacations or employments in the private sector once a political actor retired 
from politics. Oversight agencies, such as law enforcement and the prosecution, are 
therefore especially ineffective as they focus on identifying criminal wrongdoings. 
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Activities that take place in the gray-zones of the law are rarely what these oversight 
agencies look for. 
Last, Infoafera has been the only case of local capture of these three cases. I find 
that it supports all three propositions of causal claim 2. Also in this case, several existing 
control mechanisms had failed to deter the corrupt relationship. However, it also 
highlights another important aspect—that even though control mechanisms exist that 
are specialized on corruption with a clearly identifying criminal element, they are still 
not an effective deterrent. Along the way, the corrupt actors have deactivated or 
subverted several oversight agencies and procedures. Hence, even if one or two oversight 
mechanisms, such as the media, remained untouched, they do not exist in a vacuum. 
Instead, the various control mechanisms depend on each other to provide an effective 
system of deterrents. 
In sum, causal claim 2 established why the political and economic actors had 
formed a corrupt state business relationship—their opportunity structures had presented 
them with powerful incentives for and only a few constraints against forming a corrupt 
state-business relationship. Causal claim 3 now concentrates on why the specific type of 
corruption emerged from their corrupt exchange. The last causal claim provides 
therefore the crucial link in my argument about why the emergence of competition in 
politics and the economy has led to a systematic transformation of corruption patterns. 
Causal Claim 3: Emergence of Patterns of Corruption. 
In causal claim 1, I demonstrated how the emergence of political and economic 
competition has led to a transformation of the actors’ opportunity structures. Causal 
claim 2 then highlighted how actors developed a particular constellation in their 
opportunity structures—powerful incentives for and few constraints against—which 
encouraged them to enter into corrupt state-business relationships. Causal claim 3 now 
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examines the resource distribution within these corrupt state-business relationships to 
uncover the systematic transformation of patterns in the type of corruption emerges.  
In part one of chapter 4, I categorize three cases as representing either legal 
corruption or local capture. For legal corruption, as in the cases of Rywingate and Afera 
Hazardowa, I expect to find that the power of political actors was fragmented and weak, 
while the economic actor’s power was concentrated (proposition 3). In the case of 
Infoafera, which represents local capture, I expect to find a balance in the relative 
resource distribution among the political and economic actors (proposition 2). 
 Rywingate. 
The third causal claim examines the resource distribution between the political 
and economic actors. In part one of this chapter, I have categorized Rywingate as legal 
corruption. Based on the corruption case’s type, I, therefore, expect to observe a power 
imbalance in favor of Agora, the economic actor. Even though Agora did not enter into a 
corrupt relationship with Rywin and his political associates, I can still determine the 
actors’ resource concentration from that time. The third causal claim, especially 
proposition 3, can therefore be tested. And I find moderate and indirect evidence that 
the political actors’ power was fragmented, in contrast to the concentrated power of the 
economic actor, in line with proposition 3 of causal claim 3.  
Observation 1: Michnik and several others founded the media company Agora 
S.A. in 1989, at the same time as its premier daily Gazeta Wyborcza emerged from the 
underground press that had existed throughout the eighties (Sparks, 2008, p. 53; Stetka, 
2012, p. 450). The firm went on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in 1999 (Agora SA, 
February 15, 2018; Company Overview of Agora S.A., February 15, 2018).110  
                                                        
110 Adam Michnik, as editor-in-chief and co-founder of Agora, would have had a right to its shares, but he 
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Observation 2: The company owns fully or partially two dailies, Gazeta Wyborcza 
and Metro, several magazines, radio stations, Internet news portals, as well as cinemas, 
print companies, and the company AMS, an outdoor advertisement firm (Agora SA, 
February 15, 2018; Company Overview of Agora S.A., February 15, 2018). 
Observation 3: Shortly after the 2001 Parliamentary elections, PM Miller was the 
leader of an internally well-organized party (Nalepa, 2016, pp. 359–360) and his own 
position seemed secure as he had brokered the electoral alliance between the SLD and 
the UP (Raciborski, 2007, pp. 25–26). 
Observation 4: In a detailed empirical study on the changes in the legislative 
organization of Poland’s Sejm, Nalepa (2016) finds that the SLD had not been an 
ideologically cohesive party. Instead, the party faced the risk that its MPs would switch to 
another party, if they believe it would increase their chances of reelection. One of 
Nalepa’s interview partners stressed that many if not most of the party’s members were 
more interested in the SLD because its capacity to win seats than any ideological 
commitment to the party and its political programme (Nalepa, 2016, pp. 359–360). The 
findings follow the conclusion of an earlier study which examined the kinds and forms of 
party-switching in Poland. Shabad and Slomczynski (2004) argue that party switching 
provides MPs with high benefits (seats in the Sejm) at a low cost, as Poland’s open list 
electoral system means that candidates get elected more because of their reputation than 
their party affiliation. 
 Inference: Observations 1 and 2 depict Agora as a financially strong company. 
And while its origins laid in the publishing market, it has since then expanded into other 
markets as well. Combined with observations 3 and 4 from the first proposition in Causal 
                                                        
refused (Cohen, November 7, 1999). 
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claim 2, where I have described Agora’s market size, I reason that Agora has been a 
major player in the media sector. In comparison, the resources of the political actors 
from the SLD had been much weaker. While PM Miller stood atop of a well-organized 
party (observation 3), looks can be deceiving as observation 4 suggests. That the formal 
rules of the Sejm strengthened the rights of individual MPs and smaller political factions, 
and so favored the political opposition and undermining party discipline within the 
majority further corroborates the conclusion. It appears that while Miller was leading a 
strong electoral alliance, the underlying basis of the party as an organization was weak. 
Neither the individual political actors, such as the KRRiT member Czarzasty and the 
deputy minister of culture Jakubowska, nor the SLD had full control over the legislative 
process.  
The observations addressing Agora’s resources came from several industry-
specific resources. However, references addressing the strength of the political actors 
have been drawn largely from previous scholarship and neither has directly addressed 
the issue of resources of the political actors. The evidence for causal claim 3 therefore 
only provides moderate and indirect support, at least in the case of Rywingate. 
Despite several drawbacks, the case illustrates well how the distribution of 
resources among political and economic actors imposes particular constraints on actors 
that impact what type of corruption they can engage in. Rywingate reveals that the 
political actors, despite the mysterious reference to ‘people in power’, did not have 
enough control over the legislative process to ensure that the relevant provisions would 
have remained in acceptable form in the bill. Especially as the political actors did not 
occupy key positions within the state apparatus. This further undermined their ability to 
deliver on their promises. As such, even if Agora would have participated in the corrupt 
exchange, the company would have only increased their chances of received the 
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beneficial legislation but there was no guarantee. The following case study underscores 
the difficulty of ‘guaranteeing’ a beneficial legislation in the highly decoupled political 
system. 
Afera Hazardowa 
Afera Hazardowa provides a second test case for the third proposition about 
concentrated economic power combined with fragmented political power resulting in 
legal corruption. Observations 1 to 3 portray the concentrated resources of the economic 
actors, whereas observations 4 to 6 depict the more fragmented power of the political 
actors. The evidence provides strong and direct support for the third causal claim. 
Observations 1: Sobiesiak had established ties with local and national politicians. 
And as one of his competitors remarked to a newspaper—his ties to politicians, especially 
the SLD and PO, were Sobiesiak’s competitive advantage (Kacprzak et al., October 8, 
2009). 
Observation 2: Investigations by Rzeszpospolita revealed that Sobiesiak and 
Kosek’s businesses practically had a monopoly on high-stakes gambling, a particular 
niche in the industry that requires special permits from the Ministry of Finance and the 
tax authorities (Kacprzak et al., October 8, 2009). 
Observation 3: Kosek has been the deputy head of the Union of Employers of 
Games of Chance and Mutual Betting. He also owns either alone or with others, 
including Sobiesiak, several firms in the gambling industry (Kacprzak et al., October 8, 
2009; Kacprzak et al., February 2, 2010). Kosek has also acted as the Polish 
representative of the Austrian gambling company Novomatic (Pytlakowski, October 13, 
2009).111 Thomas Graf, the oldest son of the owner of Novomatic, is also an shareholder 
                                                        
111 Novomatic Group produces slot machines, video poker games, video lottery, multiplayer games and 
electronic table games and is one of the largest gambling conglomerates in the world (Fleckl et al., October 
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in Kosek’s PRU Filmtechnik company, one of Kosek’s firm in the gambling sector 
(Kacprzak et al., February 2, 2010; Pytlakowski, October 13, 2009). 
Observation 4: Table 4.10 shows the results of the 2007 parliamentary elections. 
The PO had won 41.5 percent of the votes, which translated into 206 seats of 460 in the 
Sejm. As coalition talks with the second-placed PiS failed, the PO ended up forming a 
coalition with the fourth-placed PSL, which had gained less than 9 percent of the votes. 
The PO-PSL coalition ended up with a small majority in the Sejm (Piasecki & Michalak, 
2016, p. 360). 
Table 4.10: 2007 Parliamentary Election Results 
Political Group Percent of Votes Number of Seats 
Civic Platform (PO) 41.51 209
Law and Justice (PiS) 1.11 166
Left and Democrats (LiD) 13.15 53
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) 8.91 31
German Minority 0.20 1
Source: Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza [PKW] (October 21, 2007). 
Observation 5: Poland’s political system accommodated individual members of 
parliament and ministers at the expense of the government and the party.112 
Observation 6: PO’s internal organization also favored a decentralized decision-
making process and offered few disciplinary measures for non-confirming party 
members (Hartliński, 2014). 
Inference: While the value of Sobiesiak’s political capital through his political ties 
is hard to quantify, observation 1 as well as findings from the first proposition of causal 
claim 2, indicate that these personal connections played a major role in Sobiesiak’s 
business endeavors. Observation 2 further corroborates this conclusion. Additionally, 
                                                        
13, 2017; Forbes, April 17, 2o18). 
112 Recall the decentralized law-making process in Poland, explained in proposition 3 of causal claim 2. 
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Kosek was head of a business association representing the major companies in the 
gambling industry (observation 3) on whose behalf he was lobbying the Polish law-
makers. Hence, even if Sobiesiak was not a ‘shark’ in the gambling industry, i.e., a major 
player, he still had all major economic actors in the industry behind him.113 The most 
reasonable assumption about Sobiesiak’s and Kosek’s role in their partnership is that the 
former provided access to political actors in the ruling party, while the latter coordinated 
the actors in the gambling industry—ensuring that they all acted in accord to the 
industry’s best interests. Based on this assumption, it hardly matters whether Sobiesiak 
controls a large segment of the gambling sector or not, as he major asset were his 
political connections. 
As to the power of the political actors, I find that the PO as a political party did 
not have enough power to push for a favorable gambling law. As such, even if Sobiesiak 
and Co would have had the necessary connections and good-will of the party’s 
leadership, it would not have been possible. Observation 4 illustrates the small majority 
that the PO-PSL coalition held in the Sejm. And observations 5 and 6 reveal that none of 
the participating political actors had significant political power—at best they were able to 
control the activities within their own ministries or committee. I therefore infer that the 
combination of concentrated economic power and fragmented political power results in 
legal corruption.114  
As new facts arise, the interpretation of these events might change. For instance, 
as I could not verify the number of firms and their market shares that Kosek’s business 
                                                        
113 Sobiesiak, in his testimony to the parliamentary inquiry commission, defended himself by stating that his 
family only owned around one hundred slot-machines. He therefore had few reasons to get involved in 
lobbying the gambling bill ("Stenogramy," August 9, 2011; Knysz, October 8, 2009; Kacprzak et al., February 
2, 2010; Kałucki et al., January 14, 2010). 
114 Earlier in this chapter, I already identified Afera Hazardowa as an example of legal corruption. 
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association represented in the late 2000s, I assumed that the majority of firms are likely 
to either be active members or at least benefit from the elimination of the contested 
provision. If, for instance, it would turn out that the business association did not 
represent a large number of gambling firms and that these ‘unrepresented’ firms 
somehow would not be financially hurt by the introduction of the provision, the 
conclusions drawn here would have to be reassessed. In sum, I deduce that the events in 
Afera Hazardowa provide strong and direct evidence in support of the third proposition 
of causal claim 3. 
 Infoafera 
In contrast to the previous two corruption cases, Infoafera represents a local 
capture type of corruption, specifically the capture of the public procurement process. In 
chapter 2, I derived the proposition that such a corruption type is the result of strong 
political power meeting strong economic power. To make it easier to follow the analysis, 
I have split the observations into whose power they address—the political actor’ or the 
power of the economic actor in the corrupt relationship. As the inferences require more 
extensive discussion, I have split the analysis into two parts. Observations 1 to 4 relate to 
the resources that Andrzej Machnacz, the main political actors controlled, followed by 
drawing the first inferences.115 Observations 4 to 8 cover the resources of the corrupt 
economic actors. 
Observation 1: At the CPI, Machnacz had the authority to decide what 
procurement mechanisms, such as open or restricted tendering, a negotiated procedure, 
                                                        
115 Recall that Machnacz was the director of the CPI, the IT-center that operated within the MSWiA. The CPI 
was responsible for coordinating the procurement of all major IT-projects in Poland. And Machnacz had 
abused his position by circumventing control mechanisms that were in place to deter exactly these kinds of 
corrupt activities. 
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or even just a single-source procurement procedure, would apply to a particular IT-
project (Law on Public Procurement of 2004; Zieliński, December 31, 2011).116 As the 
contracting authority, the CPI also set the terms of the tender—such as deciding on the 
time span for the bidding process and the project specifications. After the CPI awarded a 
project, it continued supervising the implementation of the project and coordinate the 
payment of the vendor (2004).  
Observation 2: Machnacz had multiple opportunities to influence the 
procurement process before and after a project had been awarded. At least once, he 
substantially changed the award specifications to favor a particular firm. And when 
dealing with Netline, the charged vice-president alleged that Machnacz would often 
delay payments until he had received another ‘gift’ (Socha, 2013). 
Observation 3: Industry-analysts and some investigative journalists doubt that 
Machnacz had been the ‘brain’ behind the corruption scheme. They argue that Machnacz 
only occupied a middle-management position within the MSWiA. In the position, he 
would not have had sole authority to decide to whom to award a contract, especially not 
contracts involving millions of zloty (Pieńkowski, May 29, 2012; Zieliński, October 31, 
2011). 
Observation 4: Together with Machnacz several other individuals have been 
charged for their parts in the case—the deputy-director as well as the head of promotion 
at the CPI and four close family members. His wife, sister, father, and mother-in-law 
have all admitted to their crimes—mainly laundering the proceeds of Machnacz’s corrupt 
                                                        
116 Open tendering refers to the tender being open to all bidders, while in the case of restricted and 
negotiated tenders, bidders have been shortlisted by the contracting authorities. The main difference 
between restricted and negotiated tenders is the number of bidders: between 5 to 20 in the case of restricted 
tenders and at least 3 bidders in the case of negotiated tenders (Article 10 of the 1994). 
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activities (Jałoszewski, July 2, 2015). Information about the specific charges against the 
deputy director and the head of promotions could not be clearly established. 
Inference: In contrast to the previous two corruption cases, the political actor is 
here a state official. As a reminder, in chapter 2, I had suggested that under these 
conditions, the official’s main resources are less likely derived from political issues. 
Instead, state officials obtain most of their power from their influence over a decision-
making process, including access to or control over a cash-cow, as well as their ability to 
deactivate control-mechanisms. Observation 1 supports the proposition that Machnacz 
had a strong influence over the public procurement process. At the very least, Machnacz 
had been able to alter the procurement mechanisms used and set the project 
specifications in some tenders (observations 2 and 3). This authority provided him with 
ample opportunities to manipulate tenders, for example, by splitting larger contracts 
into smaller lots, and allowed him to misuse the CPI as a cash-cow. 
Observation 3 contradicts this first impressions slightly as it points out that 
Machnacz may have had substantial influence over the procurement procedure used for 
each contract, but it is less likely that he had sole authority to award the largest 
contracts. This is where his ability to deactivate control mechanisms comes into play. As 
observation 4 reveals, Machnacz had several close allies that helped him cover up his 
illicit proceeds. While the ultimate activities by his deputy and the head of the 
promotions department could not be identified, several observations in causal claim 2 
corroborate the conclusion about Machnacz’ skill.117 The analysis of the third proposition 
                                                        
117 Specifically, observation 2 in proposition 1, observation 2 in proposition 2, as well as observations 2 to 6 
in proposition 3. 
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of the causal claim 2 further corroborate the conclusion, as I found that several control 
mechanisms around Machnacz had failed in detecting his corrupt activities. 
The following observations describe the resources of the economic actors. They 
highlight the impressive power the IT-firms had, in particular HP and IBM.  
Observation 5: HP Polska had been the largest IT-corporation in Poland for 9 
consecutive years between 1997 to 2016. And together with IBM Polska it had been 
under the Top 10 IT-firms in Poland since their establishment in 1991 (Jadczak, June 6, 
2009; Jadczak & Maciejewski, June 15, 2010).118 
Observation 6: Netline, IBM’s main representative in Poland, had been 
established in 1998. Over the years, the firm had managed to win larger and larger 
contracts. And in 2008, at a time when the entire market had been in decline, Netline 
had managed to increase their revenue by more than 440 percent (Jadczak, June 6, 
2009). Despite the firm’s growth, it still remained only a medium sized IT-firm, ranking 
in the second half of the top 200 IT-firms. 
Observation 7: The NIK as well as a few journalists have indicated that on several 
occasions the firms would keep the original source codes for their programs or not sign 
over copyrights for the programs—in such instances, the recipient would have to contract 
the firm again if they need to make any updates or modifications to the program (NIK, 
2013; Socha, 2013; Zieliński, October 31, 2011). 
Observation 8: There exist some indicators that at least the larger firms had 
access to higher-ranked individuals than Machnacz in the state administration. The vice-
president of Netline, in his interview with the report, mentioned that he was certain that 
                                                        
118 The annual reports are available only to subscribers, so a detailed presentation of either firms’ market 
share was not possible. 
  197 
the larger firms had contact with someone higher up. He noted that in the IT-industry, 
very often the IT-firms would set the tender requirements as they are the experts on this 
topic.119 In addition, during his confession, Machnacz implicated his direct supervisor 
Drożdż—claiming that he would occasionally order Machnacz to award contracts to a 
particular firm. He provided at least one concrete example that the authorities have 
investigated in more detail.  
Inference: Observation 5 illustrates the strength of IBM and HP in the Polish IT-
market. Their market size provided the firms with leverage in any negotiations with the 
CPI. In contrast, Netline did not have such a strong position (observation 6). Netline’s 
weaker position would also explain observation 8, where the firm’s representative 
stressed that at least IBM had higher-level contacts that went above the CPI and 
Machnacz. And while Netline apparently did not had such extensive political connections 
as IBM and HP, it shared their ability to keep the original source codes (observation 7). 
This secured the economic actor future contracts with the state. 
Before assessing the degree of uniqueness of these observations, I need to 
address the matter of Machnacz’ power in the relationship once more. Observations 3 
and 8 hint at the existence of a larger corruption network between political actors and 
selected IT-firms. Following this line of argument, Machnacz was not at the center of the 
corruption scheme. Instead, he might only have been the most brazen one, flaunting his 
illegally acquired rewards. This more conservative interpretation is highly plausible. 
Nevertheless, the interpretation does not negate the proposition as the larger point about 
the concentration of political and economic power leading to local capture still holds. But 
                                                        
119 While Poland’s and the EU’s procurement procedures allow for this, the same firm is not allowed to bid 
for the tender it helped draw up. 
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it raises the question whether political power needs to be purposefully coordinated to 
achieve its purpose. When following the more conservative assessment about Machnacz’ 
place in the corruption scheme, his resources had been access to and substantial 
influence over a cash-cow and the ability to circumvent at least some control 
mechanisms. For the economic actors, this was apparently enough to make him a 
valuable partner. 
In sum, the observations leave little room for an alternative explanation about the 
relative distribution of power within the corrupt state-business relationship. 
Furthermore, they also address the issue of how the power distribution shaped their 
relationship in an adequate manner. I, therefore, conclude that the evidence provides 
strong and direct support for proposition 3—the combination of concentrated political 
and economic resource distribution leads to local capture. 
Causal claim 3 argues that the arrangement of resources between political and 
economic actors determines the type of corruption that emerges from their corrupt state-
business relationship. As the selected cases only included legal corruption and local 
capture, I have only analyzed two out of three propositions. The inferences drawn from 
these examinations provides strong and direct support for the both propositions.120 
Rywingate and Afera Hazardowa have both represented legal corruption and I 
have found strong and direct support for proposition 2, which suggests that legal 
corruption is the result of a political actor with fragmented power forming a corrupt 
state-business relationship with an economic actor, whose power is highly concentrated. 
The last corruption case Infoafera is an example of local capture. In line with 
                                                        
120 Rywingate, because of its particular circumstances, only provided moderate and indirect support for 
proposition 3. However, Afera Hazardowa corroborated the initial findings. 
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proposition 2 of causal claim 3, I found that local capture emerges when concentrated 
political power and economic power meet in a corrupt state-business relationship. 
In this part of chapter 4, I have traced in detailed the causal mechanism that links 
the emergence of competition in politics and the economy to the systemic transformation 
of patterns of corruption. The evidence for causal claim 1 has been moderate but strong, 
where I have investigated the impact of the emergence of competition in politics and the 
economy in the actors’ opportunity structures about participating in corruption in 
general. I found that political and economic actors, as a result of the emergence of 
political and economic competition, face powerful incentives for and weak constraints 
against engaging in corruption in general.  
In causal claim 2, I probed the opportunity structures for corruption of the 
political and economic actors deeper to examine how actors go from being willing to 
engage in corruption in general to entering in a corrupt state-business relationship. 
When now political and economic actors meet, they have mutually compatible interests 
that inclines them to enter into such corrupt relationships. And when now at least one 
actor has the potential to gain substantially from the corrupt exchange (representing 
incentives) combined with a lack of effective control mechanisms to deter actors 
(representing constraints), political and economic actors will enter into a corrupt state-
business relationship. Recall, for instance, the substantial benefits that the political and 
economic actors received in Infoafera—a BMW Motorbike, furnishing of flats, paid 
vacations in Sri Lanka, for the political actor and contracts worth millions of US dollars, 
with the guarantee of future contracts for IBM and HP. While the evidence has not fully 
supported each proposition in every corruption case, no proposition has been rejected or 
significantly weakened.  
  200 
Causal claim 3 now revealed how the resource distribution within the corrupt 
state-business relationship determines the type of corruption that emerges. I have found 
that in both cases of legal corruption, the political actor was in a significantly weaker 
position than the economic actor. However, when both sides have enough resources to 
balance each other out—the result is a local capture type of corruption, illustrated in the 
case of Infoafera. This suggests that the type of corruption that emerges from the 
interaction between political and economic actors is not random but follows the logic of 
resource distribution. 
Conclusion 
Chapter 4 set out to test the theorized causal mechanism, separated into three 
components, against selected corruption cases in Poland. Given that the corruption cases 
are only a small sample, the findings present only an initial investigation into how and 
why the emergence of competition transforms the patterns of corruption in a country in 
a systematic fashion.  
In the first part of the chapter, I have categorized the six corruption cases into 
one of two types of corruption—legal corruption or local capture.121 Four out of the six 
cases fulfilled the criteria for legal corruption. While this first finding challenges my 
argument about a transformation of corruption pattern taking place, in the second part, I 
find that the political system in Poland predisposed it to legal corruption. Poland’s 
political system features several elements that keep the various political actors weak, 
which fosters political competition. However, in the case of Poland, these features have 
led to such intensive political competition that for a long time no single political actor 
was able to amass enough resources and thus power to counter the pressure from 
                                                        
121 No case fulfilled the criteria of the third corruption type - covert party financing. 
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economic actors. The two cases of local capture, which are the result of concentrated 
political power meeting concentrated economic power, take place in places which 
allowed the political actor to gain resources. In the case of InterAms, the political actor 
was a prime minister, while in the case of Infoafera, the main political actor was head of 
Poland’s main IT-procurement agency. In both cases, therefore, the political actor was 
able to derive their political resources from their formal position they occupied. 
The second part of the chapter then examined why the emergence of political and 
economic competition has led to a systematic transformation of the country’s patterns of 
corruption. By examining the three components of the theorized causal mechanism 
individually, I was able to trace in detail how the entire causal mechanism operates. 
Causal claim 1 described how the emergence of political and economic competition 
transformed the actors’ incentives and constraints in favor of engaging in corruption in 
general. Causal claim 2 then investigated why the specific constellation of powerful 
incentives and weak deterrents encouraged political and economic actors to form corrupt 
state-business relationship. Through true process-tracing, I have shown that the specific 
constellation of incentives and constraints that economic and political actors faced, 
resulted in the creating of mutually compatible interests to form a corrupt state-business 
relationship. However, anyone that every has tried to be more active or less ‘hungry’ 
knows that interest is not the same as outcome. Causal claim 2 therefore also tests 
whether the actors have actually entered a corrupt relationship by examining the benefits 
that each side gained through the corrupt exchange (which represents the incentives for 
actors to engage in a corrupt exchange) and the constraints that they faced (representing 
the deterrents against engaging in a corrupt exchange).  
The core part of the causal mechanism is causal claim 3, where I tested the 
resource distribution with the corrupt state-business relationship. This final component 
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of the causal mechanisms allows me to argue that the type of corruption that emerges 
follows a specific logic. I have found strong evidence supporting causal claim 3, 
specifically the propositions about legal corruption and local capture. In line with 
proposition 2, I found that local capture emerges when political and economic actors 
have a balanced distribution of power. In comparison, legal corruption emerges when 
the political actor is fragmented and thus in a weaker position against a more powerful 
economic actor, represented in the third proposition of causal claim 3. 
Two important questions remain now. First, I have not yet been able to test the 
first proposition of causal claim 3, which proposes that concentrated political power, 
combined with weak economic power, results in covert political financing. Second, I have 
traced the emergence of local capture only in the case of Infoafera. To ensure that the 
finding is not just a random occurrence, it requires additional testing. I will pick up on 
these questions in chapter 
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CHAPTER 5 
CASE STUDY: HUNGARY 
In the preceding chapter, I analyzed the transformation of corruption patterns in 
Poland. I have first categorized the type of corruption that took place in each of the six 
corruption cases. While four out of the six cases reflected legal corruption, with no 
variation across time, the cases also exhibited no variation across sectors. Moreover, two 
of full set of cases involved the same political party during the same time period. And 
while the cases took place in different sectors, I have traced the root to this variation in 
the different resource distributions between the political and economic actors in the 
corrupt exchange. The chapter provided also some preliminary support for the theorized 
causal mechanism. But the case study of Poland was not able to test whether the logic of 
resource distribution also holds for covert political financing, the first proposition of 
causal claim 3. 
The present chapter classifies the type of corruption that each corruption case 
exhibits and evaluates the causal mechanism in the case of Hungary. Before I go into 
details on the types of corruption and test the three proposed causal claims that link the 
emergence of competition to the type of corruption, I provide a brief background 
description of Hungary. Specifically, I will outline the major economic and political 
developments in Hungary from 1989 to 2010 as well as explain the dominant corruption 
forms practiced in Hungary during the early transition period.  
I then move to the first substantive section of the chapter where I classify the six 
selected corruption based on their type of corruption. I find that the cases, regardless 
whether they occurred in the real estate, construction, or energy sector, share some 
remarkable similarities. All three cases that have occurred in the early to mid-nineties 
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fall under the category ‘Covert Political Finance’ while the later the three cases represent 
some form of local capture.  
In the next step, I investigate why such a transformation of corruption types has 
occurred across sectors. Causal claims 1, 2, and 3, and their propositions, presented in 
chapter 2, divide the proposed causal mechanism into its separate parts. This section is 
set up in a similar fashion as it begins by examining whether the collected evidence 
supports the propositions of causal claim 1. For causal claim 2, which hypothesizes about 
actions taking place on the micro-level, I analyze the selected three corruption cases. 
Here I test whether the change in opportunity structures has encouraged political and 
economic actors to enter into corrupt state-business relationships. Also causal claim 3 
hypothesizes about activities on the micro-level by predicting that the distribution of 
resources between political and economic actors determines the type of corruption. 
Ultimately, I find strong support for my argument through the careful examination of the 
process that links the emergence of political and economic competition to the three 
Hungarian corruption cases. 
Background information 
When Hungary held its first free parliamentary political elections in 1990, it had 
already introduced several market liberalizing reforms in the late 80s (Borish & Noel, 
1996, p. 60; Inzelt, 2011, pp. 352–379). Despite these early steps toward a smooth(er) 
transition, the economy nevertheless plummeted (Borish & Noel, 1996, p. 141; Inzelt, 
2011, p. 360). Moreover, in the first few years, the Hungarian Parliament had to race to 
catch up with the rapid economic changes occurring around it (Burai, 2016; Innes, 2002, 
pp. 94–95; Inzelt, 2015, pp. 182–197). Eventually, the Hungarian government managed 
to stabilize its markets and succeeded in attracting significant amounts of foreign direct 
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investments (Borish & Noel, 1996, p. 61), in part because of its focus on signing and 
ratifying several multilateral trade agreements with the EC/EU, EFTA, and CEFTA.  
Hungary’s drive to adjust to the Western standards of laws and legislation also 
shaped its political arena, where political parties competed not on an ideological or 
substantive matter (i.e., the direction in which Hungary ought to develop), but on 
technical matters (i.e., how Hungary should adapt to be able to join the European Union) 
(Grzymała-Busse & Innes, 2003, pp. 64–73; Innes, 2002). Political parties had a weak 
societal basis in the former communist countries, which in part explains the high 
political turnover Hungary experienced in the last decade of the 20th century.  
While in the first parliamentary elections, the rightist parties of the former 
opposition defeated the communists and formed a coalition between the MDF 
(Hungarian Democratic Forum), the FKgP (Small Farmers’ Party), and the KDNP 
(Christian Democratic Party), the reformed communist party MSZP entered into the 
opposition with two smaller political parties (SZDSZ, the Alliance of Free Democrats, 
and FIDESZ). By 1993, however, "serious rifts appeared between the three coalition 
parties, while acrimonious in-fighting took place between moderate and hard-line 
factions within their ranks, leading to a number of defections" (Canning & Hare, 1996, 
p. 7). It came therefore as little surprise when at the next parliamentary elections in 
1994, the rightist government were ousted from office and a post-opposition center 
coalition between the MSZP and SZDSZ came to power. But they also faced some 
difficulties, including several corruption scandals, some of which will be discussed in the 
next sections, and at the next parliamentary elections four years later a post-opposition 
right coalition between FIDESZ, the FKgP, and the MDF established a new government. 
As usual, the right-winged coalition was voted out of office in 2002, and the center-left 
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coalition between MSZP and the SZDSZ returned to office until 2010, when the rightist 
FIDESZ-FKgP Coalition won a qualified (i.e., two-thirds) majority. 
Just as their socialist neighbors, under communist rule Hungarians commonly 
practices corruption related to everyday bribery due to the overwhelming shortage of 
necessary items (Burai, 2016, p. 96; Inzelt, 2015, p. 182; Sajó, 2002). Such a ‘shadow 
economy’ was a tolerated part of the socialist system, despite the existence of the Act IV 
of 1978 on the Criminal Code that regulated active and passive bribery (Burai, 2016, 
pp. 98–100). In other words, while the necessary laws and regulations existed, they were 
not enforced. 
A second common corruption practice that was especially popular among the 
nomenklatura was the use of personal connections.122 In these planned economies, the 
state had full control over all aspects of the economy, and "power was strictly centralized 
to members of distinguished circles of society who had influence on decision-making, the 
executive, control bodies and the judiciary." (Burai, 2016, p. 95). This also meant, that 
the elites were in a better position to personally benefit from their positions with the 
state (Holmes, 2006). 
Once the change of the political and economic system began and most people 
were still struggling to understand what is going on around them, a few entrepreneurial 
souls managed to profit from the chaotic years of the early nineties. If one had the 
business acumen and some political connections, her income could increase drastically 
in just a few years (HU 101, personal communication, 2017, Jul 16. Location: Budapest, 
                                                        
122 The term nomenklatura refers to "the exclusive network of party functionaries, political and economic 
leaders, presidents of local councils, public prosecutors, judges and members of the police all appointed 
upon political criteria and connected through close relationships or even friendships." (Schöpflin (1990), 
cited in: Burai  (2016, p. 95)). Later the term started to refer to any individual that was understood to be part 
of the power elite in communist countries (Tarkowski, 1991, p. 15). 
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Hungary; Inzelt, 2011, p. 360, 2015, p. 184). The parallel transition of the political and 
economic system shaped each other, and, as the following analysis will show, also the 
patterns of corruption. 
Categorizing ‘Patterns of Corruption’ 
In this section, I analyze the first part of the research question on how corruption 
patterns vary by classifying the types of corruption each corruption case exhibits. The 
three main types of corruption—Covert Political Finance, Local Corruption, and Legal 
Corruption—have several causal attributes that enable me to group each of the six cases. 
As the corruption cases are paired based on the sector in which they have occurred, this 
section is also divided into three subsections—the Tocsik affair and Hunvald case in the 
real estate sector, the BKV Metro 4 and Simicska case in the construction sector, and the 
Energol case in the energy sector.123 Within each subsection, I start with a summary of 
the corruption cases, before assessing the corruption type based on the available 
information. 
Corruption Pair 1: Real Estate Sector. 
Tocsik Case. 
Case Summary: In December 1995, Imre Szokai, the President of the National 
State Privatization and Holding company ÁPV Rt., introduced the lawyer Marta Tocsik to 
ÁPV Rt.’s legal counsellor Peter Liszkai. By January 1996, ÁPV Rt. hired Tocsik to 
negotiate on ÁPV Rt.’s behalf with local governments on the sum ÁPV Rt. owned them 
for privatizing their assets (Hajdu, Pápay, & Tóth, 2016, p. 5; Szikinger, 1999, pp. 15–17). 
                                                        
123 I want to remind the reader that the case of Lajos Simicska spans the entire period under investigations 
and has been divided into two instances. The first instance covers Simicska’s activities from the late eighties 
to the early 2000s, while the second instance covers the 2000s. 
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For her involvement, Tocsik received ten percent of the sum she saved ÁPV Rt., which 
came to around 3,296,400 EUR (Barrett, 2002, pp. 233–287). Journalists revealed the 
first details of the case on September 18, 1996 (Hajdu, Pápay, & Tóth, 2016, p. 8). In the 
next few weeks events moved quickly as the parliament established an parliamentary 
inquiry committee and the Budapest’s Attorney-General brought forward charges against 
Tocsik (Barrett, 2002, pp. 38–39; Hajdu, Pápay, & Tóth, 2016, p. 7; MTI, March 29, 
2000). While the Metropolitan Court of Budapest acquitted Tocsik and her co-
defendants in the first instance in February 1999, her confession leaked. In it, she states 
that László Boldvai (then treasurer of the ruling party MSZP) and György Budai (an 
entrepreneur associated with the Alliance of Free Democrats, SZDSZ) demanded that 
she transfer 50 percent of her fees to companies named by them (Barrett, 2002, p. 38; 
Hajdu, Pápay, & Tóth, 2016, p. 7). Court documents later revealed that Tocsik indeed 
transferred EUR 943,000 and EUR 471,000 to two companies associated with these 
individuals (Szikinger, 1999). 
What is known to the outside as the ‘Tocsik Affair’ consists of two different 
instances of corruption: the first being the appointment of Tocsik as the lawyer 
negotiating for the state privatization company, the second one relates to what happened 
with half of her income. As these instances represent two different types of corruption 
pattern, I will examine them separately. 
Corruption Type & Activities: The first instance of corrupt behavior in this affair 
represents local capture, in particular, the corrupt ‘Public Purchase of Goods or Services.’ 
First, corruption occurs around the process of the acquisition of services for the state, in 
this case the appointment of Tocsik as the negotiator that acts on ÁPV Rt’s behalf 
without a competitive selection process. Second, the purchase of these services broke 
with previously established norms and procedures, in this case, for instance that no 
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other potential candidates where invited. Next, the state organization purchases services 
that are either a public good or in the public’s interests. ÁPV Rt. claimed that the 
purchase of Tocsik’s services saved them a substantial amount of money, suggesting that 
it was in the public’s interest. While the Budapest Metropolitan Court ruled in the first 
instance “that it was not illegal to earn large fees” (Szikinger 1999, p. 17), many 
Hungarians nevertheless disagreed and considered her fees to be extraordinarily high. In 
addition, the question arises whether it was necessary for the privatization company to 
hire a lawyer, especially as they had their own in-house legal counsel. 
Fourth, other state organization have criticized the transaction as financially 
unsound, or at least not in the public’s interest. Last, the purchase has benefited a close 
network by excluding other actors that would have a right of inclusion. In this case, the 
other actors with rights of inclusion would have been any other lawyer with similar 
experiences as Tocsik but without her connections to the head of the ÁPV Rt. 
The predominant corrupt activity appeared to be the use of personal and political 
connections. And while a simple introduction does not necessarily mean that the entire 
hiring process is rigged, the amount of personal-political connections that tie the main 
actors together raises doubt about the procedural fairness. For one, Tocsik’s 
appointment as the 'intermediary' between ÁPV Rt and the local governments already 
appeared unusual as she was the only applicant for what appeared to be a lucrative 
position. In addition, the ÁPV Rt.’s Supervisory board failed to investigate the 
appointment of Tocsik after the scandal became public (Hajdu, Pápay, & Tóth, 2016, 
pp. 5–6). The prosecutor has also viewed the transactions as suspicious as he charged 
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Tocsik, ÁPV Rt’s president Imre Szokai, and four of his colleagues with fraud and 
forgery.124 
The second instance of corruption in the case refers to Tocsik transferring almost 
50 percent of her fee to two associates of the ruling political party, exemplifying ‘covert 
political financing’. First, the political actors (László Boldvai, MP and treasurer of the 
MSZP and György Budai, to a lesser degree) had the power to offer nothing or just a few 
general concessions in exchange for a contribution. The transfer of almost half of her 
income to companies closely associated to the then-ruling coalition has been well-
documented; while the Supreme Court dismissed charges of bribery against her due to 
lack of evidence (Barrett, 2002, pp. 38–39; Hajdu, Pápay, & Tóth, 2016, pp. 5–6). 
Second, the financing of a political cause occurs through channels that disguise the 
origin of the resource and/or its recipient is visible in the financial structure of the party 
funding scheme, including Tocsik’s apparent coercion. Third, the political actor refuses 
to, or at least makes it unnecessary difficult, to disclose the origins of his funding. The 
MSZP and SZDSZ neglected to reveal the contributions of Tocsik in their annual 
accounts; this was partially enabled by the circuitous route the money took.125 
The main corrupt activities involved in this covert political financing case, were 
extortion and a lack of implementation and enforcement of rules and procedures that 
would have increased the accountability and transparency of the process (Burai, 2016; 
EC, 2014a; GRECO, 2009; HU 101, 2017, Jul 16.; Inzelt, 2011). 
                                                        
124 After a long process through several judicial instances, the Supreme Court dismissed all charges but 
‘counterfeiting private documents’ due to lack of evidence in 2003. In a civil procedure, however, the 
Supreme Court did require her to pay back over HUF 500 million (Inzelt, 2011, pp. 352–379). 
125 While parties are obliged to annually publish their accounts in the Official Hungarian Gazette, however, 
multiple sources emphasized that these reports tend to be provide an inaccurate picture of a party’s income 
sources (European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, 2014a; Group of States against corruption 
[GRECO], 2009; HU 101, personal communication, 2017, Jul 16. Location: Budapest, Hungary). 
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Hunvald Case. 
Case Summary: In February 2009, a year before the parliamentary elections that 
would put Fidesz in power, the police arrested the MSZP mayor György Hunvald of the 
District VII—the famous Erzsébetváros district—in Budapest on suspicions of real estate 
fraud.  
The investigations surrounded the sale of over a dozen district-owned buildings 
between 2003 and 2004. In the course of the investigation, György Gál, and a major real 
estate entrepreneur names György Nagy, in addition to the mayor. It turned out that 
Nagy and Gál arranged for the sale of these buildings to friends and acquaintances far 
below the building’s market values and allegedly ignoring the pre-emption rights of the 
building’s current tenants (Mayor of Budapest’s District VII in custody for real estate 
fraud, February 10, 2009; Erdélyi, May 20, 2016). In exchange for their help, Hunvald 
and Gál, a member of the SZDSZ, seemed to have ended up with luxurious apartments 
with swimming pools, several houses, a fleet of luxury cars, and even a private jet in the 
case of György Hunvald (Hungarian Digest, February 27, 2012; Halász, November 17, 
2013; Inzelt, 2015, pp. 186–187). Several drawn-out court proceedings later, Hunvald 
was acquitted of all charges by the Hungarian Supreme Court, which explained in its 
ruling that Hunvald’s role in the corruption scheme was only minor (Hunvald and Co. 
acquitted in final court ruling, February 13, 2015; Dull, December 16, 2016).126 The main 
culprits in the scheme where Gál and Nagy who orchestrated these fraudulent real estate 
sales.  
                                                        
126 Labeling the case therefore ‘Hunvald Case’ is actually a misnomer, but the name remained (Wirth, Z., 
personal communication, December 2017). 
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Corruption Type & Activities: The case again is an example of local capture, 
specifically the corrupt ‘sale of public assets’, where actors sell or at least attempt to sell 
public assets over which they have control for personal or third-party gains. As mayor 
and head of the economic city councils, Hunvald and Gál had final discretionary 
authority over the sale of these publicly owned buildings. Court documents revealed that 
several of the involved individuals profited immensely from the exchange. The 
identifying key attributes of this type of corruption have therefore been fulfilled.  
First, both Hunvald and Gál were key-decision makers in the sale of these 
buildings. Second, their approach of selling these public assets violated the commonly 
accepted norms of procedure, among others because they sold the buildings often under 
market values, according to court rulings.127 For instance, one indicator that the sale did 
not follow the standard procedures was the lack of any public tendering of the sale 
(Halász, November 17, 2013; Wirth, November 24, 2009; Wirth, April 19, 2011). Last, 
and most importantly, the corruption occurs around the process of selling state assets.  
The primary corrupt activities that produce this type of corruption were also 
present in the Hunvald case. The key players in the sale seemed to have abused their 
discretionary power in order to complete the sale. The same players were also making 
use of a conflict-of-interest situation as the buyers of these buildings where often friends 
or acquaintances of Gál and Nagy. Finally, Gál and Hunvald where both suspected of 
having accepted bribes, and while these allegations could only be proven in the case of 
Gál (Wirth, April 19, 2011), the massive wealth that Hunvald accumulated during the 
time, indicates that he too managed to profit from these transactions. 
                                                        
127 Even though these rulings contradicted themselves on several issues, they agreed on this point. 
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Corruption Pair 2: Construction Sector. 
BKV Metro 4 Corruption Case. 
Case Summary: The Budapest municipality government has been considering 
the construction of another metro line for some decades before finally making the 
commitment in the early 2000s.128 It worked out financing arrangements with the 
national government, the EU, and the European Investment Bank and the first tender 
calls went out in 2004. From the start, the project’s implementation failed to follow 
common public procurement procedures and as more than one dissertation could be 
written on the full case, I will limit myself here to a summary of the two largest contracts 
in terms of their values that have been linked to corruption: the cases of Siemens Metro 4 
Consortium and Alstom Transport SA. Siemens’ contract Co-09 revolved around the 
provision of “Systems and power supplies” (European Anti-Fraud Office [OLAF], 
Directorate B Investigation II, 2016, p. 40), i.e. power-supply infrastructure, and valued 
at 108,850,000 EUR plus extra for two additional provisions (valued at 32,050,000 
EUR). Siemens M4 Budapest Consortium (including Siemens AG, Siemens Zrt, and 
Siemens Transport System sas) and BKV’s DBR Metro Directorate signed contract Co-09 
on July 26, 2006 (OLAF, 2016, p. 40). Alstom, as the leader of the Budapest Metropolis 
Konzorcium, signed contract Co-10 for the supply and maintenance of metro carriages 
on May 30, 2006. The value of the contract was EUR 76,444,919 (OLAF, 2016, pp. 42–
43). 
                                                        
128 The summary and assessment draw heavily on OLAF’s 2014 report, due to its in-depth investigation. 
OLAF is the European Union’s Anti-Fraud Office (the abbreviation comes from its French name: Office 
européen de lutte antifraude) and has the mandate to protect the financial interests of the European Union. 
It does this, among others, by investigating suspicious of corruption related to EU funds. 
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Relevant political actors involved include persons from the national and local 
government. The highest-ranked individual implicated in the case is the former prime 
minister Péter Medgyessy (an independent who served as prime minister for the MSZP 
and SZDSZ coalition government from May 2002 to September 2004), through several 
consulting contracts. In addition, companies associated with László Puch, the treasury of 
the MSZP, were recipients of some of the payments by Siemens. At the local level, the 
long-time mayor of Budapest, Gábor Demszky, a founding member of the SZDSZ, was 
also accused of being involved. And while the entire corruption case around the Metro 4 
line spans over a decade, I will only cover the first four years, from 2006 to 2010. 
Corruption Type & Activities: Both instances are examples of ‘public 
procurement corruption,’ a subtype of ‘local capture’. They occurred around the public 
procurement process and broke with previously established rules of behavior for going 
about winning a tender. In addition, both contracts related to the purchase of public 
goods or services—the expansion of the Budapest Public Transportation system (the 
third attribute of ‘Public Procurement Corruption’). 
Regarding the violation of the procurement procedures, consider how Alstom 
went about. While the firm’s tender was ranked last out of eight bidders, it eventually 
ended up winning the tender under rather dubious circumstances that have been 
investigated by the United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office (OLAF, 2016, p. 15).129 In the 
case of Siemens, OLAF’s investigation revealed that the company and its subsidiaries 
made several financial disbursements just around their public procurement decision to 
                                                        
129 The United Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office (SFO) reached a Deferred Prosecution Agreement with an 
undisclosed company over its involvement in systematic corruption in several foreign jurisdictions Serious 
Fraud Office (2016). Despite the undisclosed name, the general characteristics, time period, and that the 
Alstom investigation was not mentioned any more by the SFO all point towards Alstom being the 
undisclosed company. I, nevertheless, will rely predominantly on the OLAF report. 
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relevant decision-makers at the BKV and the project management company Eurometro 
Kft. (OLAF, 2016, p. 40).  
Additionally, several national and European agencies viewed the management of 
the project as financially and operationally unsound, as summarized in the OLAF Report 
(OLAF, 2016, pp. 16–19). The agency’s own conclusion, based on an in-depth 
examination of the project, point to extensive mismanagement and irregularities in the 
implementation of the project which "are not in line with the principle of sound financial 
management." (OLAF, 2016, p. 62). Last, both contracts benefited a closed network of 
actors by excluding other actors that would have had a right of inclusion. Alstom’s 
approach to winning its contracts is a strong example of this (discussed more below), but 
also Siemens’ payments to several individuals at BKV or Eurometro Kft. highlight how 
competitors were excluded. 
Admittedly, at a first glance, it seems that both instances are examples of the 
‘covert political finance’ type of corruption as funds were diverted to political parties. The 
main distinction, however, is that for covert political finance, the aim of actors is to 
acquire resources with only a few commitments in return. Both Siemens and Alstom, 
however, received major contracts in exchange for their part in the deal. Moreover, the 
political actors subverted the public procurement processes for their own benefit at the 
expense of economic actors that had a valid right to be included, as later court 
authorities determined. 
How did Siemens and Alstom go about winning the contracts? Despite their 
many commonalities, Siemens and Alstom differed in their choice of corrupt activities. 
Siemens’ used an intricate web of consulting and advertising contracts to create several 
conflict-of-interest situations. The German multinational focused its efforts on four firms 
that have been associated with, among others, the treasury secretary of the MSZP, László 
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Puch, and the co-owner of Eurometro Kft. (the firm tasked with the management of the 
entire project) (OLAF, 2016, pp. 40–41). 
Alstom, in contrast, used bribe payments to gain inside information in the public 
procurement process and so win the contract despite having the worst tender offer. In 
addition, Alstom has also employed an advertisement firm that was owned by then-
Prime Minister Péter Medgyessy (OLAF, 2016, pp. 43–44). Medgyessy downplayed his 
involvement in the firm when confronted by OLAF, stating that he became a traveling 
“business ambassador” for Hungary after leaving office. In this position, it is his duty to 
build international political relationships (OLAF, 2016, p. 45). Such behavior, however, 
raised even more red flags as Medgyessy was still prime minister for a few months after 
the consulting contract between his firm and Alstom was signed (OLAF, 2016, p. 45). He, 
therefore, would have "substantial authority over or access to state assets and funds, 
policies and operations” (FATF, 2013, pp. 28–29), even on projects at the subnational 
level. And even once he left office he still could potentially exercises (informal) influence, 
especially when considering his former political position (FATF, 2013, p. 12).  
To summarize, Siemens and Alstom used a combination of creating conflict-of-
interest situations, paying bribes, and making use of professional and political 
connections to win their public procurement contracts. 
Rise of Lajos Simicska. 
Case Summary: Lajos Simicska is one of the richest persons in Hungary with a 
net worth of 55.8 billion HUF in 2016 (Fekete & Zsiborás, 2016).130 He has made his 
fortunes in the media, advertisement, and the construction sectors and, as I show below, 
                                                        
130 Forbes Hungary ranked him 16th in 2016, after his spectacular break-up with Victor Orbán in 2014 
(Fekete and Zsiborás, 2016). 
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benefited substantially from his close relation with Orbán, the chairman of Fidesz. The 
case illustrates excellently how the resource distribution between actors transforms their 
relationship and thus shapes the corruption type they engage in. Moreover, it also serves 
as a prime example of how corruption can hide behind a facade of legality. 
As in the case of Tocsik, Lajos Simicska was involved in several corruption cases 
throughout the years. These cases, however, fall into two types of corruption: covert 
political financing in the early to mid-nineties, which slowly transformed into local 
capture from the early 2000s on. 
In the early to mid-nineties, corruption fit the general characteristics of covert 
political financing, where the main goal of the political actors is to acquire resources with 
as few commitments made to the economic actors in exchange as possible. In addition, 
the political actors prefer that the acquisition of resources and the origins of these 
resources remain hidden from outsiders. 
Corruption Type & Activities: The first attribute of covert political financing—the 
political actor has the power to offer nothing or just a few general concessions in 
exchange for a contribution—are being fulfilled when analyzing the relationship between 
Victor Orbán and Simicska. First, Simicska had no independent power base; instead, his 
fortunes dependent entirely on Fidesz and any economic activities were also done for 
Fidesz’ benefits even though he himself benefited from these interactions as well. 
However, without his ties to Fidesz, Simicska would have been unlikely to pull off his 
early coups such as the sale of the party’s headquarters and the purchase of the state-
owned publication company Mahír (a detailed description of both events follows). In the 
early years, therefore, Simicska, was still a ‘tool’ for Fidesz, despite Fidesz being 
dependent on Simicska’s business expertise. The major element that pushed the power 
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towards Fidesz was that Simicska’s wealth came from economic activities whose first aim 
was to ensure the party’s continuous financing. 
The second attribute is the use of covert channels to finance the party and that 
the party either refuses or attempts to refuse to disclose the sources of the income and 
the channels themselves. We see this several times in Simicska and Orbán’s relationship. 
Apart from the sale of the party’s headquarters, where the income disappears into 
unknown accounts, similar irregularities occurred in the case of Kaya Ibrahim and the 
subsequent destruction of documents related to the implicated firms (also more 
information below)(Kovács, February 10, 2015). The channels and income sources 
needed to stay hidden as the Party Act prohibits explicitly for political party to engage in 
business activities (GRECO, 2009, p. 15).  
The third defining feature is that the event excludes others that have a right to 
know. A major indicator supporting this element is that even the party’s internal steering 
committee did not manage to reveal where the money went from the sale or who the final 
recipients where (Balogh, November 23, 2013). In addition, the Hungarian State Audit 
Office, despite the party’s obligation to inform it about financing activities (GRECO, 
2009, p. 12), was also not informed. And at a more abstract level, the public was also 
excluded from knowing about the dealings.  
In sum, the main corrupt activities employed by the actors were a combination of 
embezzlement, conflict-of-interests, and patronage appointments. In addition, we see 
instances of relying on personal connections and a lack of enforcing accountability 
measures. All of these activities are common in cases of covert political financing. 
By the late 90s to early 2000s, Simicska and Orbán’s relationship transformed 
into one of local capture in its various forms. The aim of local capture is to subvert the 
effectiveness of a state agency, policy, or procedure so that it is beneficial to a select 
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group of actors by allowing them to either shape the creation or at least the 
implementation of laws and regulations. 
For a case to be one of local capture, the first attribute it needs to have is that it is 
done by political actors that manipulate a state agency, policy, or procedure to work in 
their favor. Again, several instances have occurred within a short time span indicating 
that this was the case. There is the appointment of Simicska himself as head of the 
Hungarian IRS, the ÁPEH (Adóés Pénzügyi Ellenőrző Hivatal). During his short tenure, 
allegations arose that he used his position as head of the ÁPEH to order the destruction 
of essential documents related to firms implicated in the suspicious sale of the party’s 
headquarter as well as in the case of Kaya Ibrahim (Balogh, November 23, 2013; Kovács, 
February 10, 2015). Another indicator is the surprising resignation of the serving Chief 
Public Prosecutor in 2000, despite having had tenure until 2002 (Barrett, 2002, p. 237; 
GRECO, 2002, pp. 21–22; HU 101, 2017, Jul 16). His replacement Péter Polt was a 
Fidesz party member with personal ties to Orbán (Balogh, November 23, 2013; Rádi, 
September 9, 2016). Orbán also arranged for some other questionable appointments, 
such as appointing his former law professor István Stumpf, a party loyalist whose name 
appears on some of the aforementioned suspicious companies and a former minister of 
the Prime-Minister’s office (1998-2002), to the Constitutional Court (Balogh, September 
9, 2008; Hack, 2011, p. 77). Fidesz also asserted their control over state agencies. For 
instance, during its first term in office, it hindered the appointment of the opposition 
candidates and so ensured that only government representatives are on board of the 
National Television and Radio Board ORTT (Országos Radió és Telekizió Testület), the 
state agency controlling the public media enterprises (Freedom House, 2003, p. 296; 
OSCE/ ODIHR, 2002). Despite the opposition having had the right to appointing four 
out of the eight seats on board of the ORTT, because of a struggle between the two 
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largest opposition parties, MSZP and SZDSZ, against the third largest, the Hungarian 
Party of Justice and Life MIÉP, the four opposition seats remained empty (OSCE/ 
ODIHR, 2002). The constitutional court, nevertheless, approved these developments 
(Freedom House, 2003, p. 298).131 
A second core element of local capture is that the functioning of the captured 
entity is now violating the principle of impartiality or it harms the public’s interests—
both of these elements can be observed with the appointment of Péter Polt as new chief 
public prosecutor (more on this in the second part of the case study). However, also the 
appointment of Simicska as head of the ÁPEH points towards a manipulation of the 
agency’s responsibilities. Even if he did not order the destructions of these documents, 
which is rather unlikely that he would implicate himself, his negligence of hindering the 
destruction of important financial documents points towards him having at least 
implicitly encouraged the wrong-doings. 
The third point—the capture benefited a select few—also finds strong support. 
First is the rise of Mahír (and Publimont) to one of the top firms in the media and 
advertisement sector due to generous state contracts, helped by the capture of the ORTT 
and the public procurement authority which pushed state agencies to advertise with 
politically friendly advertisement companies. And returning to the appointment of Polt 
as new Chief Public Prosecutor, the Hungarian law enforcement and judiciary system is 
set up in such a way, that the Chief Prosecutor can dismiss any investigations by law 
enforcement if he believes there is not enough evidence (GRECO, 2002, pp. 21–22; HU 
094, personal communication, 2017, Jul 17. Location: Budapest, Hungary; HU 101, 2017, 
                                                        
131 Additional examples of Fidesz’ capture of state agencies and procedures exist that will be discussed 
throughout the chapter. Suffice to say that the following agencies and state bodies have been considered to 
be captured at some point: Chief Public Prosecutor, Public Procurement Council and the Public Procurement 
Authority, ÁPEH, the National Election Commission, and the ORTT. 
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Jul 16). For instance, in the case of Kaya Ibrahim, Polt eventually dismissed the charges 
and thus stopped the investigation due to lack of evidence (Balogh, September 9, 2008; 
Inzelt, 2011, pp. 371–372). 
Local capture was predominantly achieved through a combination of following 
corrupt activities: patronage appointments, which went beyond the positions of heads of 
agencies or enterprises but included middle to low-level bureaucrats, perverting the 
course of justice by appointing individuals to courts and public prosecution with a strong 
link to Fidesz, and by employing covert lobbying. The latter, however, was 
predominantly in Fidesz’ favor or at least firms that are closely connected to Fidesz, 
meaning that the party would create beneficial legislation that helped the firms, which in 
turn helped Fidesz. 
Corruption Pair 3: Energy Sector. 
Energol case. 
Case Summary: The Portik case is part of the larger oil-mafia scandal 
surrounding the illegal import of gasoline in the early nineties. Hungary had liberalized 
the oil market and its prices in 1990 and the oil price soon reached values close to the 
world market (Borish & Noel, 1996, p. 48). The government taxed heating oil much lower 
than gasoline and also introduced subsidies to relieve the population. To distinguish 
gasoline from heating oil, the government dyed it red at the borders before letting it 
enter. The broader corruption scheme centered around a large number of small-time 
entrepreneurs smuggling gasoline into Hungary by declaring it heating oil and later 
removing the dye through a chemical bleaching process. The state lost billions of forints 
through customs and tax fraud.  
One of the largest companies involved in the systematic import of dyed gasoline 
was Energol Rt., founded in 1994 by Tamás Portik and several others (Sipos, September 
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24, 2007). Energol Rt. acted then as a distributer of oil to a major firm, in which then 
prominent members of the MSZP held senior posts (Rádi, March 26, 2015). But also 
senior officials of ÁPEH as well as law enforcement and customs have also been accused 
of having been involved the oil-scheme (Burai, 2016, pp. 107–108; Finn, March 23, 
2000; Sipos, November 11, 2007; Thorpe, August 28, 2000; Thorpe, June 29, 2007). 
These rumors found more and more supporters as several major criminal investigations 
into the matter were shut down from above (Rádi, March 26, 2015; Sipos, November 11, 
2007). For instance, in 1999 a parliamentary inquiry committee was established to 
investigate corruption cases in connection with organized crime (Finn, March 23, 2000; 
Kósa & Alexa, 2007, p. 104; National Assembly of Hungary, 2000, May 8). The 
committee, however, only existed for a few months—from February to November 2000—
and its final report was heavily criticized by all sides, and even was rejected by the 
committee’s members (Thorpe, June 29, 2007). They claimed that “among other things, 
that facts revealed during committee hearings were not included in the report. 
Significantly, the report named no names and made no links between the oil mafia and 
politicians or the courts.” (Kinga, July 1, 2007). 
Corruption Type & Activities: The Energol case and the events surrounding it 
point towards the capture of several state agencies and policies. For instance, there is the 
passage of the 1993 law on the regulation and control of excise custom payment. In 
addition, the uncovered connections between senior public officials, such as the Vice-
president of ÁPEH between 1997 and 1999, his wife, and a smaller oil-distribution firm, 
or the ties of former Interior Minister Sándor Pintér (Sipos, November 11, 2007). 
Moreover, the almost regular ‘dismissal/ shut down’ of law enforcement investigations 
into the oil-scandal to this date are cast doubt on the impartial functioning of the 
authorities. The conclusion is corroborated as even the court judges criticized the 
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prosecutors for having provided only limited evidence on which they can make a decision 
(Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting [OCCRP], n.d.). Last, the capture of these 
authorities and policies has created several fortunes (Finn, March 23, 2000). 
The main corrupt activities that the corrupt actors employed can be summed up 
as creating and profiting from conflict-of-interest situations, soliciting or extorting 
bribes, and the abuse of the political actors’ discretionary powers. 
To summarize, the classifications of the three pairs of corruption cases reveals 
that the types of corruption vary across time and not across sectors, visible in table 5.11. I 
found that the Tocsik case, the first case of Lajos Simicska and the case of Energol all 
represent covert political financing type of corruption. The corruption cases of the 2000s 
that is the case of Hunvald and the second case of Lajos Simicska have shown all 
attributes of local capture type of corruption. These findings allow me not only to answer 
part of the research as to how corruption patterns differ, but they also indicate that the 
transformation of corruption patterns is shaped by factors beyond specific business 
sectors. In the following section, I delve deeper into the causal factors that transform the 
corruption patterns. Specifically, I test the causal process through which the emergence 
of competition in politics and the economy has transformed these corruption patterns. 
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Table 5.11: Results of categorizing Hungary's Corruption Cases 
 Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3 
Name 
Tocsik 
Affair 
Hunvald 
Case 
BKV/ Metro 
4 
Rise of Lajos 
Simicska 
Energol Kft. 
Period 1996 2003-2004 2003-2006 1990-2010 1993-1995 
Sector Real Estate Construction Energy 
Type of 
Corruption 
Covert 
Political 
Financing 
Local 
Capture 
Local 
Capture 
Covert 
Political 
Financing; 
Local Capture 
Covert Political 
Financing 
Linking Competition to the Transformation of Corruption Patterns 
In the previous section, I categorized the six corruption cases into their types. I 
found that the three corruption cases that have occurred in the early to mid-nineties all 
represent covert political finding, while the cases in the 2000s classified as local capture. 
The main distinction between these two types is the power distribution between the 
political and economic actor. In covert political financing types of corruption, the power 
lies unequivocally with the political actors, while in local capture or its subtypes the 
concentration of power between the political and economic power is more equally 
distributed. As the variation of corruption patterns occurred over time and not across 
business sectors, I have shown the significance of tracing the origins of these new 
patterns of corruption. 
In this section, I therefore trace the causal factors of the transformation of 
corruption. Concretely, I investigate why the emergence of political and economic 
competition transformed the patterns of corruption in Hungary, the second element of 
my research question. I argue that the emergence of competition in the political and 
economic domains shifted the actors’ opportunity structures towards powerful incentives 
for and weak constraints against engaging in corruption. This constellations of incentives 
and constraints in turn encouraged political and economic actors to form corrupt state-
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business relationships. The distribution of power within these corrupt relationships then 
determines the type of corruption that develops. The causal argument consists of three 
parts, labeled causal claims 1, 2, and 3 (specified in table 5.12). In chapter 2, I have 
already I operationalized these causal claims by hypothesizing their real-world 
implications. The result are nine propositions, three for each claim. To test the causal 
mechanism, I will therefore examine each proposition in light of the collected data. 
Specifically, I analyze the degree of support the data provides for each proposition.  
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Table 5.12: Argument Roadmap 
Causal Mechanism: Emergence of competition in politics and the economy 
transforms the opportunity structure of actors, resulting in changes in their 
interactions, and so leads to a shift in the Patterns of Corruption. 
Causal Claim 1: Emergence of competition in the political system and the economy 
transforms the opportunity structure of actors to engage in corruption. 
P1 
Emergence of competition encourages political and economic actors to engage in 
corruption, or more broadly, violate established norms and regulations. 
P2 Emergence of competition weakens existing constraints on corruption. 
P3 Emergence of competition develops few new constraints on corruption. 
Causal Claim 2: The constellation of powerful incentives and weak constraints 
encouraged political and economic actors to enter into corrupt state-business 
relationships. 
P1  
Mutual compatible interests encourage political and economic actors to enter into 
state-business relationships. 
P2 
At least one of the actors in the state-business relationship benefits substantially 
from their relationship. 
P3 
Control mechanisms are unable to deter actors to form corrupt state-business 
relationships. 
Causal Claim 3: The distribution of power between political and economic actors in a 
corrupt state-business relationship determines the type of corruption that emerges. 
P1 
Concentrated political power combined with weak economic power results in covert 
political financing. 
P2 Concentrated political and economic power results in local capture. 
P3 
Weak political power combined with concentrated economic power leads to legal 
corruption. 
 
The section examines the evidence for each claim and each proposition 
individually. Before I begin, however, two caveats are necessary. First, there exists some 
overlap, as evidence for one proposition is also suitable for another. In these instances, I 
will refer the reader to the first time I have mentioned the evidence to avoid unnecessary 
repetition. Second, while evidence for the first causal claim comes from the national 
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level, the observations for causal claims 2 and 3 comes from the three selected 
corruption cases. 
Causal Claim 1: Transforming the actors’ opportunity structures. 
The emergence of competition in the political and economic domain transform 
the opportunity structures of actors. This first causal claim about the transformation of 
opportunity structures contains three propositions, P1, which captures the incentives 
that actors have to engage in corruption, and P2 and P3, which focus on the existing and 
newly created constraints to corruption. In chapter 3, I discussed the evidence I expect to 
find, if this part of the causal mechanism takes place as theorized. To support the first 
proposition, I expect to encounter accounts in interviews and other sources that 
emphasize the willingness of political and economic actors to engage in corruption. The 
second proposition requires traces in the historical records about the limited capacities 
of existing oversight agencies. The third proposition similarly relies on historical 
evidence, but evidence that speaks to the creation of new and effective oversight agencies 
or mechanisms, or the lack of such control mechanisms.  
Proposition 1. 
Strong evidence exists for the first proposition that the emergence of competition 
has encouraged political and economic actors to engage in corruption, or more broadly, 
violate established norms and procedures. 
Observation 1: With the change in political regime, competition among political 
parties emerged. If one looks at the ENEP indicator in Hungary from the first democratic 
elections until 2004, where effectives parties refers to those parties that actually had 
some influence on the political decision-making process and were part of the cabinets, 
we see a slow decrease from a starting ENEP value of 3.78 at the founding elections in 
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1990, to 2.89 at the second elections in 1994, 3.44 at the 1998 elections and an ENEP 
value of 2.48 in 2002 (Krupavicius, 2007, pp. 23–38).  
Observation 2: Throughout the nineties, the percentages of votes gained by the 
first or first two political parties has steadily increased. In 1990, voters cast only 25 
percent of the total votes for the winner of the election (and only 46 percent of the total 
votes for the first two parties). At the next two elections, the winning party already 
gained 33 percent of the votes (the first two parties gained 53 percent in 1994, and 60 
percent in 1998). By 2002, the electoral winner managed to gain 42 percent of the votes 
(the first two parties gained a combined 83 percent of all votes cast) (Bozoki & Simon, 
2006, pp. 146–195). 
Observation 3: While the political parties received state subsidies from the 
beginning, the amount was not enough to cover their daily expenses or their campaign 
spending, as scholars find (Bozoki & Simon, 2006, p. 183; HU 095, personal 
communication, 2017, Jul 13. Location: Budapest, Hungary) and confirmed by (former) 
members of parliament (HU 094, 2017, Jul 17.; Magyar, 2016).132 Likewise, the income 
from membership fees never made up more than 5 percent of the parties’ budgets in the 
nineties (Enyedi, 2007, p. 93). 
Observation 4: Multiple interviewees saw extensive party competition, combined 
with a vague party financing law, as the major cause of covert political financing schemes 
(GRECO, 2009, p. 25; HU 072, personal communication, 2017, Jul 04. Location: 
Budapest, Hungary; HU 094, 2017, Jul 17.; Magyar, 2016, p. 7). 
                                                        
132 Only the successor party of the former Hungarian Communist party, the MSZP, inherited a large number 
of properties (Enyedi, 2007, p. 92; HU 072, personal communication, 2017, Jul 04. Location: Budapest, 
Hungary). 
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Observation 5: All ruling parties made sure to capitalize on their position and 
increase their base of economic actors connected to them. Stark and Vedres examine the 
ties between 1,696 corporations and all political office holders in Hungary from 1987 to 
2001. Their measure of state-business ties goes beyond the common campaign 
contribution indicator. Instead, measure state-business ties by studying whether “a 
politician occupies a position of influence in that firm, whether as a senior manager or, 
more typically, as a member of its board of directors or supervisory board” (Stark 
& Vedres, 2012, p. 703). In their empirical assessment of the effect of political affiliations 
of firms have on their market behavior, the authors make two significant findings. First, 
economic and political actors use their connections “to coordinate strategy and channel 
resources” (Stark & Vedres, 2012, p. 702). Second, firms with strong political ties exhibit 
also a strong preference for firms with the same political affiliations. The authors 
conclude from their study that with more political competition and polarization, 
businesses will also become more polarized along ideological lines.  
Observation 6: With the change in the economic regime, private sector 
contribution to the GDP increased dramatically in the early nineties, largely coming from 
new private firms that made new investments. The World Bank, based on internal 
documents and data from the Hungarian Ministry of Finance estimated that private 
sector contribution to GDP increased from 20 percent in 1990 to approximately 60 
percent in 1993 (Borish & Noel, 1996, pp. 93–96). 
Observation 7: During these years, Hungary also boosted the number of foreign 
investments, even managing to receive four times as much FDI as Poland during the 
same period. Between 1991 and 1994, FDI made up around 25 percent of the GDP 
(Borish & Noel, 1996, pp. 98–99). 
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Observation 8: The lack of adequate regulation facilitated the development of 
emergence of a ‘spontaneous’ privatization in the late eighties and early nineties (HU 
072, 2017, Jul 04.; Inzelt, 2011, p. 360, 2011, pp. 359–360, 2015, p. 184; Jancsics 
& Jávor, 2012, p. 63). 
Observation 9: The number of unregistered firms, taken by the World Bank as an 
indicator for the size of the informal sector, has also expanded substantially, moving 
from 421,000 in 1989 to 427,000 in 1990, and almost doubling in 1993 by jumping to 
801,700 informal enterprises. 
Observation 10: Sources consistently point out that bank lending significantly 
declined between 1989 to 1994, which posed a major problem for small and medium 
enterprises in making more investments (Borish & Noel, 1996, pp. 96–97; Meagher, 
2002, pp. 1–76). Small enterprises, then, become vulnerable to outside forces beyond 
their control, as they are confronted with an expanding number of competitors, 
multinational corporations, and deteriorating credit availability (Magyar, 2016, p. 35).  
Inferences: Observations 1 and 2 describe a steady decline in the number of 
political parties with at least some political power after they have peaked in 1990. Both 
indicators point towards an intensive competition among political actors for their 
survival. When combined with the lack of adequate state subsidies to cover the rising 
campaign expenses of political parties (observation 3), I infer that political actors had 
strong incentives to seek out additional income sources. Observation 4 corroborates the 
interpretation as it presents a picture of close and long-lasting connections that formed 
intentionally between state and businesses. 
We can observe a similar development in the economic domain. As a larger 
number of firms (observation 6 and 7) are confronted with a lack of regulation 
(observation 8) and difficulty of obtaining credits (observation 10), economic actors are 
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encouraged to seek out alternative options. The increase in the size of the informal sector 
(observation 9) corroborates the interpretation and reveals that economic actors were 
willing to violate laws to do so. To discover that political actors were equally willing to 
violate laws and norms (observation 5) provides further support for the explanation. 
Taken together, the observations provide therefore abundant evidence for proposition 1. 
Proposition 2. 
Circumstantial evidence suggests that the emergence of competition weakened 
the capacities of existing corruption deterrents. The main focus is, therefore, on the 
various oversight agencies such as law enforcement agencies, prosecution, and the state 
audit office that existed prior to the transition in 1989. 
Observation 1: Already in the early nineties, law enforcement agencies had 
earned a reputation of being highly corrupt (Holmes, 2006), not without reasons as the 
case of the oil mafia mentioned above shows. One interviewee, having worked closely 
with police officers and prosecutors for years, noted that for the first decade after the 
transition police and customs were highly corrupt, where stealing or planting evidence 
was common (HU 101, 2017, Jul 16). Two interviewee corroborates the statement, stating 
that at some point an entire regional department of border and customs officials had to 
be sacked and replaced with new officials from Budapest (HU 002, personal 
communication, 2017, Jul 02. Location: Budapest, Hungary)(HU 072, 2017, Jul 04). 
Both of these issues are also stressed in the first National Integrity report of 
Transparency International in 2007, stressing that police corruption is one of the main 
reasons that the agency’s ability to constrain corruption outside is limited (Kósa & Alexa, 
2007, p. 50). 
Observation 2: Corruption investigations are also deterred as these oversight 
agencies do not have direct or indirect independence. For instance, while the Chief 
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Public Prosecutor is elected by the Parliament for a six-year term, his nomination comes 
from the President of the Republic. And as the appointment only requires a simple 
majority, there exists the risk that the Chief Prosecutor falls under enormous political 
influence (GRECO, 2002, pp. 21–22; Kósa & Alexa, 2007, p. 50). Furthermore, the 
system is arranged in a hierarchical manner, thus providing the Chief Prosecutor 
significant power over the investigations of the public prosecutors across Hungary. Some 
interviewees noted that in their work with public prosecutors, these individuals have felt 
pressured in the kind of investigations they can follow through (HU 094, 2017, Jul 17.; 
HU 101, 2017, Jul 16). 
Observation 3: Investigating suspicions of corruption requires a specialized set of 
skills and additional resources, both elements that these oversight agencies have been 
lacking for most of the time (Borish & Noel, 1996, p. 120; GRECO, 2002, p. 10; HU 094, 
2017, Jul 17). 
Observation 4: The State Audit Office is tasked with auditing the finances of the 
National Assembly and the political parties with regards to whether they have fulfilled 
the formal reporting requirements (Barrett, 2002, p. 269; GRECO, 2005, p. 11). If it 
uncovers unlawful activities, the agency either has to notify the public prosecutor, who in 
turn will assess the claim and initiate an investigation, or order the violating party to 
“restore the legal operation” (GRECO, 2009, p. 16). Since 1990, the agency uncovered 
several violations and notified the public prosecutor. Between 1996 and 2009, for 
instance, it had uncovered 20 of these violations of which it forwarded one to the public 
prosecutor.133 
                                                        
133 The Chief Public Prosecution Office has not initiated criminal proceedings for the “violation of 
regulations of party financing” (Group of States against corruption [GRECO], 2009, p. 16). 
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Observation 5: Judges are independent from political influence as established in 
the Hungarian Constitution (GRECO, 2002, p. 14). However, during the nineties, the 
judiciary’s ability to effectively adjudicate corruption cases was limited because laws kept 
changing (Inzelt, 2011, p. 362). While political influence was not yet a major issue in the 
nineties, judges were also hindered in their effectiveness by the requirement to not 
extend a corruption case beyond the scope declared in the indictment provided by the 
prosecutor (Barrett, 2002, pp. 264–265; Fleck, 2012, pp. 793–833; HU 094, 2017, Jul 
17.; Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting [OCCRP], n.d.). 
Inference: Observations 1 to 3 highlight the limited ability of law enforcement 
agencies, such as national police, customs and border controls, to deter actors from 
engaging in corruption. As one interviewee explained, when the old regime collapsed, the 
new regime was not able to establish proper monitoring institutions, leading to an 
inefficient police, prosecution, state audit office, and so forth (HU 094, 2017, Jul 17). 
Other state agencies tasked with oversight have also not been able to provide effective 
deterrents as the case of the State Audit Office shows (observation 4 and 5). This 
ineffectiveness stems in large parts also from the necessary interplay between these 
agencies required to investigate and prosecute a corruption case. In sum, I find strong 
but circumstantial evidence that the emergence of competition weakened the capacities 
of existing oversight institutions. 
Proposition 3. 
There exists direct evidence for proposition 3, stating that the emergence of 
competition has not introduced effective deterrents. The following observations are 
grouped into constraints provided by political competition (observations 1 to 8), followed 
by observations that examine the impact of economic competition (observation 9 to 11). 
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Observation 1: All of the larger political parties have been implicated in covert 
party financing scandals. The MSZP and SZDSZ in the Tocsik affair, while Fidesz (with 
help of the MDF) has been accused of aforementioned suspicious sale of its headquarters 
in 1993. Moreover, over the years, academics and international (non-) governmental 
agencies have repeatedly warned that the Hungarian political financing system is at a 
high risk of corruption (Austin & Tjernström, 2003, p. 90; Barrett, 2002, p. 238; HU 
095, 2017, Jul 13.; HU 101, 2017, Jul 16.; Magyar, 2016, p. 8; Speck & Baena Olabe, 2013, 
p. 25). 
Observation 2: Multiple references claim that the main political parties secretly 
participated in a financing scheme, the so-called ‘70-30 party finance scheme’, in the 
nineties.134 In essence, any firm that wanted to work for the state needed to pay a certain 
sum to the parties—of which approximately 70 percent would go to the governing 
political parties and the rest to the opposition parties. While no apparent evidence exists 
for its existence, several (former) political actors made references to the scheme, such as 
the former president of the MDF and Minister of Justice between 1998 and 2002, Ibolya 
Dávid, who referenced the scheme in an interview with journalists (HU 072, 2017, Jul 
04.; HU 094, 2017, Jul 17.; HU 095, 2017, Jul 13.; HU 096, personal communication, 
2017, Jul 19. Location: Budapest, Hungary; HU 101, 2017, Jul 16.; Inzelt, 2015, p. 184).  
Observation 3: In the course of a few years, Fidesz tok’ control over the center-
right camp by ‘merging’ with the Christian Democratic Party KDNP and the FKgP. 
Moreover, it formed an electoral alliance with the MDF in the 1998 elections. MDF, 
however, was nothing more than their junior partner in their first term in office (Bozoki 
                                                        
134 Each interviewee, without prompting, would mention the scheme at some point in the interview. As far 
as I could establish, two prominent investigative journalists uncovered the political finance scheme and 
published about it in the mid-1990s, but these articles are not online and the journalists are not active 
anymore. 
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& Simon, 2006, pp. 149–150; HU 094, 2017, Jul 17). As a result, the electoral landscape 
in Hungary moved from seven larger political parties in the early 1990s to only four by 
2002. 
Observation 4: The legal framework on the functioning and financing of the 
newly established political parties originated at the round-table discussions before the 
first free parliamentary elections in 1989 (Enyedi, 2007, p. 92)—the Act on the Right of 
Association (1989) and the Act on the Operation and Financial Management of Political 
Parties (hereafter “Party Act”)135 (EC, 2014a, p. 6; GRECO, 2009, p. 3). The Party Act, 
among others, requires political parties to publish their annual accounts in the Official 
Hungarian Gazette (Enyedi, 2007; GRECO, 2009, pp. 11–12). In 1997, the Act was 
amended to include a spending limit of HUF 1,000,000 (400 EUR) for parliamentary 
candidates in their campaigns and 386 million HUF (EUR 1.5 million) for political 
parties (Enyedi, 2007; GRECO, 2009, p. 21).136  
Observation 5: Areas that require a qualified majority of votes in Parliament to 
pass a bill are legislation related to the “police, on secret intelligence gathering, on the 
remuneration and benefits, legal status, and conflicts of interest of MPs, the rules of 
parliamentary procedure and many others.” (Kósa & Alexa, 2007, p. 22). 
Observation 6: Multiple reputable sources criticize the party funding legislation 
as inadequate (Enyedi, 2007, p. 93; GRECO, 2009, p. 18; GRECO, 2009, p. 25; HU 095, 
2017, Jul 13.; Kósa & Alexa, 2007, p. 28); some references go as far as claiming that it 
even promotes covert political financing (Bozoki & Simon, 2006, p. 183; HU 094, 2017, 
Jul 17.; HU 101, 2017, Jul 16.; Magyar, 2016, pp. 6–7). 
                                                        
135 Act no. XXXIII of 1989 on the functioning and financing of parties. 
136 The amendment was repealed by Law XXXVI of 2013. 
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Observation 7: When the various parties negotiated the transition, the opposition 
forces pushed for a strong parliament (i.e.; strong veto powers and a large number of 
areas requiring a qualified majority) to counter any attempts by the government to 
concentrate power in its hands (Bozoki & Simon, 2006, p. 151).  
Observation 8: During Fidesz’ first term in office in 1998 to 2002, however, it 
managed to reduce parliamentary oversight of the government significantly (Freedom 
House, 2003, p. 300). First, Orbán pushed for switching the parliamentary sessions from 
a weekly to a monthly basis (Barrett, 2002, p. 258). Second, in 2000, he forced through a 
bill that allowed the government to operate on a bi-annual budget (Bozoki & Simon, 
2006, p. 174). 
Observation 9: When foreign firms were confronted with corruption they 
generally would either initiate a law suit against the Public Procurement Authority or 
report such instances to their embassies or their national Chamber of Commerce. As the 
law suits had limited chances of success, the majority of complaints went to the 
embassies, who in turn would often come together and give joint conferences calling on 
the Hungarian government to take care of corruption in the sector (HU 095, 2017, Jul 
13). 
Observation 10: Domestic firms could report instances of corruption in which 
they did not want to participate to various authorities (see discussion in the previous 
proposition). Among these is the Hungarian Competition Authority (in Hungarian: 
Gazdasági Versenyhivatal; GVH). The GVH was established in 1991, and implements the 
regulations established in the Competition Act of 1996 on the prohibition of unfair and 
restrictive market practices, including investigating whether firms formed cartels. Its 
other main task is to strengthen market competition and create competition in markets 
where it has not yet emerged (Hack, 2011, p. 241; Kósa & Alexa, 2007, p. 64). 
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Observation 11: The tenure of the GVH’s first President, Dr. Zoltán Nagy, expired 
at the end of October 2010. He served in this position since 1998, two consecutive six-
year periods. In the first few years of his tenure, he was repeatedly confronted with 
business people that expected to be exempt from GVH’s investigations, threating to call 
the prime minister’s office or other high-ranking politicians (HU 095, 2017, Jul 13). 
Inference: Observation 1 implies that the political parties partook in a collusive 
arrangement where none of the actors would tattle on the others. This conclusion is 
corroborated by the story of the 70-30 party finance distribution scheme, described in 
observation 2. Political party competition also declined because Fidesz incorporated 
most parties on the right spectrum, further decreasing the ability of political opponents 
to constrain corruption (observation 3). And even if a political party would have wanted 
to reform the Party Finance Laws, it would have required a two-thirds majority 
(observation 4 and 5). The lack of introducing adequate amendments to the party finance 
legislation substantiates the conclusions that various references drew—that the laws are 
purposefully kept vague to allow for covert political financing (observation 6). While 
there exist additional checks to restrict the activities of the ruling governing parties by 
needing government approval for its annual budget (observation 7), these controls can 
be removed as well, for instance by weakening parliamentary oversight (observation 8).  
Observations 9 to 11 focus on the deterrent effects of economic competition. Here 
again, evidence reveals that competition has only a limited impact on deterring 
corruption. Neither foreign (observation 9) nor domestic firms (observation 10 and 11) 
have relied on the relevant state authorities to report suspicions of corruption.137 The 
ability of these agencies in constraining corruption, therefore, was limited, despite being 
                                                        
137 See also the relevant observations in the previous proposition. 
  238 
established with the direct the purpose of strengthening market conditions. Overall, 
there is direct evidence that supports the third proposition of the first causal claim. 
In summary, to support causal claim 1 on the transformation of the actors’ 
opportunity structures because of the emergence of political and economic competition, I 
have analyzed three propositions. I have shown that the emergence of competition has 
transformed the incentives and constraints that political and economic actors faced in 
the early nineties. In the second proposition, I examined the impact that the emergence 
of the two competitive processes had on already existing constraints and discovered that 
these constraints, such as law enforcement or courts, experienced a decline in capacity, if 
they ever had such capacities in the first place. The last proposition focused on whether 
political and economic competition managed to encourage the creation of new oversight 
agencies or mechanisms that would be able to deter corruption. The evidence that I have 
found points overwhelmingly towards a limited ability to create new deterrents. While 
the evidence presented did not always speak directly to the proposition (such as for the 
second proposition, where evidence was mostly circumstantial), in all three instances, I 
have found strong evidence in support of causal claim 1. 
Causal claim 2: Entering into a corrupt state-business relationship. 
In this section, I analyze the three selected corruption cases in light of causal 
claim 2, which suggests that the particular constellation of powerful incentives and weak 
constraints encouraged political and economic actors to form corrupt state-business 
relationships. To corroborate the claim, I should ideally encounter evidence that 
supports its three propositions: (1) political and economic actors form corrupt state-
business relations, (2) at least one side benefits substantially from their exchange, and 
(3) the control mechanisms failed to deter these actors from engaging in corruption. 
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Specifically, I examine the three corruption cases that have occurred in the early 2000s—
the case of the mayor of district VII, G. Hunvald, and the rise of Lajos Simicska.138 
To support the first proposition, then, I expect to find references in interviews 
and description of the cases that the political and economic actors formed corrupt state-
business relationships. For the second proposition, I expect to find references in the 
description of each case about the profitability of the corrupt exchange for each actor. 
While it is almost impossible to determine the exact values of the goods and services that 
have been exchanged, I am also more interested in the relative balance of power, visible 
in what they exchange. The third proposition requires evidence that highlights the 
inability of control mechanisms to deter political and economic actors to engage in 
corruption. Evidence for this will come in the form of accounts of interviewees and other 
records on how the corrupt actors subverted existing control mechanisms or prevented 
the establishment of new ones. 
Hunvald Case. 
The following four observations provide compelling evidence for the first 
proposition. 
Observation 1: According to the prosecution’s indictment, G. Nagy gave G. Gál a 
loan in 1996 (Wirth, April 19, 2011). These two have also developed a close and personal 
relationship over the years (Z. Wirth, personal communication, December 2017). 
Observation 2: The entrepreneur Nagy maintained regular contact with Gál and 
other local officials over the years (Wirth, April 19, 2011). 
                                                        
138 As the case of Lajos Simicska considers the formers relationship to Victor Orbán over the entire period, I 
examine the development of their relationship over time. This enables me to study the change in resource 
distribution between the political and economic actors, which provides an additional test for my argument. 
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Observation 3: By 2003, Nagy owned, among others, 10 percent of ERLAK, a real 
estate developing firm. The local government under mMayor Hunvald owned the other 
90 percent (Budapest Public Prosecution Office, 2006, pp. 1–17; Wirth, April 19, 2011). 
Observation 4: G. Hunvald became deputy mayor of the district VII in 1998 for a 
four-year term. In the following elections, he became mayor and served in the position 
until 2010. Gál took on the position as president of the economic council in the late 
nineties and sources indicate that Hunvald and Gal have served together in the district 
government since at least 1996 (Somlyódy, March 5, 2009; Wirth, April 19, 2011). 
 Inference: The first three observations reveal that there existed formal and 
informal ties between the political and economic actors over a longer time period. In 
addition to Nagy, Gal also had been working along Hunvald in the local government for 
almost a decade when the events occurred (observation 4). As the main sources of these 
observations were either court documents or the reports of investigative journalists with 
a reputation for high-quality work, I assume that the observations are reliable. As such, 
these observations provide evidence of a state-business relationship, if not of a corrupt 
relationship. However, as I have already established the corruption element in the first 
part of this case study, I conclude that the first proposition is supported. 
 The following observations for the second proposition provide circumstantial 
evidence that all involved sides benefited substantially from their exchange. 
Observation 1: At the time of his trial in 2012, György Hunvald owned multiple 
luxurious homes and cars, the latter worth over USD 1 million, as well as private jet 
(Inzelt, 2015, pp. 186–187). 
Observation 2: Research by an investigative journalist revealed that when 
Hunvald and Gál entered into government service already, they already made some 
fortunes in the business world. For instance, both of them would drive in their Jaguars to 
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their jobs in the local government (Somlyódy, March 5, 2009), cars which are unlikely to 
be affordable on a public official’s salary. 
Observation 3: Csaba Czibula, a Fidesz—representative on the economic council, 
fled to Mexico. He has been investigated for accepting bribe money from Nagy and Gál 
for his vote in the council’s decisions (Wirth, November 24, 2009; Wirth, April 6, 2011). 
Czibula refused to leave Mexico, which has no extradition agreement with Hungary, 
claiming he does not have the resources to return. As he did not return as requested by 
the Hungarian authorities, they issued a red notice with Interpol139 (Halász, November 
17, 2013; Wirth, December 13, 2011). 
Observation 4: When the court convicted György Gál, it also confiscated property 
as the prosecution showed that he obtained it through bribery (Inzelt, 2015, pp. 186–
187). According to the indictment, Gál received around 366 million forints (Budapest 
Public Prosecution Office, 2006). 
Observation 5: Investigations by several journalists revealed that G. Nagy used to 
be a major figure in the local real estate market who made his fortunes in the early 
privatizations of state buildings (Somlyódy, March 5, 2009; Wirth, April 19, 2011). In the 
late nineties, he switched to the construction of real estates with his firm ERLAK. By 
2003, however, the firm’s financial situation was so poor that he requested that the local 
government invest into his firm and so becoming a minority owner (Wirth, April 19, 
2011). 
Observation 6: Individuals associated with Nagy, in particular his girlfriend, 
where the owners of the newly registered firms that would buy the properties from the 
local government and sell it on to foreign owners, often through offshore accounts 
                                                        
139 A ‘red notice’ is wrongly known as an ‘international arrest warrant’ which actually does not exist. 
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(Budapest Public Prosecution Office, 2006; Somlyódy, March 5, 2009; Wirth, April 19, 
2011). 
Observation 7: While for the first few months Nagy was considered the prime 
suspected, at the indictment he was considered a key witness and his trial was separated 
from the trials of Hunvald and Gál (Budapest Public Prosecution Office, 2006; Wirth, 
April 19, 2011).  
Inference: No direct evidence that shows that Hunvald benefited from the 
corruption scheme as he already made a fortune before he entered into local government 
(observations 1 and 2). But then the main political actor involved was Gál, despite the 
essential role that Hunvald played. And observations 3 and 4 reveal that Gál, as well as 
other political actors, did benefited substantially from the exchange. Observation 5 
points towards Nagy, the real estate entrepreneur, being in poor financial health. He, 
therefore, benefited by getting the government to invest into his firm. In addition, 
observation 6 shows that people close to Nagy would be the first owners of the new 
buildings. This indicates that Nagy might have benefited as close associates of his where 
some of beneficiaries of the scheme. A plausible conclusion then is that Nagy is likely to 
also have benefited from the exchange in some way. Observation 7 corroborates the 
conclusion, as it indicates that Nagy has become a witness for the prosecution in 
exchange for leniency. Here, the lack of evidence does not mean that Nagy has not 
benefited from the exchange. It is more reasonable to assume that he benefited, but that 
the evidence is withheld on purpose. As such, there exists a preponderance of evidence 
that supports the second proposition, even though it is mainly circumstantial. 
The third proposition concerns the ineffectiveness of control mechanisms and 
focuses on how the local government managed to sell valuable buildings despite the 
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restrictions set by the UNESCO, and the involvement of several external oversight 
institutions in place. 
Observation 1: In 2002, large parts of Budapest were declared an UNESCO 
World Heritage site, including parts of the VII district. Such a declaration restricts the 
owner to make substantive changes to the property in question, as it aims to protect the 
world’s cultural heritage. The consequences of destroying or otherwise irreparably 
damaging such historic sites are limited to the UNESCO World Heritage Committee 
making a public announcement. 
Observation 2: In Budapest, long-time tenants in public housing have a pre-
emptive right to their apartments. A pre-emptive right means that tenants have the right 
to be the first to receive an offer of sale and it needs to be at a reduced price (Erdélyi, 
May 20, 2016).140 
Observation 3: To initiate the sale of publicly owned buildings, the local 
economic council had to propose the sale of these buildings for financial reasons to the 
National Office of Cultural Heritage OCH (Kulturális Örökségvédelmi Hivatal) for 
approval.141 The economic council’s chairman was György Gál (SZDSZ) and it consisted 
of over a dozen individuals, including representatives of the three major political parties 
MSZP, SZDSZ, and Fidesz (Budapest Public Prosecution Office, 2006, p. 9; Wirth, April 
6, 2011). 
Observation 4: The OCH issued approvals for the sale and subsequent 
destruction of the selected buildings, despite the World Heritage declaration. 
                                                        
140 The local government, however, sold these buildings without holding up its side of the deal. At a later 
point, it excused its behavior by claiming that because of the status as protected World Heritage buildings, 
the right of pre-emption was not applicable (Borish and Noel, 1996, p. 4). 
141 The OCH was responsible for the preservation of historic monuments and archaeological sites all over 
Hungary. The Hungarian Government abolished it in 2012 (Földes, September 6, 2012). 
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Observation 5: Once the economic council received the approval by the OCH, it 
then needed to engage an independent appraiser to assess the building’s market price (Z. 
Wirth, personal communication, December 2017). 
Observation 6: Court documents revealed that the selected appraiser, Lajos 
Kormos, had professional ties with Gál and Nagy. The trial also showed that he was an 
important member of the corruption scheme to sell the public assets well under their 
value (Budapest Public Prosecution Office, 2006, p. 9; Wirth, April 6, 2011; Z. Wirth, 
personal communication, December 2017). 
Observation 7: Based on the appraiser’s valuation, the public asset management 
company ERVA (Erzsébetvárosi Vagyonkezelő Rt.) would report on the need to sell the 
property to the district mayor, in this case, G. Hunvald (Budapest Public Prosecution 
Office, 2006, p. 2; Somlyódy, March 5, 2009). 
Observation 8: The mayor would then present the report to the economic council 
in a closed meeting, where they would vote on whether the expected earnings from the 
property’s sale, based on the evaluation of the outside appraiser, outweigh the benefits of 
keeping it. Once it decided to go ahead with the sale, a restricted bidding process would 
be started (Budapest Public Prosecution Office, 2006; Wirth, April 6, 2011). 
Observation 9: Depending on the estimated value of the building, the bidding 
could either be public, in which the highest offer would win, or closed. The municipality 
had previously established that any sale that was valued below 1 billion forints would not 
require a public bidding (Jancsics & Jávor, 2012, p. 76). 
Observation 10: Hunvald would then sign on behalf of the government the sales 
contract. The buyer would generally be a close associated of Nagy’s, who signed as 
representative of a specially established project firm, founded for the purpose of owning 
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a particular property.142 On paper, the new owner of most of these project firms was 
Nagy’s girlfriend, and employee at his firm ERLAK. Other people that owned some of 
these firms, or at least parts of them, were the lawyers that organized the formation of all 
of these project firms (Budapest Public Prosecution Office, 2006; Jancsics & Jávor, 2012, 
p. 75). 
Observation 11: Shortly after these contracts were signed, sometimes even on the 
same day, the project firms were then sold on, either to offshore companies or directly to 
foreigners. If sold to an offshore company, the company would then sell the project firms 
to the actual real estate developer who would transfer the price to the offshore company. 
As the core feature of these offshore companies is anonymity, the recipients of the money 
cannot be traced. And the real estates were owned by project firms once they were sold 
by the municipal government and not by individuals. When a building changes 
ownership, therefore, it is actually the project firm that changes owner, not the building 
itself (Budapest Public Prosecution Office, 2006; Somlyódy, March 5, 2009; Wirth, April 
6, 2011). 
Observation 12: When G. Hunvald would sign over the ownership rights of the 
buildings, Nagy or his representative would not immediately transfer the price. Despite 
this, the local government would forward the necessary documents to the Land Registry 
Office to initiate the change in ownership (Jancsics & Jávor, 2012, pp. 71–72). 
Observation 13: The police investigations could not establish the final recipients 
of the money made from the sale of these assets; it cannot be traced as it disappears in 
offshore companies or abroad. 
                                                        
142 Importantly, the practice of real estates being owned by a project firm is actually common practice in real 
estate business. 
  246 
Observation 14: One of the first beneficiaries of the corruption scheme was the 
local opposition party Fidesz as they acquired valuable real estate, which they converted 
into the local party’s headquarters (Jancsics & Jávor, 2012, p. 75). 
Inference: Any sale of public buildings needed to pass several internal and 
external control mechanisms. The repeated approvals by the OCH (observation 4), 
ignoring the pre-emptive rights of tenants (observation 2)143, engaging a compromised 
appraiser (observation 6), and then holding a closed meeting where the actors decided 
on a restricted bidding process (observations 8) all highlight how external control 
mechanisms were manipulated in the actors’ favor. Similarly, internal control 
mechanisms, provided by the opposition party (observation 3), having an internal asset 
management company (observation 7), or the requirement of an open bidding process, 
where all deactivated (observations 9 and 14, and the description in the previous 
proposition of how an Fidesz-representative was bribed for his vote on the council). All 
of these observations combined, present us with strong and direct evidence that the 
corrupt actors subverted the oversight mechanisms in place and rendered them 
ineffective.  
A plausible alternative interpretation for why such a large number of oversight 
agencies failed, if not through a systematic deactivation of control mechanisms, would be 
weak state capacity. However, this interpretation of the situation loses credibility if one 
                                                        
143 Hunvald himself maintains he was innocent. In his version of events, the district owned several old 
houses in which the tenants were forced to live without modern amenities, including toilets in each 
apartment. As the district did not have the money to renovate and upgrade the buildings, as well as could not 
find adequate housing for the tenants, it decided to sell the buildings. In exchange for selling the buildings at 
prices far below the market price, however, it made the new owners responsible for relocating the tenants 
(Balogh, May 16, 2011). While the explanation is plausible, it only accounts for a few observations, leaving 
the rest unexplained. For instance, even if the sale of the buildings at the lower market price was in the 
public’s interests as tenants were resettled, it does not explain why their right of pre-emption were ignored 
or why the bidding process was not open to more real estate developers, which could have increased the 
price the local government would have received for the buildings. Given these and other points, the null 
hypothesis that the political and economic actors did not engage in corruption is extremely unlikely. 
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considers that the potential sale of these buildings involved multiple steps. The actors 
had to receive internal approval from the committee, as well as the OCH, appoint an 
appraiser for a valuation of the market value of the building, and then make a final 
decision in another council meeting where the mayor would be included. If the state was 
indeed weak, there would not have been the need to go through such an elaborate 
process, as one could simply sell these buildings, not fearing any consequences. Instead, 
the mechanisms provided some deterrents, just not enough. 
In summary, I have found strong evidence in support of the second causal claim 
in the corruption case surrounding the former mayor G. Hunvald, that is, that the change 
in the opportunity structures of political and economic actors encouraged them to form 
corrupt state-business relations.  
The rise of Lajos Simicska. 
The rise of Lajos Simicska is the second Hungarian corruption case against which 
I test the three propositions of causal claim 2. The claim suggests that the new 
constellations of powerful incentives for and weak constraints against corruption 
encouraged political and economic actors to form corrupt state-business relationships.  
There exists overwhelming evidence supporting the first proposition for the case 
of Lajos Simicska, which states that mutually compatible interests between political and 
economic actors encourage them to form corrupt state-business relationships. 
Observation 1: Simicska was a childhood friend of Victor Orbán. Between 1981 
and 1982, they even served together in the army and later went to the same university 
(Kovács, February 10, 2015; Lambert, March 13, 2015). 
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Observation 2: When Orbán became president of Fidesz in 1993, he appointed 
Simicska to the position of economic director of the party.144 Once in office, he arranged 
for Fidesz to receive the deed to its current party headquarters overlooking Heroes’ 
Square (previously owned by the state), even though, by law, the party was not entitled 
to such a large place. He then organized the sale of their residency to a state-owned bank 
for a substantial amount of money, while Fidesz retained the right of use (Kovács, 
February 10, 2015). 
Observation 3: The party received around 700 million forints from the sale of 
their headquarters which disappeared into the accounts of several companies and whose 
whereabouts never where fully explained (Balogh, November 23, 2013; Kovács, February 
10, 2015). 
Observation 4: In 1995, a lawyer called Csaba Schlecht sold twelve companies to 
Kaya Ibrahim. The new owner, however, was not present.145 These twelve companies 
owned over 400 million forints in taxes to ÁPEH, but where unable to pay them back as 
they were bankrupt. When newspapers examined the previous registered owners of these 
companies, they found that apart from the lawyer Csaba Schlecht, Viktor Orbán and 
Lajos Simicska also were listed as owners several times.146 
                                                        
144 The position of economic director, or party treasurer, or similar titles, were essentially about 
coordinating the financing of the party by firms (Stark and Vedres, 2012, pp. 700–722). 
145 Journalists later established, that Kaya Ibrahim was a Turkish immigrant in Germany, unaware that his 
name was used for the transaction. 
146 The names and owners of some of these companies are "Centum Kft.: (László Kövér, Viktor Orbán, István 
Stumpf, Tamás Varga); Foliograph Bt.: (Csaba Schlecht, Tamás Varga, Szilárd Kövér, Lajos Simicska, Viktor 
Orbán, László Kövér); Matt Bt.: (Szilárd Kövér, Tamás Varga); Creato Kft.: (Lajos Simicska, Tamás Varga, 
Szilárd Kövér); Bonusz Bt.: (Lajos Simicska, Tamás Varga); Menüett Kft.: (Lajos Simicska, Tamás Varga, 
Csaba Schlecht, Szilárd Kövér); Joys Kft.: (Csaba Schlecht); Padrone Kft.: (Lajos Simicska, Tamás Varga, 
Csaba Shlecht, Szilárd Kövér); Draft Kft.: (Lajos Simicska, Tamás Varga, Csaba Schlecht, Szilárd Kövér); 
Prompt Profit Kft.: (Lajos Simicska, Tamás Varga, Csaba Schlecht, Szilárd Kövér); Quality Invest Rt.: (Lajos 
Simicska, Tamás Varga, Szilárd Kövér); and Quality Profit Kft.: (Lajos Simicska, Tamás Varga, Szilárd 
Kövér)." (Balogh, September 9, 2008). The other individuals listed as former owners of these companies 
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Observation 5: In September 1997, Csaba Schlecht again sold two firms to 
someone posing as a Josif Tot, a Croatian national. The real Josif Tot apparently was also 
unaware of the transaction, as he had his passport stolen while he was in Hungary. And 
the companies again owned the ÁPEH substantial sums of back taxes, which they were 
not able to pay back (Schöpflin, 1990, p. 4, cited in: Burai, 2016, p. 95). 
Observation 6: In 1999, the liberal newspaper Magyar Narancs published a list 
of 60 companies that were closely associated with Fidesz. Of these companies, Simicska’s 
name appears on the ownership records of 24 (Kovács, February 10, 2015). The list also 
included the 14 companies sold by Csaba Schlecht (Balogh, November 23, 2013). 
Observation 7: When Fidesz came into office in 1998, Orbán appointed Simicska 
as Head of the Hungarian Tax Authority ÁPEH. 
Inference: There exists overwhelming evidence pointing towards Simicska and 
Orbán having had a strong, long-lasting personal relationship (observations 1) that they 
cemented by establishing several professional ties between them (observations 2 to 7) 
after the transition. In addition, observations 4 to 6 indicate that these two individuals 
were not opposed to engage in corruption. An alternative explanation for these 
observations is difficult to fanthom given the abundance of observations, despite the 
existence of some incongruities about the origins of their friendship.147 The large number 
of formal ties that these two individuals established in the 1990s provides, therefore, 
strong direct evidence supporting the first proposition of causal claim 2. 
                                                        
were also well-known individuals within Fidesz. 
147 The media provides conflicting reports on this—but they differ in when they met, not where they met. I 
cited here the information provided by Lajos Simicska himself in a public interview. Regardless of what 
source, in the end, they all agree that these two individuals met before 1990. 
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The second proposition about one or both sides gaining substantially from their 
relationship requires two separate assessments, as Simicska’s and Orbán’s relationship 
changed over the years. In the early nineties, Fidesz, just as other parties, employed 
covert political financing to acquire resources, and Lajos Simicska was their man for it. 
Observation 1: It was Simicska who orchestrated the sale and renting of the 
party’s headquarter that it had received from the state during the transition (Enyedi, 
2007, p. 101; "The Fidesz robber barons. Part I," November 23, 2013). The new owners 
remain unknown despite questions by the party’s internal steering committee (Enyedi, 
2007, p. 93; Balogh, August 5, 2013; HU 096, personal communication, November 
2017). 
Observation 2: Beginning of 1994, Simicka orchestrated the sale of the state-
owned broadcasting corporation Mahír and eventually gained ownership rights over it 
(HU 096, 2017, Jul 19.; Kovács, February 10, 2015). One of his helpers in the deal was 
Gábor Liszkay, “a shrewd lawyer, who later became one of the most important executives 
in the Simicska empire" (HU 096, personal communication, November 2017). 
Observation 4: At the national elections in May 1998, Fidesz came in second with 
28 percent of the votes (MSZP came in first with 32 percent). FKgP came in third (14 
percent), followed by the SZDSZ (8 percent). As a result, Fidesz formed a centre-right 
coalition government with the FKgP and the MDF (which alone only gained 3 percent). 
Victor Orbán, as leader of the largest party, became prime minister. 
Observation 5: Simicska is appointed head of ÁPEH soon after Fidesz took over. 
He served in this position until 1999, when suspicions arose that under his watch, 
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financial documents related to firms implicated in the Kaya Ibrahim case were destroyed 
(Kovács, February 10, 2015).148 
Observation 6: Multiple sources argue that Simicska was Fidesz’ main financier 
until his break with Fidesz in 2014 (HU 094, 2017, Jul 17.; HU 096, 2017, Jul 19.; 
Kovács, February 10, 2015; Magyar, 2016; Than & Dunai, April 16, 2012). 
Inference: While Simicska benefited from their interactions, as evident in each 
observation, they also expose his lack of any independent economic power that he could 
use to counter any demands by Fidesz. In essence, he still acted as a covert political 
financier for Fidesz. For instance, Simicska’s appointment as president of ÁPEH might 
appear as a prestigious position. However, for someone building up an economic empire, 
having to spent time away from their businesses is likely to negatively affect their ability 
to manage their companies. In addition, Simicska’s past behavior of not taking on 
political or party positions (apart from his brief position as economic director of Fidesz 
in the early nineties) also points towards a limited interest on his side. In contrast, 
Fidesz profited from Simicska’s foray into the media sector. By gaining control over a 
media company through Simicska, Fidesz again had access to positive media coverage, 
something they had lost when the party made the move from a liberal-socialist to a 
centrist-right in 1993 (more on this below). As such, I conclude that while Simicska 
definitely benefited from his close relationship with Orbán, Fidesz made the larger gains 
in terms of achieving their objectives—winning votes as they ended up in government. As 
to the resource distribution between Fidesz and Simicska—the power laid with the party 
as Simicska’s fortunes were still tied to the party. 
                                                        
148 See for more details observations in proposition 1. 
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During the 2000s, the relationship between Simicska and Orbán had slowly 
changed to a more equal partnership. The change in their relationship is also reflected in 
the benefits each side receives. 
Observation 1: Companies close to Simicska or his associates, such as Zsolt 
Nyerges, started acquiring stakes in the media and advertisement sectors.149 It started 
first with the acquisition of Mahír, the then-state owned billboard company in 1994. Its 
new owner was was B-Reklám, an advertisement firm, where Simicska became a 
member of the board of directors and shareholder a few weeks later (HU 096, 2017, Jul 
19.; Kovács, February 10, 2015). In 1999, Fidesz announced that more right-wing media 
outlets where needed (Bátorfy, April 29, 2015). Simicska made his big move into the 
media sector came when Fidesz lost its reelection campaign in 2002. Simicska 
established Hír TV in 2002, whose first Editor-in-Chief becomes the former government 
spokesman of Fidesz (Bátorfy, April 29, 2015). And between 2007 and 2010, Simicska 
gained control over even more advertisement and media outlets. All of them eventually 
exhibited strong political bias towards Fidesz as several reports by multiple sources show 
(Bajomi-Lázár, 2008; Barrett, 2002, p. 285; Jancsics, 2012). By 2010, he controlled 
either directly or indirectly through associates two radio stations (Class FM and Lánchíd 
Rádió), a TV-station (Hír TV), a daily newspaper (Magyar Nemzet) and several outdoor 
                                                        
149 Zsolt Nyerges and Simicska where business associates throughout the last 25 years. Nyerges, however, 
also dealt directly with Fidesz members in these years. For instance, in 2001, during Fidesz' first term in 
office, Fidesz appointed Nyerges on the board of the state-owned Dunaferr. By 2005, he had switched to 
Budai Malomipari, a company owned at that time by Mahír Rt., which was in turn led by Lajos Simicska. In 
Spring 2010, shortly before the elections, he bought the shares of a big media company called Infocenter 
from Tamás Fellegi. Fellegi later became the Minister of Infrastructure in the new Fidesz-led coalition 
government (Pethő, December 6, 2010). But Nyerges’ formal business connections with Simicska went 
beyond him having worked at one of Simicska’s companies. There are their shared ownership of several 
companies, including one in Switzerland and Publimont, a major billboard advertising company ("Kis 
Oligarchatározó," October 30, 2012; Pethő, December 6, 2010; Than and Dunai, April 16, 2012). In addition, 
in the late 90s, one of Zsolt Nyerges' businesses showed up among Közgép shareholders for a short time. 
Közgép is a construction company that plays a major role in Simicska’s empire. 
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advertisement companies (Mahír City Poster, Publimont, EuroAWK, and Euro Publicity 
(How Viktor Orbán channeled tens of billions of forints to Lajos Simicska's media 
empire, February 18, 2015; Bátorfy, April 29, 2015; Bátorfy, April 29, 2015; Kovács, 
February 10, 2015; Lambert, June 13, 2016; Pethő, December 6, 2010; Than & Dunai, 
April 16, 2012). 
Observation 2: Közgép is a former state-owned company that operates in the 
construction sector, among others in the construction of bridges, roads, and railways. It 
was a minor player in the sector after its privatization in 1994 and has changed 
ownership a few times in the first years after its privatization. In 1998, a few months 
before the parliamentary elections, the company Axon acquired Közgép. As investigative 
journalists found out later, Axon had strong ties to Fidesz members which naturally 
spread to Közgép (Becker & Bodoky, September 24, 2012; Pethő, December 6, 2010). 
Among others, for instance, was Zsolt Nyerges—one of Axon’s shareholder (Kis 
Oligarchatározó, October 30, 2012). However, during Fidesz’ first term in office, Közgép 
continued to be a minor player—Fidesz apparently relied on another construction 
company to win public procurement contracts and channel the money to the party (HU 
096, 2017, Jul 19.; Kovács, February 10, 2015; Pethő, December 6, 2010). Közgép’s 
breakthrough came in 2004, when in addition to an associate of Simicska and Nyerges 
becoming a member of the firm’s board of directors, new capital came in and the firm 
started to invest into new market opportunities, including public procurement (Pethő, 
December 6, 2010). In 2004, Közgép reported HUF 1.8 billion. In 2005, Közgép’s 
revenues increased to HUF 7.5 billion. In 2008, Közgép's revenues reached HUF 20 
billion and HUF 40 billion in 2009 (Kovács, February 10, 2015). Multiple sources 
emphasized that between 2007 and 2010, Közgép Construction managed to make 
substantial profits at a time when the entire construction sector was in a deep economic 
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crisis in the late 2000s (Kovács, February 10, 2015; Pethő, December 6, 2010; Than 
& Dunai, April 16, 2012). 
Observation 3: With the start of EU accession negotiations in 2001, Hungary 
became eligible for funding from the EU, aimed at improving the social and economic 
situation in a new member country. Once it joined the EU in 2004, Hungary was also 
eligible to receive additional money from the various EU finds, including the EU 
Cohesion fund. The fund makes up a large part of the EU budget and focuses on 
equalizing the social and economic inequalities between its member states, with a focus 
on improving a member state’s infrastructure (European Commission, Directorate-
General for Regional and Urban Policy, 2015). 
Observation 4: At the national elections in 2002, Fidesz lost surprisingly by a 
narrow margin (Freedom House, 2003; HU 094, 2017, Jul 17). MSZP gained 42 percent 
of the votes, Fidesz, in an alliance with the MDF, again came in second with 41 percent. 
However, the SZDSZ, MSZP’s coalition partner managed to gain over 5 percent of the 
votes and bring the social-liberal coalition back into power. The ruling MSZP-SZDSZ had 
only won 48 percent of the votes, translating into 198 out of 386 seats in the parliament 
(the MSZP alone only gained 179). Fidesz, in contrast, managed to gain 184 seats, 
making it the largest political party in the 2002-2006 legislature. 
Observation 5: Fidesz would often leverage its political size in the National 
Assembly to force the government to fulfill some of its own demands, if it wanted Fidesz’ 
cooperation (Magyar, 2016, pp. 49–50). 
Observation 6: Multiple references point out that Fidesz initiated a political cold 
war after the election, where it attempted to undermine the legitimacy of government 
(Bozoki & Simon, 2006, p. 172; Jancsics, 2012, p. 20; Magyar, 2016, 26, 48-49). 
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Observation 7: Victor Orbán managed to steadily accumulate power within 
Fidesz in the 1990s and also during Fidesz’ tenure in office. As a result, he had 
eliminated any potential rival within Fidesz by 2002 (Bozoki & Simon, 2006, pp. 172–
173; HU 096, 2017, Jul 19.; Magyar, 2016, pp. 42–43). 
Observation 8: Simicska continued working with Fidesz and providing financial 
support for them even once they left office in 2002 (Becker & Bodoky, September 24, 
2012; HU 096, 2017, Jul 19.; Pethő, December 6, 2010). 
Inference: Firms that belong to Simicska, or are closely associated with him, 
experienced a rapid rise in their revenues in the following years as observations 1 and 2 
reveal. These additional resources provided him with more leverage in his relationship 
with Fidesz, and in particular with Victor Orbán. Fidesz’ years in opposition for the 
majority of the 2000s, helped shifting the balance of power in their relationship. Fidesz, 
however, managed to continue capture important state entities and accumulate political 
power. Its major tools were a) that the ruling coalition needed it to pass any legislation 
requiring a qualified majority (observation 4), b) that it was able to start a political cold 
war that aimed at undermining the legitimacy of the election results and the government 
(observation 6), and c) that Fidesz had a strong internal party cohesion, centralized 
around personal loyalty to Victor Orbán (observation 7). In addition, Fidesz continued 
aiding its construction companies in acquiring public contracts, in particular with the 
additional funding provided by the EU accession process (observations 2 and 3). This 
provided it with enough political capital to not end up in a reverse relationship with 
Simicska. 
Similar as above, while no single observation provides direct proof, the number of 
observations provide indirect and strong support for the second provisions—that at least 
one side of the state-business relationship benefits significantly from their exchange. 
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Clear evidence supports the third proposition on how control mechanisms that 
theoretically should have been strengthened with the introduction of competition proved 
to be ineffective in constraining the corrupt relations between Orbán and Simicska. 
Because of the large number of observations, I am grouping them not chronologically as 
before but rather based on how they relate to political and economic competition. In 
claim 1, specifically in propositions 2 and 3, I already confirmed the general lack of 
constraints imposed by political and economic competition on actors forming corrupt 
state-business relations. The following observations, therefore, examine more closely 
how the actors managed to subvert or otherwise circumvent constraints. Observations 1 
to 3, therefore, relate to how Orbán eliminated critics within the party, while 
observations 4 to 6 present evidence on how external constraints related to economic 
competition have been deactivated. 
Observation 1: When Fidesz’ internal party steering committee asked about the 
whereabouts of the 700 million forints that the party apparently received for the sale of 
its headquarter in 1993, Orbán decried them as unfaithful to the party and their cause 
and undermined, if not entirely eliminated the committee ("The Fidesz robber barons. 
Part I," November 23, 2013; Enyedi, 2007, p. 93; HU 096, personal communication, 
November 2017; Magyar, 2016, p. 41). 
Observation 2: Shortly thereafter Orbán, as elected president of Fidesz, moved 
the party to the ideological right, which eliminated a number of his internal opponents as 
well ("The Fidesz robber barons. Part I," November 23, 2013; Enyedi, 2007, p. 93; Rádi, 
September 9, 2016). 
Observation 3: During Fidesz’ term in office and even more after its defeat in 
2002, Orbán further centralized Fidesz and eliminated potential alternative party leaders 
(Bozoki & Simon, 2006, pp. 172–173). As another long-serving member of parliament 
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writes, a dramatic reorganization within Fidesz took place after the electoral defeat in 
2002. By the time of the 2010 parliamentary and local elections, Orbán concentrated all 
power within the party in his hands, for instance, by deciding who is an appropriate 
candidate for the national assembly, both for the individual constituencies as well as the 
electoral party lists. In this way, any dissenters within the party could be eliminated, 
including "the old Fidesz candidates’ members, the local politicians who were considered 
cadres of other leaders within the party where replaced—or arranged to be beaten—by 
Fidesz candidates loyal to the top boss" (Magyar, 2016, pp. 42–43). 
Observation 4: During Fidesz’ first term in office, it also undermined the 
National Assembly’s ability to supervise the activities of the government by holding only 
monthly instead of weekly sessions and by pushing for a bi-annual budget for the 
government (Barrett, 2002, p. 258; Bozoki & Simon, 2006, p. 174; Freedom House, 
2003, p. 300).150 
Observation 5: Shortly after becoming Prime Minister, Orbán appointed 
Simicska as Head of ÁPEH. Other major positions in oversight agencies that where filled 
with close associated were the Chief Public Prosecutor and the Head of the State Audit 
Office, to mention a few (Balogh, November 23, 2013; Barrett, 2002, p. 258; Bozoki 
& Simon, 2006, p. 174; Kovács, February 10, 2015).151 
Observation 6: During Fidesz’s first term in office, it made a large number of 
appointments to major positions in the public media sector. "In October 1998, senior 
news staff at Hungarian Television were removed and replaced. In autumn 1999, the 
President of Hungarian Television fired hundreds of journalists, apparently because the 
                                                        
150 See proposition 3 in causal claim 1 for more details. 
151 See the description in Part I of chapter—categorization of Simicska case for more detail. 
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company was making huge losses. However, at the same time, new journalists loyal to 
the Government were appointed." (Barrett, 2002, p. 286). 
Observation 7: While demand for investigative journalism exists in Hungary, 
publishers rarely support investigative journalism as it threatens their advertisement 
income. As publishers generally own several media-outlets, if one of these outlets 
publishes a damaging investigative story on a (potential)advertiser, the publisher likely 
suffers an advertisement loss in all of their media-outlets (Hajdu, Pápay, & Tóth, 2016, 
pp. 37–38). This is especially relevant for advertisement by state agencies, as the state is 
a major buyer of advertisement (Hajdu, Pápay, & Tóth, 2016, pp. 37–38; Kósa & Alexa, 
2007, p. 72). 
Inference: Observations 1 to 3 all highlight how Orbán managed to consolidate 
power within Fidesz over the years. Each observation is supported by multiple sources, 
independent from each other, strengthening the interpretation that Orbán continuously 
undermined any internal actors that could potentially harm his political ambitions. 
Observation 4 presents another approach of Fidesz to eliminate any potential oversight 
and control mechanisms, now by weakening the parliament’s ability to oversee the 
government’s actions. Moreover, by appointing several allies to high-ranking positions in 
oversight institutions such as the tax authorities and the chief public prosecutor, Fidesz 
furthermore undermined the ability of state authorities to oversee its actions 
(observation 5). Last, even the introduction of economic competition, and so increase the 
number of media outlets, did not improve the media’s ability to report on governmental 
wrongdoings (observations 6 and 7). Combined, there exist strong and direct evidence 
that Fidesz systematically weakened any potential control mechanisms that could have 
been introduced or strengthened with the emergence of competition. 
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To examine causal claim 2, I tested the three propositions against each 
corruption case, twice in the case of Lajos Simicska. Each of these propositions focused 
on one piece in the puzzle of how the particular constellation of powerful incentives and 
weak constraints encourages political and economic actors to form corrupt state-
business relationships. And even though the presented observations did not always 
provide direct evidence for each the propositions, they did provide me with strong 
evidence supporting the individual propositions for the causal claim. The case of 
Hunvald demonstrated well the existence of this part of the larger causal mechanisms. 
And the case of Lajos Simicska corroborates the inference, as it focuses on the 
relationship of the same two actors across time. It highlights that even if the corrupt 
actors move across sectors, the constellation of considerable incentives and weak 
constraints continues shaping their relationship and their involvement in corruption. 
The question now is, what shapes the type of corruption that emerges from the actors’ 
interactions? I have argued in chapter 2 that the distribution of resources between 
political and economic actors plays a significant role in the corruption patterns. I 
therefore investigate in the next section the resource distribution among the actors and 
how it affected the type of corruption that emerges. 
Causal Claim 3: Emergence of Patterns of Corruption. 
This section evaluates causal claim 3, which argues that the distribution of 
resources between the corrupt actors determines the type of corruption that emerges. In 
chapter 2, I have outlined the three types of corruption and the particular distribution of 
resources between actors that I expect to observe. I described that covert political finance 
is the result of concentrated political power and weak economic power, while legal 
corruption is the exact reverse—fragmented political power confronted with 
concentrated economic power. Local capture, results from both sides having 
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concentrated power and provides each side with leverage. The expected evidence for 
each proposition needs to illuminate the power balance in the actors’ relationship. For 
covert political finance, the evidence ideally reveals that the economic actors are 
dependent on the political actor. The proposition will be further strengthened if I 
encounter evidence that illustrates how the actors attempted to hide the transactions. 
Legal corruption requires evidence that highlights the limited power of the political 
actors when confronted with the economic actor’s demand. Such evidence can be for 
instance tracing the language of a bill put forward in the national assembly to a report or 
white paper of an economic actor. It may also come in the form of account revealing the 
strong dependency of political actors on the economic actor. Evidence for local capture 
will ideally come in the form of accounts of the large-scale capture of state resources and 
agencies. Again, each proposition will be assessed against each corruption case—Lajos 
Simicska again being evaluated twice. 
Hunvald Case. 
To determine whether both actors had concentrated power in their domain, as 
the proposition on local capture requires, I examine the state of the actors’ powers 
separately, beginning with the political actors and whether they had concentrated their 
powers. And while the evidence presented is circumstantial, the mass of observations 
supports the proposition. 
Observation 1: A coalition of MSZP and SZDSZ had governed the VII. district 
since the first local elections in 1990. 
Observation 2: Between 1990 and 2010, the mayor of the city of Budapest was 
Gábor Demszky, a member of the SZDSZ. 
Observation 3: At the national level, a coalition of MSZP and SZDSZ governed 
Hungary between 1994 to 1998. 
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Observation 4: Over time, the state administration became politicized as 
government parties would replace personnel in the state administration (Bozoki 
& Simon, 2006, p. 168; Jancsics & Jávor, 2012; Magyar, 2016, pp. 37–38). 
Observation 5: At the local elections in 2002, G. Hunvald got elected mayor of 
the district with almost 60 percent of the votes. In the local council, 18 of the 27 seats 
belong to the MSZP and SZDSZ representatives, 8 belonged to Fidesz representatives, 
and one to a representative of the far-right MIEP (Nemzeti Választási Iroda, 1998). 
Observation 6: There exist no indications that the local Fidesz representatives 
voiced their disapproval of the sale of the real estate properties (Budapest Public 
Prosecution Office, 2006; Jancsics & Jávor, 2012; Wirth, April 6, 2011). 
Observation 7: Thirteen members of the economic council, regardless of party 
affiliation, where charged with defrauding the state of billions of forints (Budapest Public 
Prosecution Office, 2006; Hack, 2011, p. 195). 
Inference: From observation 1 and the contextual conditions, we can reasonably 
to assume that the MSZP and SZDSZ, after 14 years in office, managed to establish 
partisan people in the local state administration. Observations 2 and 3 extend the 
inference to the administration of the city of Budapest and to the national level, implying 
that even state agencies had been filled with individuals that were either party members 
or at least not completely opposed to the ruling parties. The secondary sources 
mentioned in observation 4 corroborate the conclusions drawn. While observation 5 
could counter the proposition of concentrated political power in the hands of a particular 
party, observation 6 points towards a cross-party engagement in corruption as Fidesz did 
not only neglected to voice its opposition to the events but even benefited from them.152 
                                                        
152 For additional evidence, see relevant observations in proposition 2 in causal claim 2 about Fidesz 
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Observation 7 corroborates the previous observations, strengthening the evidence in 
support of the proposition of the existence of political power, even if not concentrated in 
the hands of a political party, it was concentrated in the hands of the political actors 
involved. 
On the side of the economic actor, I also find circumstantial evidence that 
supports the proposition about the existence of a concentration of power. 
Observation 1: G. Nagy had contacts to lawyers and trustworthy individuals 
willing to become owners of these project firms on papers (Budapest Public Prosecution 
Office, 2006; Wirth, April 6, 2011). 
Observation 2: Investigative reports have found indicators that G. Nagy had 
previously created a similar corruption network in another district (Jancsics & Jávor, 
2012, p. 78). 
Observation 3: G. Nagy was a successful entrepreneur who made his fortune with 
the privatization of state buildings in Budapest in the early nineties. By the mid to late 
nineties he was one of the main players in the Budapest’s real estate sector (Wirth, April 
19, 2011). 
Inference: Observation 1 implies that G. Nagy played a crucial role in the corrupt 
scheme. While observation 2 provides only anecdotal evidence, it suggests that he had 
the experience necessary to set up such a corruption network once more. Observation 3 
indirectly points towards Nagy’s experience in the real estate sector. While none of the 
observations provide strong evidence in itself, consider the alternative. What if G. Nagy 
was not a partner in the relationship, and one day the political actors decided to replace 
him? They would have needed to find an economic actor with extensive knowledge of the 
                                                        
transforming one of the sold properties in the local party headquarter. 
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Budapest real estate market, a similarly well-developed network of co-conspirators, e.g., 
lawyers and sham-owners such as Nagy’s girlfriend, able to identify willing buyers for the 
property that would not ask questions, and also ensure the transfer of the money to the 
final recipients. As a result, the costs of engaging in corruption would have risen 
dramatically for the political actors. G. Nagy might not have been the largest actor in the 
real estate market, but he had the knowledge and expertise scarce enough to make him 
an equal partner in their relationship. 
In sum, the proposition about the equal distribution of power resulting in local 
capture, therefore, finds at least moderate support. While neither side accumulated 
concentrated power in its domain, they were able to either cooperate with potential 
opposition voices (in the case of Hunvald and Gál and the local Fidesz representatives) 
or provided such a rare resource that they could not have been easily replaced (in the 
case of G. Nagy). 
The rise of Lajos Simicska. 
As described above, Simicska’s case represents two different corruption types—
covert political financing and local capture. Thus, the corruption case offers two tests for 
my third causal claim that the distribution of resources between actors determines the 
corruption type. In the following section, I, therefore, examine the available evidence 
that (a) in the nineties, the balance of power between Simicska and Orbán leaned 
towards towards the latter, and (b) in the late nineties to early 2000s, Simicska 
accumulated enough independent economic power to become an equal partner in their 
relationship. 
While the individual pieces of evidence only circumstantially support the first 
proposition, combined they corroborate the conclusion of an imbalance in the resource 
distribution in the state-business relationship in favor of the political actor Victor Orbán. 
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Observation 1: Simicska worked on behalf of Fidesz in the early 1990s and 
apparently had little independent economic capital. His income seems to have come 
from the sale of the party’s headquarters on Hero’s Square and his position on the board 
of directors of the advertisement company Mahír.153 
Observation 2: Simicska’s held the post of economic director of Fidesz in 1993. 
Observation 3: Fidesz gained political power throughout the years in political 
power by gaining votes and through them seats in the National Parliament (see table 
5.13). 
Table 5.13: Distribution of Votes for Main Political Parties in Hungary, 1990—1998 
Political Party 1990 1994 1998
FIDESZ-alliancea 16.84% 11.92% 55.18%
MDF† 42.49% 9.84%  ---
MSZP 8.55% 54.14% 34.72%
SZDSZ 23.83% 17.88% 6.22%
Others 8.29% 6.22% 3.88%
Source: National Election Commission of Hungary (Nemzeti Választási Iroda, 1998). 
aIncludes votes for the FKgD. In 1998, MDF votes were included in votes for FIDESZ as they ran together. 
Inference: As the first two observations highlight, Simicska did not participate in 
any independent economic activities, at least none that we know of. His fortune came 
from the sales he organized on behalf of Fidesz, who provided the resources. However, 
none of these observations is conclusive; in particular as the absence of any evidence of 
Simicska having engaged in economic activities without Fidesz does not mean that he did 
not do so. But such an absence of evidence is still a corroborating indicator for two 
reasons. First, it is plausible to assume that after 15 years, one of the number of 
                                                        
153 The description of the sale of the headquarter and the surrounding events are described in part 1 of the 
chapter. 
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journalistic investigations into Simicska’s and Fidesz’ past would have uncovered at least 
some of these activities. Second, when Orbán and Simicska ended their relationship in a 
rather ‘confrontational’ manner, they were quick to accuse the other side of 
wrongdoings. To date, however, no allegations appeared that would contradict the 
current conclusion. 
For the second proposition that acts as empirical manifestation of the third 
causal claim, I find abundant and strong evidence—by the time Fidesz left office in 2002, 
the relationship between these actors had shifted towards local capture. 
Observation 1: Fidesz, in a coalition with the FKgD and the MDF, came to power 
with a qualified majority in 1998. The coalition of these three parties gained 213 out of 
386 seats in the parliament as figure 5.1 illustrates. With this power, they could force 
through legislation in areas that previously have required the cooperation of at least 
some opposition parties. 
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Observation 2: During their first term in office, Fidesz appointed a large number 
of politically connected individuals to senior positions in the tax administration 
(Simicska), Public Prosecution (Péter Polt), and the Public Procurement Authorities, 
among others.154 
Observation 3: Multiple independent sources highlighted that each government 
would introduce layoffs of state officials at senior and lower ranks (Bozoki & Simon, 
2006, p. 168; Magyar, 2016, p. 37). As one of the sources notes,  
the debilitating effects of these firings cannot be ignored in terms of their impact 
on individuals who would like to complete their careers in the country’s 
bureaucracy, the productivity of government offices, and the confidence that 
average citizens have in the impartiality of their government officials (Freedom 
House, 2003, pp. 301–302). 
                                                        
154 In the first part of the chapter, I listed more state agencies that Fidesz has captured over time. 
MSZP
134
SZDSZ
24
MDF
2
FIDESZ-MDF
50
FIDESZ
113
FKgP
48
MIEP
14
Others
1
Other
15
Figure 5.1: Number of Seats per Party in National Assembly of Hungary in 1998 
Source: National Election Commission of Hungary (Nemzeti Választási Iroda, 1998). Shaded areas represent 
members of the ruling coalition. 
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Observation 4: In December 2001, the Hungarian Bar Association, the Budapest 
Bar Association, and the National Association of Prosecutors made a public 
announcement, warning of the ongoing threats to judicial independence (Barrett, 2002, 
p. 264, 2002, pp. 264–265). 
Observation 5: After Fidesz’ electoral defeat in 2002, it still maintained enough 
power to ‘blackmail’ the MSZP-SZDSZ government. For instance, Fidesz hindered the 
government’s attempt to pass an economic reform package in the National Assembly by 
withholding its votes, which votes were needed to obtain a qualified majority. A former 
member of parliament for the SZDSZ said of Fidesz’ behavior: 
in the hands of Fidesz—lacking the wish to reach consensus—[the need to reach a 
qualified majority] had become a weapon for blackmailing the government: they 
would only vote for something (even if they agreed with)if they received 
something in return, or they would not vote for anything, to preempt any success 
of the government (Magyar, 2016, p. 49).  
Fidesz made sure to secure benefits for their supporters (in particular Simicska). 
The media sector became one of the markets where companies associated with Simicska 
or otherwise concentrated in the hands of a few economic actors close to Fidesz (Hajdu, 
Pápay, & Tóth, 2016, pp. 32–33; Lyman, November 27, 2014, A12).155 
Observation 6: Simicska’s expanded his economic empire after he left ÁPEH with 
the acquisition of Közgép.156 
                                                        
155 Take the case of the Law of Digital Switchover. In 2006, the two largest parties (Fidesz and MSZP) 
adopted the Law on Digital Switchover, which included a stipulation that two TV channels, apart from the 
three state-owned ones, would operate for another four years - the beneficiaries of this policy were Hír TV 
and the MSZP-friendly ATV (Kósa and Alexa, 2007, p. 71). Several other references agreed with the 
assessment that MSZP and Fidesz designed the law to favour these two TV channels (Group of States against 
corruption [GRECO], 2009, p. 18, Group of States against corruption [GRECO], 2002, pp. 21–22; HU 095, 
personal communication, 2017, Jul 13. Location: Budapest, Hungary). 
156 Recall that Simicska involvement into Közgép coincided with a dramatic rise in the firm’s revenues. 
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Observation 7: Közgép experienced a dramatic increase in its revenues at a time 
when the rest of the market made losses because of the economic crises (Kovács, 
February 10, 2015; Pethő, December 6, 2010). 
Observation 8: With the start of the EU accession negotiations in 2001, Hungary 
became eligible for several EU funds aimed at improving the country’s failing 
infrastructure. 
Observation 9: Közgép and other business entities of Simicska lost significant 
revenues after Simicska’s break with Orbán. For instance, Közgép’s net revenue 
decreased from 112.9 billion forints in 2014 to 101.5 billion forints in 2015. In a similar 
vein, his media and advertisement companies also made substantial losses in 2015. They 
made a total revenue of 12.1 billion forints, down from 20.5 billion forints in 2014 
(Lambert, June 13, 2016). The loss is commonly attributed to a decline in state 
advertisement revenue. 
Observation 10: In 2014 and 2015, a large number of patronage appointments 
lost their positions. Several sources attribute their dismissal to their allegiance to 
Simicska and not Orbán (Kovács, February 10, 2015). 
Inference: When Fidesz came into power with a qualified majority in 1998 
(observation 1), it displayed an excessive zeal of placing their people in senior positions 
(observation 2), sometimes through dubious means.157 Fidesz extended its eagerness also 
to the lower levels in the state administration (observation 3) that eventually even 
apolitical state entities started to raise their concerns (observation 4). Fidesz’ ambitions 
to control over the state administrations did not even stop when the party left office in 
                                                        
157 One of these dubious means was the replacement of the Chief Public Prosecutor in 2000. As prime 
minister, Orbán managed to get the highly respected Chief Public Prosecutor Kálmán György, whose tenure 
would only have expired in 2002, to resign. The new appointee was Péter Polt, a long-time friend Victor 
Orbán and party member (Balogh, November 23, 2013; Barrett, 2002, p. 237). 
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2002 (observation 5), as the developments in the media and construction sectors 
illustrate. Simicska ended up being one of the beneficiaries of Fidesz’ rise to power. 
Observation 6 illustrates how Fidesz continued help for its economic actors even if not in 
office, which can explain the steady media concentration that emerged (observation 6). 
The party also allocated a significant number of public procurement contracts to its 
businesses in the construction sector (observation 8 and 9).  
The strongest support for the proposition, however, comes from observation 10. 
It provides unambiguous evidence for the close ties between Simicska and Orbán. Once 
these two broke off their relationship, Simicska’s empire suffered serious losses. An 
alternative interpretation of the last observation that needs to be considered is that 
Orbán had the stronger hand in their relationship through all these years. While this is a 
reasonable explanation, Orbán apparently passed several pieces of legislations that 
specifically targeted firms owned by Simicska or his associates since their breakup 
(Kovács, February 10, 2015; Lambert, June 13, 2016). 
In other words, the early 2000s saw a shift in the balance of power between these 
two actors. Simicska had slowly established himself as an independent economic actor, 
that is, his power came from his economic activities and not from any position in the 
party. The relationship between these two actors also transformed, as Fidesz and 
Simicska both manage to concentrate power in their hands and so end up capturing state 
agencies and procedures. The incentives for this remained the same – Fidesz desperately 
needed funds and positive media coverage, Simicska was interested in deactivating any 
potential control mechanisms. The concentration of power meant that they were on a 
more equal footing now. 
In summary, the evidence supports the three propositions in each corruption 
case. One the one hand, the case of Hunvald and the second period of Simicska’s and 
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Orbán’s relationship highlight how a balance of power between these actors’ results in 
the capture of state agencies or procedures. The early period of the relationship between 
Simicska and Orbán strongly support the hypothesis that concentrated political power 
combined with weak economic power will lead to covert political financing. 
The in-depth investigation of these three corruption cases offers persuasive 
evidence for the hypothesized causal mechanism. I found through detailed process-
tracing that in the three corruption cases, the emergence of political and economic 
competition transformed the opportunity structures of actors in a way that encouraged 
them to form corrupt relationships. The analysis then revealed that the resource 
distribution within such corrupt state-business relationships between political and 
economic actors determines the type of corruption. Take for example the case of 
Simicska during the nineties. Due to his weak economic power, the balance of power in 
his relationship with Fidesz and specifically with Orbán favored the political actor. 
Contrast this with the shift in their relationship in the 2000s, when Simicska managed to 
gain independent economic power. Orbán’s and Simicska’s relationship has transformed 
to a more equal partnership with both sides having gained concentrated power. The 
resulting type of corruption resembled local capture. Similarly, with the case of then-
mayor Hunvald, where the balanced resource distribution between the political and 
economic actors provided both sides with leverage. Again, the evidence showed the 
emergence of local capture of several state agencies. 
Conclusion 
This chapter shows that my argument can shed light on the transformation of 
corruption patterns in Hungary. And while the findings from such a low number of cases 
cannot be taken as representative for the larger population, they do present us with some 
clear insights into the changes of corruption. 
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First, classifying the selected corruption cases by the type of corruption that they 
represent reveals that corruption varies not across sectors but across time. Corruption 
cases which took place in the early to mid-nineties all exhibited the characteristics of 
covert political financing type of corruption. These were situations where the political 
actors practically extorted the economic actor for their own benefits, while providing 
little in return. The power rested with the political actors, who also attempted to cover 
the origins of these funds. In contrast, the corruption cases of the 2000s belong to local 
capture or one of its subtypes. In these instances, the power distribution between the 
political and economic actors has been balanced. And each side was able to further their 
objectives at the expense of actors that would have had a right of inclusion. In short, this 
discovery is a first indicator for my argument that patterns of corruption transform 
systematically, a change which needs to be far better understood. 
Second, tracing the emergence of competition in the political and economic 
domains to the transformation of corruption patterns presents some research challenges. 
However, by having separated the causal mechanism into three components, causal 
claims 1, 2, and 3, I tested each step of the causal mechanism individually. The evidence 
provides strong support for each of these causal claims. I find that in the early transition 
periods, political actors were confronted with high degree of competition, little income 
coupled with high expenses, in an uncertain environment that already had experience in 
corruption. Economic actors were also confronted with markets without clear rules and 
regulations but a large number of competitors. Both sides, therefore, had strong 
incentives to enter into a relationship, and there were hardly any constraints in place 
that could have deterred them from entering into a corrupt state-business relationship. 
What now determines the type of corruption that emerges? In the cases studied, I find 
that the distribution of resources between the political and economic sector determines 
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the type of corruption that emerges. We see in the case of Lajos Simicska how his lack of 
independent economic power meant that he was beholden to Fidesz. And we saw that it 
was in their interests that he would gain economic power as this benefited the party. The 
cases of Hunvald and Simicska in 2000s then show that when both sides have roughly 
equal power, their relationship is far more balanced. 
This analysis of the transformation of patterns of corruption through the 
emergence of competition exposes some of the elements that until now stayed hidden in 
the black box that ties competition to corruption. I want to highlight three of these 
elements. One is the impact the distribution of power in the corrupt state-business 
relationship has on the type of corruption. The corruption cases reveal that concentrated 
power on both sides do not constrain their action but allows actors to engage in another 
form of corruption. As we have seen, local capture allows actors to manipulate or subvert 
specifically these state agencies and control mechanisms which are in place to prevent 
corruption. 
The case of Simicska also shows that the EU is not a deterrent for all types of 
corruption. In fact, it acted as another opportunity to engage in corruption as the influx 
of money created new incentives for actors. And as the EU relies largely on the member 
state to implement the stringent rules and regulations that accompany the EU funds, it 
creates no new constraints as these domestic agencies and mechanisms have long been 
captured. The final point that this chapter makes is that democratization is not certain 
no matter how far along the path a country’s political and economic development is. This 
conclusion stands in contradiction to the broad path dependency argument. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Social scientists and anti-corruption practitioners tout political and economic 
competition as an almost guaranteed antidote to corruption. Political and economic 
competition, so the broad argument, reduces corruption because it increases the cost of 
actors to engage in corrupt practices through several channels: competition increases the 
risk of exposure, provides non-corrupt alternatives for consumers, and introduces non-
corrupt practices into the political and economic domains. Following this argument, we 
ought to observe a significant reduction in corruption in the Central Eastern European 
countries after the introduction of political and economic competition, especially two 
decades later. And while certain kinds of corruption, such as bribery, have been in 
decline, the population does not share the sentiment of an overall reduction in 
corruption (Open Society Institute, 2002). This hints at corruption transforming itself 
instead of disappearing in the region. 
In this dissertation, I delve deeper into the conventional argument by 
investigating how and why the emergence of competition in the political and economic 
domains led to a transformation of the patterns of corruption158? I argue that under 
conditions of a shared communist past and high levels of uncertainty, the simultaneous 
emergence of political and economic competition transforms the opportunity structures 
of actors, that is, their incentives for and constraints against engaging in corruption. The 
resulting constellation of powerful incentives for and weak constraints against 
                                                        
158 Patterns of corruption refers to refers to the prevalent configuration of types and activities of corruption 
that actors (e.g., individuals, organizations, or institutions) employ in a place (e.g., market sector, federal 
government, municipality, or other state entities). I consider an event or behavior as corrupt, if it fulfills 
four attributes: (a) a political decision-maker is involved, (b) who has violated the norms or regulations of 
their office, (c) receives some kind of compensation in return, and (d) the act or situation has harmed the 
public’s interest. 
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corruption encourages political and economic actors to enter into a corrupt state-
business relationship. Finally, the resource distribution between the actors in the corrupt 
state-business relationship determines the type of corruption that emerged.159 Through 
intensive process-tracing of the micro-causal mechanisms of five corruption cases in 
Poland and six in Hungary, I have found preliminary support for my argument. 
But before I discuss the findings in more detail, a short note on the research 
strategy and method employed in this dissertation. At the country level, I have selected 
Poland and Hungary as my case studies. While I do not conduct a cross-country 
comparison, selecting two countries ensures that any findings are not just a coincidence. 
At the corruption case level, I systematically selected six cases in Poland and five in 
Hungary according to three criteria: involvement of a politically exposed person, the 
business sectors the corruption case occurs in, and the time period. Specifically, I paired 
corruption cases based on having taken place in a shared sector, but at different points in 
time. Now, to examine how corruption patterns have transformed over time in Poland 
and Hungary, I categorized each of the selected corruption cases according to their types 
of corruption. Because I have paired the corruption cases based on a shared sector but 
having occurred at various points in time, I was able to investigate whether any change 
in the type of corruption took place over time. While I have found few signs of a 
transformation in the types of corruption in Poland, the findings for Hungary showed 
support for my argument. Table 6.14 illustrates the selected pairs of corruption cases for 
each country and their identified types of corruption.  
                                                        
159 I distinguished between legal corruption, local capture, and covert party financing types of corruption. In 
chapter 2, I described in detail the three main types of corruption that I expected to observe in the selected 
cases and the causal attributes of each type as well as the most common corrupt activities that lead to them. 
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Table 6.14: Selected corruption cases and their types of corruption in Poland & Hungary 
 
Name Period Sector Type of Corruption 
Poland 
Pair 1 
Concession for Polsat 1994 Arts & 
Entertainment 
Legal Corruption 
Rywingate 2002 Legal Corruption 
Pair 2 
Afera Automatowa 2002-2003 
Gambling 
Legal Corruption 
Afera Hazardowa 2008-2009 Legal Corruption 
Pair 3 
Afera InterAms 1994-1995 
IT 
Local Capture 
Infoafera 2008-2010 Local Capture 
Hungary 
Pair 1 
Tocsik Affair 1996 
Real Estate 
Covert political Financing 
Hunvald Case 2003-2004 Local Capture 
Pair 2 
BKV/ Metro 4 2003-2006 
Construction 
Local Capture 
Rise of Lajos Simickaa 1990-2010 Covert Political 
Financing; Local Capture 
Pair 3b Energol Kft 1993-1995 Energy Covert Political Financing 
Note: The names of corruption cases generally come from its most prominent actor(s) involved or another 
striking characteristic. Unless otherwise noted, I have kept the name of the corruption case with which it is 
commonly referred to. 
aThe case of Lajos Simicka, who for a long time had been a close associate of Hungary’s current Prime 
Minister Victor Orbán, presents two types of corruption as the duration of their relationships allowed me to 
explore a change in the resource distribution between actors. 
bThe final corruption pair in Hungary lacks a counterpart as there was not enough data for a third pairing. 
The case of Energol Kft., nevertheless, highlights the lack of variation in types of corruption across 
industries. 
In a second step, I then investigated why the emergence of competition in politics 
and the economy has transformed the corruption patterns. For this, I traced the type of 
corruption in the second case of each pair back to its causal factors, that is, the 
emergence of competition. Despite the early non-findings in the case of Poland, each of 
the analyzed corruption cases supports the proposed causal mechanism. I have found 
that the emergence of political and economic competition changed the opportunity 
structures of actors in favor of corruption. Political and economic actors faced powerful 
incentives for and few constraints against engaging in corruption. Moreover, the new 
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constellation of incentives and constraints encouraged them to enter into corrupt state-
business relationships. Crucially, I found that based on the resource distribution within 
these corrupt state-business relationships, a specific type of corruption emerges—local 
capture when both sides share concentrated resources that allow them to balance each 
other out, legal corruption when a fragmented political actor is confronted with a strong 
economic actor, and covert political financing when a weak economic actor faces a strong 
political actor. 
At its core, the corruption case studies on the micro-causal mechanisms that link 
the emergence of competition in the political and economic domain to the 
transformation of corruption patterns uncover three points that challenge our existing 
understanding of corruption and anti-corruption. First, I find no signs of a variation in 
corruption type across industries, despite covering a wide range of business sectors 
(visible in table 6.14). This contradicts the findings of previous studies that have argued 
that certain industries are particularly prone to corruption, such as real estate and 
construction. Based on my findings, I suggest that instead of a particular sector having a 
higher risk of corruption, the sectors foster a particular resource distribution within the 
state-business relationships, which results in the observed corruption. 
Second, by investigating the resource distribution within a corrupt state-business 
relationship, I was able to explain how the emergence of a particular type of corruption is 
not a random coincidence, or the result of a particular sector, but shaped by the 
concentration of resources that each actor has. I found that political actors with a large 
share of legislative control and/or other ways to control the distribution of state assets 
can leverage such resource in their interactions with an economic actor. Economic 
actors, in contrast draw their power from their market shares as well as prior political 
connections, both resources that allow them to counter the pressure stemming from a 
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strong political actor. Such a finding significantly updates our knowledge about the 
variations in the kinds of corruption that can emerge as well as the underlying causal 
mechanism that results in such variation. 
Third, the corruption cases also illustrate vividly how corrupt actors are able to 
deactivate or otherwise subvert control mechanisms in place to counter exactly such 
malfeasance. Specifically, I find that despite the existence of a few strong entities that 
could deter corrupt actors, they alone are not enough. I interpret these findings as 
evidence that an anti-corruption mechanism is largely ineffective if not integrated into a 
broader anti-corruption system. In other words, an anti-corruption mechanism does not 
exist in a vacuum but is part of a larger system, and the entire anti-corruption system is 
just as strong as its weakest link. 
In addition to the theoretical contributions described above, the dissertation also 
advances our methodological approach for causal process tracing and contributes to 
improving anti-corruption policies. To examine a subject that thrives in the dark and for 
which reliable data is hard to find, I have refined causal process-tracing to allow for a 
systematic assessment of the proposed causal mechanism. Specifically, in chapter 2, I 
outlined the expected causal mechanism before unpacking it in its three main 
components, labeled causal claim 1, 2, and 3. In chapter 3, I operationalized these causal 
claims by clearly stating what I expect to observe, if the causal mechanism took place as 
expected, as well as describing the two criteria160 that I used to assess the inferential 
weight of the evidence. In chapters 4 and 5, I then tested each proposition by clearly 
                                                        
160 Evidence was evaluated based on measurement accuracy and degree of uniqueness. Measurement 
accuracy assessed how well the evidence addressed the proposition and the reliability of the sources. Its 
values range from strong, to moderate, to weak. Uniqueness assessed how unique the observations are, that 
is, whether there exists some other plausible alternative explanation for the presented observations. 
Evidence was either direct, if no other plausible alternative explanation existed, or indirect, in case plausible 
alternative explanation existed or the evidence required additional conjectures. 
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presenting the relevant observations, before drawing any inferences from them. This 
approach also allowed me to assess the support the sum of observations provided for 
each proposition, the larger causal claim, and thus the complete causal mechanism. 
While this approach is cumbersome, detail-oriented, and requires patience on the side of 
the reader, it also clearly lays out all data points that have been used to assess the 
theorized causal mechanism. The research thus adds to the ongoing debate on how to 
strengthen analytical transparency in qualitative methods.  
The findings in this dissertation also have two major implications for 
policymakers. First, as the case of Hungary illustrates, the decline of one type of 
corruption does not imply that corruption in general is in decline. Instead, it suggests 
that corruption transformed into another type. Corruption is not only a multi-causal 
phenomenon, but also a multi-faceted one, which constantly adapts to changes in its 
environment. Second, placing one’s hope about eliminating corruption into a single anti-
corruption mechanism will ultimately lead to a bad wake-up. All of the here investigated 
cases took place in systems where a number of deterrents existed; in some instances, the 
corrupt actors even faced a strong anti-corruption agency. However, in all of the cases 
investigated, the corrupt actors managed to deactivate or otherwise subvert the 
effectiveness of these control mechanisms by exploiting the weaknesses in the anti-
corruption system. Hence, the entire anti-corruption system is only as strong as its 
weakest link in the chain. With this knowledge in hand, policymakers are better able to 
allocate their scarce resources in an appropriate manner. 
While the study has favored a deeper understanding of a few corruption cases at 
the expense of a more generalizable theory, it nevertheless only covered a fraction of the 
cases in the countries of Central Europe. Analyzing eleven corruption cases, regardless of 
how strong the evidence in favor of the proposed causal mechanism is, does not present 
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a definitive test for the argument. I do, however, provide a much deeper study of the 
politics and economics of corruption than has previously existed. To corroborate the 
findings, future research would benefit from expanding the universe of contexts in which 
the theory has been tested. In particular, scholars should consider the case of weak 
political actors and weak economic actors as my theorizing did not extend into this 
category. 
 Finally, the findings of my dissertation also shed light on recent troublesome 
trends in Poland. As party consolidation slowly took place in Poland, the political actors 
have been able to overcome the institutional elements that kept them in a weaker 
position relative to the economic actors and accumulate political resources. And while 
social scientists largely view this as a positive development, my theory suggests that this 
represents a move away from ‘legal corruption’ towards a ‘local capture’ type of 
corruption - where strong political actors meet strong economic actors. In line with my 
argument, Poland’s far-right party ‘Law and Justice’ has made several steps towards 
capturing the state since it won a clear majority in the 2015 parliamentary elections. Two 
of the party’s more outrageous acts have been the introduction a constitutional 
referendum that would have threatened judicial independence if it had not been vetoed 
by President Duda after massive public protests and threats from the EU. But the party 
did succeed in bringing the public media, for a majority of Poles still the main source of 
news, under more direct government control. This episode shows that while I have 
advanced our understanding of corruption’s causes by unpacking its underlying micro-
mechanisms that shape the type of corruption that emerges, we still have a long way to 
go in finding effective policy solutions to minimize it. 
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